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Single-name credit default swaps (“CDSs”) are derivatives based on the credit risk of a 
single borrower such as a corporation or sovereign. Although the single-name CDS market 
expanded rapidly during the period of loose monetary policy and expanding credit from 2002 
through 2007, its growth began to slow after the global credit crisis and during the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 2011, after which the single-name CDS market began to 
contract. In recent years and despite deliberate efforts by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (“ISDA”) and market participants on both the buy and sell sides, the single-name 
CDS market shifted from stagnating growth to an actual contraction and has shrunk substantially. 
At its high-water mark in June 2011, the total notional amount outstanding on single-name CDSs 
based on corporate and sovereign borrowers was $15.4 trillion. By June 2015, notional 
outstanding had collapsed to $6 trillion – i.e., a contraction of 61 percent over four years.  
Several possible reasons may explain the recent decline in single-name CDS activity. 
One possibility is that the current environment of relatively low interest rates and default rates 
has reduced the demand for hedging and synthetic bond investments (a.k.a. taking a position on 
the credit risk of a borrower) using CDSs. Another oft-cited potential explanation for the post-
2011 contraction in the single-name CDS market is the panoply of changes to the global 
financial regulatory framework, such as margin and capital requirements on cleared and non-
cleared swaps and the ban in the E.U. on short selling using sovereign CDSs. Such regulatory 
changes have already reportedly raised costs and decreased demand for single-name CDSs (or 
for hedging entity-specific credit risk altogether) even though many regulatory initiatives have 
still not been implemented in final form.  
Some skeptics of single-name CDSs believe that the products themselves may have been 
defective prior to some of the reforms undertaken following the credit crisis and Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, despite any significant evidence, a few commentators maintain that 
CDSs were either a cause or significant source of amplification for the credit crisis that migrated 
from U.S. subprime and leveraged finance markets to the global credit system beginning in 
August 2007.  
To provide a more widespread and better understanding of the benefits and costs of 
single-name CDSs, we were commissioned by ISDA to prepare a review of the empirical 
academic literature on these products. Specifically, we restricted our review to single-name 
CDSs based on corporate and sovereign borrowers and did not consider the research on multi-
name and/or index CDSs, loan CDSs, or CDSs based on asset-backed securities. The scope of 
our review included empirical research published in peer-reviewed academic journals, quasi-
academic/trade journals with largely academic editorial boards, and working papers distributed 
through the Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”), universities, and the research divisions 
of financial regulators (e.g., the Bank for International Settlements, European Central Bank, and 
Federal Reserve). Our review did not include a survey of industry research, articles in industry 
and trade magazines or journals, and mainstream media publications. Although we have made 
every effort to be comprehensive and reviewed more than 260 empirical studies, comprehensive 
is not synonymous with exhaustive, and we offer our apologies for any research we might have 
missed.  
To frame our literature review and analysis, we considered four major subject areas into 




(a) The informational content and determinants of single-name CDS spreads;  
(b) Implications of single-name CDS trading for lenders and reference entity borrowers;  
(c) Relations between single-name CDS markets and related debt and equity markets; and  
(d) Single-name CDSs, interconnectedness, and systemic risk.  
 
In the four sections below, we summarize 15 conclusions that we reached from our review of the 
empirical literature in these four topic areas. 
A. Informational Content and Empirical Determinants of Single-Name CDS Spreads 
1. Single-name CDS spreads contain valuable information about the probability and 
severity of adverse credit events that the underlying reference entity may experience 
during the life of the CDS. 
Significant empirical evidence indicates that CDS spreads and/or changes in spreads 
contain information that can be used to estimate the probability of future adverse credit events at 
the underlying reference entity, as well as market participants’ expectations about recovery rates 
and loss given default. We did not identify any evidence in our review that the connection 
between CDS spreads and the information they reflect about reference entities has become 
weaker during the recent years in which CDS activity has declined. The informational content of 
CDS spreads thus remains significant, which is essential for single-name CDSs to be useful 
credit risk transfer mechanisms.  
2. Single-name CDS spreads reflect a risk premium that protection sellers demand to 
compensate them for reference entity-specific and systematic risks (both credit-related 
and non-credit-related). 
One of the largest bodies of empirical academic research on single-name CDSs concerns 
the risk premium reflected in CDS spreads. Part of this risk premium is related to the credit risk 
of the reference entity. Specifically, CDS spreads reflect expected credit losses but also include a 
risk premium demanded by protection sellers to compensate for the risk of unexpected losses and 
changes in recovery rates.  
The academic literature also identifies the following additional determinants of the risk 
premium reflected in single-name CDS spreads: volatility of the reference entity’s equity price; 
leverage of the underlying reference entity; liquidity risk for the cash bonds of the reference 
entity and a market-wide liquidity risk factor; market-wide investor sentiment and risk aversion; 
and macroeconomic conditions. For CDSs with restructuring specified as a credit event, 
protection sellers demand additional compensation for bearing restructuring risk. For sovereign 
borrowers, moreover, both national and global macroeconomic conditions impact CDS spreads. 
3. Single-name CDS spreads are anticipatory and contain information regarding future 
announcements about the credit risk and financial condition of the underlying reference 
entity. 
Using the time-honored and well-established “event study” methodology in financial 
economics, abnormal single-name CDS spreads (i.e., single-name spreads in excess of spreads 
on a relevant index or basket) are found to provide information about credit events before such 




particular, significant evidence indicates that CDS spreads reflect negative actions by credit 
rating agencies, including downgrades, reviews for downgrades, and negative outlooks prior to 
the rating action. Interestingly, there is little evidence to indicate that single-name CDS spreads 
anticipate positive actions by credit rating agencies.  
CDS spreads also provide anticipatory information about events other than rating actions. 
For example, studies have found that single-name CDS spreads anticipate both earnings and 
dividend announcements or surprises and can be used to analyze both the anticipation and impact 
of public policy announcements (e.g., government bailouts of banks and sovereign rescue 
packages).  
B. Implications of Single-Name CDS Availability for Lenders and Reference Entity 
Borrowers 
4. Single-name CDSs are used by financial institutions to achieve their desired risk/return 
profiles and commercial objectives. Little empirical evidence supports the often-voiced 
belief that banks’ usage of single-name CDSs translates into more aggressive and riskier 
lending decisions. 
Some have expressed concerns that the availability of single-name CDSs can give rise to 
moral hazard and incentivize banks to make riskier lending decisions. Single-name CDSs are not 
the sole means by which banks manage their credit exposures. In addition to purchasing credit 
protection through CDSs, lenders also have other choices such as syndicating loans in the 
primary market or selling loans or loan participations on the secondary market. Loan sales 
combined with securitizations can transfer all but the first-loss exposure of a loan portfolio to 
investors in other financial instruments like collateralized loan obligations.  
The literature on how banks use single-name CDSs is somewhat ambiguous. Some 
research indicates that banks use CDSs primarily in their capacity as dealers and rely more 
heavily on loan syndications, sales, and securitization for credit risk management. Other studies 
indicate that single-name CDSs are an efficient means of hedging credit risk, especially for loans 
to high-quality borrowers for which monitoring costs are high. Yet, further research indicates 
that some banks and insurance companies are net sellers of credit protection and use CDSs 
primarily to generate income as compensation for deliberately and selectively assuming credit 
risk. Lead arrangers in loan syndicates also tend to be net sellers of CDS protection to other 
syndicate members to mitigate concerns about moral hazard in the syndication process.  
The main conclusion thus seems to be that banks use single-name CDSs to help achieve 
their desired risk/return profile and commercial objectives. Because of the bank-specific nature 
of risk, return, and commercial objectives, it is not entirely surprising that banks use single-name 
CDSs to help accomplish their goals as efficiently as possible, the implication of which varies 
from bank to bank given their different and sometimes disparate goals. This evidence supports 
other academic research showing that firms’ uses of non-credit derivatives also depends on their 
specific risk management objectives and cannot easily be generalized across groups of firms 




5. The empirical evidence is mixed regarding the impact of bank CDS usage on the ongoing 
monitoring of the credit risks of their borrowers.  
Another potential concern with CDSs is that bank hedging with single-name CDSs could 
attenuate banks’ incentives to engage in costly monitoring of borrower credit risks. As noted in 
the summary for Conclusion 4, there is some evidence that single-name CDS hedging is indeed 
more popular for loans to borrowers with high monitoring costs. Less monitoring for such 
borrowers, however, is not necessarily commensurate with higher risks. If high monitoring costs 
lead to less bank monitoring regardless of the availability of CDSs then public monitoring of 
borrowers through CDS spreads (which aggregate all market participants’ expectations) could on 
net provide more discipline on borrowers. To the extent that borrowers with higher monitoring 
costs are also higher quality and lower risk, any increases in borrower risk that result from 
reduced monitoring may be insignificant at the margin.  
The literature reveals different results for passive and active monitoring of bank 
borrowers. An example of passive monitoring is the use of loan covenants – i.e., pre-emptive 
restrictions on borrowers that prevent them from undertaking certain activities that increase their 
credit risks – whereas examples of active monitoring include ongoing reviews of borrowers’ 
financial statements, interviews with senior management, and the like. Some of the empirical 
research indicates that borrowers with traded CDSs engage in less conservative financial 
reporting and are subject to more restrictive covenants, or increased passive monitoring. The 
research also indicates that certain lenders – especially lead arrangers in bank loan syndicates – 
engage in more scrupulous active monitoring prior to the introduction of CDSs and engage in 
fewer CDS credit protection purchases (and perhaps even engage in CDS protection sales to 
other syndicate members on their reference entity borrowers) after the introduction of single-
name CDSs. 
On the whole, the empirical evidence indicates that the impact of single-name CDSs on 
banks’ borrower credit monitoring depends on how banks use the CDSs. For protection buyers, 
there is some evidence of reduced monitoring of borrowers underlying the banks’ CDS 
protection purchases. For CDS protection sellers, the evidence suggests – together with the 
regular pro rata allocation of syndicated loan facilities – that lead arrangers have adequate (and 
perhaps even stronger-than-usual) incentives to engage in diligent ongoing borrower monitoring. 
6. Single-name CDSs positively impact the supply of credit to borrowers that are reference 
entities underlying traded CDSs.  
The impact of the availability of CDSs on the supply of credit to reference entities 
underlying those traded CDSs tends to be positive. Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that the 
introduction of single-name CDSs is associated with increased extensions of credit to reference 
entities. Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014) find that banks which report open CDS positions in their 
financial statements actively use single-name CDSs to extend more credit, make larger loans in 
general, and are more likely to extend larger loans to reference entities underlying traded single-
name CDSs. 
A slightly more ambiguous story is told by the data analyzed in Hirtle (2009), who finds 
that the impact of CDS trading on reference entity credit supply depends on the type of borrower 
and loan facility. Specifically, for relatively larger and lower-risk firms, CDS trading is 




CDSs appears to have little or no impact on loan commitments or bank lending through small 
term loans and to small borrowers. (Hirtle, 2009) Unlike some of the other studies, however, 
Hirtle (2009) only analyzes the impact of CDSs on bank loans, whereas studies such as Saretto 
and Tookes (2013) find that the introduction of CDSs primarily increases the availability of 
credit to reference entity borrowers through increased corporate bond issuance.  
7. The impact of single-name CDSs on the cost of credit to borrowers that are reference 
entities underlying traded CDSs depends on the characteristics of the borrowers and 
whether or not the credit spread is fixed or indexed to CDS spreads.   
Several empirical studies have documented different impacts of the introduction of 
single-name CDSs on reference entities’ borrowing costs. In general, the availability of single-
name CDSs tends to lower borrowing costs for corporate and sovereign reference entities which 
are informationally transparent and relatively low-risk, whereas borrowing costs can rise after 
the introduction of single-name CDSs for relatively more opaque and higher-risk corporates and 
sovereigns. (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Ismailescu and Phillips, 2015) Norden, Buston, and 
Wagner (2014) find, moreover, that banks using single-name CDSs for hedging realize benefits 
and cost savings that they pass along to borrowers in the form of lower funding costs, and that 
banks using CDSs exhibited smaller losses and a more stable supply of loans during the credit 
crisis. For large corporate borrowers, the evidence indicates that, although the availability of 
credit and the size of loan facilities are higher after the introduction of CDSs, the increased credit 
supply is accompanied by higher borrowing costs at banks that actively hedge using single-name 
CDSs. (Hirtle, 2009; Shan, Tang, and Yan, 2014)  
The introduction of CDSs is also associated with an increase in the maturity of term loan 
facilities. (Hirtle, 2009; Saretto and Tookes, 2013) Although maturity is a non-price term of bank 
credit facilities, borrowers often consider longer-term debt more desirable – especially for 
relatively more opaque firms that expect a deterioration in their credit rating. In this sense, the 
impact of listing CDSs on the maturity structure of borrowers’ debt may also be beneficial for 
certain borrowers. 
The impact of traded single-name CDSs on borrowing costs for reference entities 
underlying traded single-name CDSs is also affected by whether or not the loan facilities specify 
a credit spread (over a base floating rate like LIBOR) that is indexed to the borrower’s CDS 
spread. CDS-indexed loans are known as market-based loans, and the empirical evidence 
indicates that the borrowing cost on market-based loans are lower than on similar loans priced 
with fixed credit spreads, both at origination and over the lives of the loans. (Ivanov, Santos, and 
Vo, 2016) 
8. The availability of traded single-name CDSs can influence the capital structure and 
corporate financing decisions of reference entity borrowers. 
Some research is available that examines the impact of single-name CDS trading on the 
capital structure and financing decisions of reference entities underlying traded CDSs. As noted 
in Conclusion 7, the introduction of CDSs enables at least some firms to have greater access to 
longer-dated term loans and longer-maturity bonds, thus indicating an impact of CDSs on the 
debt maturity structure of reference entity borrowers. Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that, even 
for firms with similar credit ratings, borrowers that are reference entities underlying traded CDSs 




Danis and Gamba (2016) analyze how the onset of CDS trading affects a firm’s trade-offs 
between investment, equity financing, and debt financing. The authors find that the initiation of 
CDS trading is associated with increases in the reference entity’s leverage and investment but 
has no appreciable impact on its borrowing costs.  
9. The existence of creditors with hedged exposures to borrowers (so-called “empty 
creditors”) and the amount of hedged credit have ambiguous implications for the 
bankruptcy decisions of single-name CDS reference entities.  
A frequent criticism of single-name CDSs is that lenders to a reference entity can use 
CDSs to eliminate their ongoing credit exposures to borrowers but retain their control rights in 
debt renegotiations, restructurings, and bankruptcy determinations. This “empty creditor 
hypothesis” holds that such hedged creditors have incentives to force reference entity borrowers 
into bankruptcy prematurely even when a restructuring or out-of-court debt renegotiation would 
better preserve the long-term value of the firm. (Hu and Black, 2008a, 2008b) 
Several studies report empirical results that support the negative implications of the 
empty creditor hypothesis for firms with traded single-name CDSs. Specifically, some empirical 
research indicates that reference entities exhibit higher probabilities of default and/or more 
frequent bankruptcy filings after the beginning of single-name CDS trading. (Peristiani and 
Savino, 2011; Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014) In addition, some research indicates that 
borrowers with significant amounts of hedged creditors may also face higher borrowing costs. 
(Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 2014)  
Other research indicates that whether or not empty creditors lead to suboptimal 
bankruptcy filing decisions, the existence of hedged creditors can have an ex-ante beneficial 
impact on a reference entity’s borrowing costs and debt capacity. Specifically, the presence of 
hedged creditors with relatively greater bargaining power in debt renegotiations can discourage 
borrowers from engaging in so-called strategic defaults (i.e., situations in which a firm has 
sufficient cash to service its debt but attempts to renegotiate the debt to divert cash to other uses). 
(See, e.g., Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2016).) Shan, Tang, 
and Winton (2014) find support for the hypothesis that CDS protection purchases mitigate 
incentives for borrowers to engage in strategic defaults. Their empirical analysis shows that 
lenders loosen loan covenants after the introduction of CDS trading and that (consistent with the 
related empirical literature) the relaxation of loan covenants is more pronounced for firms with 
relatively more transparent financial statements and relatively lower perceived default risks.  
Altman and Karlin (2009), moreover, present information that is at odds with the 
predictions of the empty creditor hypothesis. Specifically, they find that the number of 
restructuring events (as a percentage of default events) between 1984 and 2009 increased 
significantly after 2003 when a ISDA made a major revision in its Credit Derivatives Definitions 
and when single-name CDS market activity was on the rise. The correlation between the 
frequency of adverse credit events and restructurings (as opposed to bankruptcy filings), 
moreover, is nine percent over the whole sample period but jumped to 90 percent after 2003. 
Because the empty creditor hypothesis implies a larger number of bankruptcies and a lower 
correlation between adverse credit events and out-of-court restructurings following the 
introduction of single-name CDS trading, the evidence calls into question the negative 
implications of the empty creditor hypothesis. (Mengle, 2009) Nevertheless, the authors do not 




C. Relations between Single-name CDSs and Related Markets 
10. Single-name CDSs are the primary markets for price discovery when compared to 
corporate bonds and often also lead equity markets in processing new information about 
underlying reference entities. 
Price discovery is the process by which trading incorporates new information and market 
participants’ expectations into asset prices. The relatively low transaction costs and higher 
market liquidity of many derivatives markets relative to their corresponding underlying cash 
markets generally result in new information about assets being reflected in derivatives prices 
first. Single-name CDSs are no exception, at least for CDSs with corporate reference entities. 
The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that single-name CDSs 
lead corporate bonds in price discovery, which is not surprising given the illiquidity in cash 
corporate bonds relative to single-name CDSs. The results are more ambiguous when CDSs are 
compared to equities, partly because the empirical evidence is more sample-specific. In 
particular, single-name CDSs and equities are at times both primary price discovery markets, 
with the informational dominance often switching depending on whether market conditions are 
stable or stressed (although the research is at odds as to which of the two markets dominate 
during stressed periods). The informational dominance of CDSs vs. equities also seems to vary 
between U.S. and European samples, which may indicate the different regulatory costs and levels 
of transparency in these jurisdictions. 
The empirical results are also ambiguous concerning where price discovery happens for 
sovereign credit risk. Whether the sovereign debt or sovereign CDS market dominates depends 
on the country, the nature of the underlying information being processed, and in some cases the 
sample period. 
11. The introduction of single-name CDS trading has adverse impacts on the liquidity of 
related debt and equity markets, at least initially. 
After the inception of single-name CDS trading, large institutional traders migrate from 
corporate bonds to single-name CDSs. As a result, corporate bond market trading volume 
declines and bid-ask spreads rise. The empirical research also suggests that equity markets 
become less liquid (in terms of reduced volume and higher spreads) and more volatile after the 
introduction of single-name CDS trading, especially for firms in distress.  
Some evidence suggests, however, that the adverse impact on cash market volume and 
volatility is limited to the short term after the introduction of single-name CDSs. Given the 
valuable information conveyed by CDS spreads, the quality of overall public information about 
the credit risk of the underlying reference entity is generally improved by the introduction of 
CDSs. Some of the trading volume that migrated from cash markets into CDSs markets may 
flow back into cash markets, moreover, as inter-market arbitrage between CDSs and cash bonds 




12. Differences in credit spreads for the same reference entity observed in single-name CDSs 
and corporate bonds (the “CDS-bond basis”) are driven by differences in market 
liquidity, funding costs, counterparty risk, and the design of the financial products.  
In theory, the CDS-bond basis should be zero for par bonds. In reality, various economic 
and institutional factors can lead to a non-zero CDS-bond basis. The empirical evidence indicates 
that a positive basis (i.e., CDS spreads exceed bond spreads) is caused by some mixture of the 
value of the cheapest-to-deliver option held by protection buyers in physically settled CDSs, the 
issuance of new bonds by the reference entity, and the degree of any “specialness” on a bond 
eligible for physical delivery in a CDS in the repo market (i.e., a repo rate that deviates from the 
general collateral rate as a result of excess demand for the specific bond). A negative CDS-bond 
basis can arise, by contrast, as a result of illiquidity in the corporate bond market, counterparty 
risk in the CDS market (especially following the Lehman Brothers failure), and variables that 
inhibit inter-market arbitrage (e.g., funding constraints, margin requirements, and economic or 
regulatory capital constraints). The empirical evidence regarding the often-significant and 
persistent negative CDS-bond basis that occurred during the credit crisis is consistent with the 
importance of these variables and was especially influenced by funding constraints, margin 
requirements, and capital constraints. 
D. Single-Name CDSs, Interconnectedness, and Systemic Risk 
13. Single-name CDSs on corporate and banking reference entities are a source of 
interconnectedness and contain information that may be valuable to policy makers in 
measuring potential systemic risk. Yet, there is a dearth of empirical evidence to indicate 
that single-name CDSs are systemically de-stabilizing.  
Following the credit crisis, the academic literature on the quantitative measurement of 
interconnectedness across financial institutions and systemic risk has burgeoned. A large number 
of studies include information from single-name CDS spreads as inputs for computing these risk 
measures. CDS spreads are valuable for such purposes both because they convey useful 
information about credit risk and are themselves a source of interconnectedness on inter-dealer 
CDS transactions. 
Yet, no significant or persuasive empirical evidence in the academic literature supports 
the notion that single-name CDSs either caused the credit crisis or amplified shocks during the 
crisis, or are systemically de-stabilizing. Especially in light of the credit risk transfer benefits of 
single-name CDSs documented elsewhere in this review and the literature, a more realistic 
interpretation of the empirical evidence as a whole is that single-name CDSs help diversify 
default risk (especially for holders of corporate bonds), although it is unclear whether or not the 
parties to which default risk is being transferred are relatively more informed or financially 
stronger than the originators of such credit risks.  
14. Sovereign CDSs are significant transmission mechanisms for economic shocks but not a 
cause of those shocks. 
A significant amount of empirical literature analyzes the role played by sovereign CDSs 
in the transmission of both financial and macroeconomic shocks, and the academic research is 
consistent in finding that sovereign CDSs do give rise to linkages across sovereign credits. Yet, 




originating in peripheral or smaller countries are transmitted to large, core countries, whereas 
other evidence suggests the opposite or a bilaterally integrated feedback loop).  
The literature on sovereign CDSs and interconnectedness also investigates whether the 
shocks transmitted across sovereign credits during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis were 
primarily based on macroeconomic shocks in individual countries or a global common risk 
factor. Although not unambiguous, most empirical evidence suggests that the Eurozone crisis 
was driven both by changes in individual countries’ macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals and 
at least one common global factor that explains some of the co-movements in sovereign CDS 
spreads. 
15. A well-documented “sovereign-bank” loop exists in which the financial condition of the 
banking sector and sovereign credit risk are interconnected. Single-name CDS spreads 
for banks and sovereigns provide strong information that government bailout programs 
of banks significantly intensify this feedback loop. Although single-name CDSs do not 
appear to play a causal role in this feedback loop, sovereign CDS spreads can provide 
policy makers with valuable information about the characteristics of this feedback loop. 
When the financial condition of a national banking system deteriorates, government 
bailout programs and other public sector support can place fiscal strains on the sovereign’s credit 
and lead to heightened sovereign risk. Increased sovereign credit risk, in turn, reduces the value 
of sovereign debt (often held by local banks), calls into question the value of future government 
guarantees, and can jeopardize the sovereign’s credit rating, all of which place further downward 
pressure on the financial condition of the banking system. Empirical analyses of this sovereign-
bank loop often relies on the information contained in bank and sovereign single-name CDS 
spreads, and the evidence strongly supports that such a loop exists and is intensified in countries 





ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
ABCDS CDS Based on an Asset-Backed Security 
ABS Asset-Backed Securities  
APD Arbitrage-Pricing Difference  
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
bps basis points 
CAC Collective Action Clauses  
CBOT Chicago Board of Trade  
CCAR Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review  
CCP Central Counterparty 
CDO Collateralized Debt Obligation 
CDS Credit Default Swap 
CLO Collateralized Loan Obligation 
CSA Credit Support Annex 
CTD Cheapest-to-Deliver 
DC Determinations Committee 
ECB European Central Bank 
EDF Expected Default Frequency (usually associated with Moody’s KMV model) 
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility 
EMEA Europe, Middle East, and Africa  
EMIR European Market Infrastructure Regulation  
FINRA Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
FSOC Financial Stability Oversight Council 
FV Face Value 
ICE InterContinental Exchange  
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMM Initial Market Midpoint  
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
LBO Leveraged Buyout 
LCDS Loan CDS 
LGD Loss Given Default 
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate 
M&M Modigliani-Miller Proposition(s) 
NRAM Northern Rock Asset Management PLC 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAUG Pay As You Go  
PSI Private Sector Involvement (related to E.U. sovereign debt crisis) 
PPDM Primary Price Discovery Market 




RMV Recovery of Market Value 
SOE State-Owned Enterprise 
SRO Standard Reference Obligation 
SSRN Social Science Research Network  
TBTS Too Big to Save 





A. Background and Motivation 
Single-name credit default swaps (“CDSs”) are derivatives based on the credit risk of a 
borrower such as a corporation or sovereign. During the period of loose monetary policy and 
expanding credit from 2002 through 2007, single-name CDSs were actively traded and notional 
amounts outstanding grew at an unprecedented pace. The substantial growth of the single-name 
CDS market in this period reflected the popularity of market participants using CDSs to manage 
credit risk and/or take positions on the credit of borrowers during a period in which leverage was 
expanding dramatically. After the global credit crisis that erupted in August 2007 and expanded 
throughout 2008 (hereinafter, the “credit crisis”),1 followed by the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis from 2010-2012, single-name CDS market activity began to wane.2 In 2011, at the high 
water market for the single-name CDS market, the average weekly volume of single-name CDSs 
traded was $140 billion, as compared to an average weekly trading volume of $57 billion in 2016 
(i.e., a 60 percent contraction over the last five years).3  
A February 4, 2016, story in the Financial Times stated that single-name CDSs “are 
experiencing renewed growth after a long period of decline.”4 Yet, an article in the Financial 
Times just four months later stated that “[i]nvestors…have all but lost the ability to buy 
a…single-name credit default swap.”5 Such cognitive dissonance makes it difficult to assess the 
state of the single-name CDS market based solely on popular media accounts, and, indeed, the 
data indicates that neither of those two extremes is entirely accurate.  
Despite the recent portrayal by some of the single-name CDS market’s demise, there is 
little doubt that the market has shrunk appreciably and been plagued with its fair share of 
problems and controversy. Amongst the most frequently cited reasons for the decline in single-
name CDS activity since 2011 is the series of sweeping changes to the global financial 
regulatory framework that have been (and continue to be) implemented following the crisis. 
Three of the most significant changes that have impacted CDSs include the revised Basel Accord 
(i.e., Basel III), which significantly increases the capital costs of trading certain single-name 
CDSs, as well as the ban in the E.U. on short selling using CDSs (i.e., buying CDSs without 
owning an obligation of the reference entity), and the mandated clearing of some CDSs by 
central counterparties (“CCPs”) under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in the U.S. and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(“EMIR”) in the E.U. The first two regulatory reforms have had a decidedly chilling impact on 
                                                            
1 U.S. subprime mortgage lending markets were under pressure from at least 2005 onwards, and related subprime ABS markets were affected 
significantly beginning in February 2006. August 2007, however, is generally regarded as the time at which the mortgage crisis burgeoned into a 
more widespread credit crisis. See, e.g., Borio (2008), Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008), Mishkin, (2011), and Gorton and Metrick 
(2012). 
2 We discuss some of the reasons for the recent decline in single-name CDS activity in more detail below. 
3 J. Rennison and M. Childs, “Debt Traders Miss Credit Default Swaps as Losses Loom,” Financial Times (June 9, 2016). 
4 P. Stafford and J. Rennison, “Credit Default Swaps Activity Heats Up,” Financial Times (February 4, 2016).  




single-name CDS trading. In addition to regulatory changes, the relatively low default rate on 
corporate debt has also suppressed the demand for hedging credit risk. 
The third regulatory reform (i.e., mandated clearing) thus far only has applied to multi-
name CDS index products and has not had a direct impact on single-name CDSs as of the date of 
this publication. Nevertheless, the significant expansion of CCP capabilities and services to clear 
interest rate derivatives and CDSs subject to mandated clearing requirements under Dodd-Frank 
and EMIR has had an indirect benefit for single-name CDSs – i.e., significantly expanded 
opportunities for market participants to engage in the voluntary clearing of single-name CDSs. 
For example, a group of 25 major buy-side investment management firms committed in 
December 2015 to begin clearing their single-name CDS transactions through CCPs such as the 
InterContinental Exchange (“ICE”).6 In addition to the December 2015 buy-side initiative, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) has also undertaken various efforts to 
revitalize the single-name CDS market.7  
Another possible explanation for the decline in single-name CDS volume and notional 
amounts outstanding, of course, is that in their original form (i.e. before the implementation of 
new market practices), single-name CDSs might have been inherently defective.8 Some contend 
(despite a lack of any significant empirical evidence) that single-name CDSs “caused” the credit 
and Eurozone sovereign debt crises. As we discuss in Section II of this paper, some legitimate 
deficiencies in certain CDS documentation and market practices have been identified and 
addressed over time, but many of the more sweeping and often hyperbolic criticisms of single-
name CDSs are not supported by the empirical evidence.  
Although some of the issues and controversy surrounding single-name CDSs are 
subjective and qualitative, the majority of such issues are empirical and testable. Examples of 
empirical questions that can help explain the value (or lack thereof) of single-name CDSs include 
the following: 
• What information is contained in CDS spreads about the credit risk of the underlying borrowers? In 
particular, do single-name CDSs convey valuable information about the likelihood and severity of a 
borrower credit event in the future? 
• Do single-name CDSs enable banks to manage their credit risk more efficiently, or do they 
incentivize and facilitate additional bank risk-taking? 
• Does the availability of single-name CDSs to banks result in attenuated monitoring of the credit risks 
of their borrowers?  
• Do single-name CDSs impact the supply and cost of credit to borrowers on which CDSs are traded 
(or other borrowers in general), and, if so, what is the impact? 
• Does the ability for a lender to a reference entity to hedge its exposure with single-name CDSs give 
rise to “empty creditors” (i.e., creditors that eliminate their credit exposure to borrowers but retain 
their control rights), and, if so, do those empty creditors prematurely and inefficiently force ailing 
firms into bankruptcy instead of negotiating restructurings that would allow the reference entity to 
remain in operation?  
                                                            
6 Certain CDS index products are subject to mandatory clearing requirements, whereas single-name CDSs are not.   
7 See, e.g., J. Rennison, “ISDA Looks to Overhaul Single Name CDS,” Financial Times (May 20, 2015).  




• Do single-name CDS spreads lead or lag corresponding debt, equity, and options markets in 
processing and reflecting new information? 
• How has the introduction of single-name CDS trading impacted the volatility, liquidity, and 
informational efficiency of related equity, debt, and options markets? 
• What economic factors drive the difference between credit spreads for a reference entity as reflected 
in single-name CDSs compared to credit spreads implied by the entity’s cash bonds? 
• Are single-name CDSs a source of heightened interconnectedness and potential systemic risk in the 
banking and financial systems? 
• Do single-name CDS contain information that can be used by policy makers to improve their 
quantitative measurements of systemic interconnectedness? 
Since the advent of single-name CDS trading in the 1990s, a large academic literature has 
evolved that examines all of the above questions/issues and more. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide a survey of that literature and summarize the empirical evidence on single-name CDSs 
and the impact of single-name CDS trading on related markets in order to try and elucidate the 
true economic benefits and costs of these products. In addition, we review the mechanics of 
corporate and sovereign single-name CDSs, provide an overview of the markets in which they 
trade, and discuss the documentation and market practices governing the trading of these 
products. 
Interested readers are also directed to the CDS literature surveys by Augustin, 
Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014, 2016) (for CDSs in general) and Augustin (2014) (for 
sovereign CDSs).9 Although our paper has some obvious overlaps with these other surveys, we 
view our study as complementary to theirs and not as a substitute.   
B. Scope of Review 
1. Selection Criteria 
We attempt in this paper to be comprehensive and include all of the significant academic 
research on single-name CDSs. Comprehensive, however, is not synonymous with exhaustive. 
Given the substantial volume of research on single-name CDSs, we restricted our literature 
review along certain dimensions.  
First, we limited our survey of the literature to single-name CDSs based on corporate and 
sovereign borrowers. We therefore do not review any academic research on multi-name CDSs 
and/or index products,10 loan CDSs (“LCDSs”), or CDSs based on asset-backed securities 
(“ABCDSs”).  
Second, we only surveyed academic and research-oriented articles and papers. Our 
review covers articles published in peer-reviewed academic journals, quasi-academic/trade 
journals with largely academic editorial boards (e.g., the Journal of Fixed Income), and working 
papers distributed through the Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”), universities, and the 
                                                            
9 For more targeted surveys, see Das and Hanouna (2006) (emphasizing the literature on the difference between CDS spreads and credit spreads on 
bonds) and Griffin (2014) (emphasizing the relation between CDS spreads and accounting information). 
10 There are a handful of exceptions in which index data was included with single-name data and the results were not disaggregated. We only 




research divisions of financial regulators (e.g., the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”), 
the European Central Bank (“ECB”), and the Federal Reserve). Our review did not include a 
survey of industry research (e.g., bank research publications), articles in industry and trade 
magazines or journals, and mainstream media publications.11 
Third, our literature review is focused on empirical research involving single-name 
CDSs. The theoretical academic literature comprises an important part of CDS research as well, 
and a large such body of research exists and presents a range of theoretical models of various 
issues involving single-name CDSs. That literature, however, is beyond the scope of this review 
(except in a few specific instances in which theoretical papers played an important role in 
guiding empirical research). 
Given the extensive amount of academic research on single-name CDSs, it is likely that 
we have missed some working papers or publications that fall within the criteria defined above. 
If so, we offer our apologies to those authors in advance. In no case did we exclude any article 
based on its conclusions.  
2. Citation Style and Underlying Data Sources 
Throughout most of this review, we adopt a parenthetical citation style for the academic 
studies we reference. In other words, we cite the research we review using a reference style such 
as Smith (2012), which corresponds to a citation in the References section in Appendix A to a 
publication by Smith dated 2012. When one or more of the same authors have multiple 
publications in the same year, we note the references using lower-case letters (e.g., Smith 
(2012a, 2012b)). In certain situations throughout this review, we also cite non-academic 
publications and books (both by trade and academic publishers) for background purposes. In 
those cases, we provide a full citation to the article or book in footnotes but do not include them 
in the References appearing as Appendix A.  
All empirical studies involving single-name CDSs, moreover, are summarized in Table 7, 
which appears in Appendix C. Table 7 summarizes the nature of the underlying data samples on 
which authors relied to draw their conclusions. The information presented in Table 7 for all of 
the empirical studies we reference includes the sample period (i.e., dates over which the analysis 
was performed), the type of reference entity and sample size, the region(s) in which reference 
entities included by authors are located, the single-name CDS tenors reviewed in the studies, and 
the authors’ CDS-related data sources.  
C. Structure of the Paper 
Following this introduction, Section II of this review provides some institutional 
background on single-name CDSs as well as an overview of market activity in the single-name 
CDS space and a discussion of the primary, significant contract terms and trading conventions 
for single-name CDS products. Absent from Section II is any discussion of the academic 
literature on single-name CDSs with the single exception of a review of the literature on the 
performance of CDS auctions in Section II.B.5.(b). Readers already familiar with single-name 
CDS products, documentation, and market practices may wish to skip Section II. For other 
                                                            
11 Research produced by industry and distributed by financial institutions – as well as other trade literature – is often very high quality and 




readers, Section II is provided to give a comprehensive and self-contained introduction to single-
name CDS products and markets.   
In Section III, we review the potential economic benefits and costs of single-name CDSs. 
No empirical evidence is reviewed in this section, but our discussion sets the stage for the 
empirical issues we review throughout the remainder of the paper. In particular, the benefits and 
costs discussed in Section III are essentially the issues on which we concentrate in our review of 
the empirical literature in Sections IV through VII. 
Section IV reviews the academic literature on the informational content of CDS spreads. 
Specifically, we review the literature on the information contained in CDS spreads regarding 
default probabilities and loss-given-default (“LGD”) rates for the underlying reference entities. 
We also discuss how the literature decomposes CDS spreads into expected credit loss and risk 
premium components, where the latter is demanded by protection sellers to bear both unexpected 
credit risk and non-credit risks such as market liquidity risk. Finally in Section IV, we review 
how single-name CDS spreads and/or changes in those spreads can provide useful information 
regarding certain events and announcements related to underlying reference entities (e.g., ratings 
actions, earnings announcements, and public policy actions such as bail-out and bail-in 
initiatives).  
Section V summarizes the existing academic research on how the availability of single-
name CDSs impacts both lenders to reference entities underlying traded CDSs and the reference 
entities themselves. We specifically evaluate the literature on the influence of single-name CDSs 
on the availability and supply of credit to reference entities, reference entity borrowing costs, and 
the credit and credit risk management decisions of lenders.  
In Section VI of the paper, we review the academic literature on the relations between 
single-name CDSs and other related securities, including the bonds and equities issued by 
reference entities underlying single-name CDSs. In particular, we consider which market is the 
primary source of price discovery for the revelation of new information about the reference 
entities underlying single-name CDSs, the implications of the introduction of CDS trading on the 
liquidity and volatility of related bond and stock markets, and the difference between the credit 
spreads on a reference entity as reflected in single-name CDSs versus cash bonds issued by the 
same reference entities (i.e., the “CDS-bond basis”).  
Section VII reviews the academic literature on the systemic risk aspect of single-name 
CDSs. We specifically review the literature on single-name CDS cross-market correlations, how 
CDSs can give rise to interconnectedness across financial institutions, and how CDS spreads can 
be used to measure systemic interconnectedness, spillover effects, and relations between 
sovereign CDS spreads and the financial condition of local banking systems. 
We provide a brief summary and conclusion in Section VIII.  
This review includes three appendices. Appendix A contains the references to the 
academic literature cited within the body of the review. Our brief biographies as authors of this 
review are presented in Appendix B. Appendix C presents two additional tables that are too 
lengthy to insert in the text. (The numbering of these tables, however, is consistent with the order 
in which they are referenced in the text.) In particular, Table 3 in Appendix C presents a list of 
all single-name CDS auctions held from 2005 through May 2016. Table 7 in Appendix C 




surveyed. As is the case with any empirical research in financial economics, the inferences and 
conclusions drawn by the authors of the cited studies often depend on characteristics regarding 
the underlying data, including the sample period, product and geographical universe, and sample 
selection criteria, all of which define the data on which the various empirical studies and 
inferences are based. Reporting all of these details in the body of our text is both intractable and 
distracting. Accordingly, these details appear in Table 7 in Appendix C.  
D. Sponsorship of the Review and Disclaimers 
We were commissioned to prepare this review by ISDA. Since 1985, ISDA has engaged 
in various initiatives intended to ensure the safety and efficiency of global derivatives activities. 
ISDA’s significant accomplishments have included the following: developing the ISDA Master 
Agreements and other documentation materials; helping to ensure the enforceability of the 
netting and collateral provisions of the master agreements in multiple international jurisdictions 
(thereby significantly attenuating counterparty and legal risks); promoting industry-wide safe and 
sound risk management practices; engaging in an ongoing dialogue with various international 
and national legislators, regulators, and policymakers to promote the understanding of 
derivatives products and markets and to facilitate an appropriate and efficient regulatory 
framework for derivatives; increasing transparency for privately negotiated derivatives; and 
enhancing the industry’s operational infrastructure. At present, ISDA has over 850 member 
institutions from 67 countries that include banks (both regional and international), corporations, 
energy and commodities firms, government and supra-national entities, insurance companies, 
investment and asset managers, as well as organized financial exchanges, CCPs, repositories, law 
firms, accounting firms, and other service providers.  
ISDA provided us with an honorarium for our preparation of this review. In aggregate, 
however, our total research expenditures (e.g., purchases of articles and new subscriptions) 
exceeded our honorarium, and we collectively received no net compensation for preparing this 
review.  
Although this paper was commissioned, sponsored, and primarily distributed by ISDA, 
we prepared this study entirely independently, and none of our conclusions or interpretations of 
the literature we reviewed were influenced by ISDA directly or indirectly. The opinions 
expressed herein (along with any remaining errors) are ours alone and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of ISDA or any other organizations with which any of the authors of this review are 




II. BACKGROUND ON SINGLE-NAME CDSS 
In a typical CDS, a credit protection purchaser makes a series of fixed payments over the 
life of the contract (known as the coupon, spread, or premium) to the credit protection seller (i.e., 
the counterparty to the transaction) in exchange for a commitment by the protection seller to 
make a payment to the protection buyer following a specified adverse credit or triggering event. 
CDSs include single-name, portfolio, and index products.  
In a single-name CDS, the cash flows and value of the CDS is based on the credit risk of 
a single legal entity, such as a corporation, sovereign, or municipality.12 The legal entity on 
which a single-name CDS is based is known as the “reference name” or “reference entity.” 
Portfolio and index CDSs, by contrast, have multiple underlying reference entities and thus are 
known as “multi-name” CDSs. The most important features of single-name CDSs are discussed 
in the sections below as background for the remainder of this review. Although this paper is 
exclusively focused on single-name CDSs, some of the background discussion below includes 
data on multi-name CDSs, LCDSs, and ABCDSs for comparison purposes.  
A. The Composition of the CDS Market 
1. Aggregate CDS Market Activity 
Exhibit 1 shows semi-annual notional amounts of all types of CDSs outstanding with 
reporting dealers from 2010 through a bit more than the first half of 2015 (“2015H1”) by type – 
i.e., single- versus multi-name and, for multi-name CDSs, non-index versus index products. 
Exhibit 1 further indicates the percentage of single-name CDSs based on total CDS notional 
amounts outstanding. As is evident, the total notional amount of CDSs outstanding began to 
decline in 2011 and continued to contract through 2015H1. (Not shown on Exhibit 1 is that 
single-name CDS volumes have started rising since 2015H1.13) As Exhibit 1 also indicates, 
multi-name CDSs have experienced a relatively larger decline in notional amounts outstanding 
than single-name CDSs. 
                                                            
12 Other economic variables (e.g., liquidity and counterparty risk) may also impact the value of the cash flows on single-name CDSs, but the product 
is designed primarily to reflect changes in the credit quality of the underlying reference entity. 





Exhibit 1 and any other exhibits that show notional amounts of CDSs outstanding, 
however, must be interpreted with caution. Over the last decade, swap market participants have 
been increasingly reliant on portfolio compression services to eliminate redundant positions and 
reduce unnecessary credit exposures. In a typical portfolio compression service, participants 
submit trades to a compression service provider (e.g., Markit/Creditex or TriOptima), which then 
evaluates and compares potentially offsetting trades. Any identified offsetting trades are then 
terminated legally and voluntarily (assuming all involved counterparties agree) and replaced with 
economically equivalent bilateral trades. The net cash flows and risk exposures on the 
compressed bilateral trades are identical to the original portfolio, but the gross notional amounts 
and numbers of trades can be reduced significantly through this compression process.14 
The increased usage of portfolio compression services creates the false impression that 
the CDS market has contracted by more than the underlying data indicates. Especially for multi-
name CDS index products for which portfolio compression has been the most popular, some of 
the shrinkage in notional amounts in recent years (i.e., the red columns on Exhibit 1) is 
attributable to compression. Although the reductions in notional amounts outstanding for single-
name CDSs have been less significant than for CDS index products, such reductions have hardly 
been inconsequential. The compression service for single-name CDSs offered jointly by Markit 
                                                            






































































Exhibit 1: Notional Amounts Outstanding of CDS by Type, 2010 - 2015H1
Single-Name Multi-Name Index Multi-Name Non-Index % Single-Name




and Creditex, for example, reports a cumulative reduction in gross notional amounts of single-
name CDSs outstanding of $8.6 trillion as of February 2016.15  
Unfortunately, disentangling actual declines in market activity from the impact of 
portfolio compression on notional amounts outstanding is not easily accomplished given the 
proprietary nature of compression data at providers such as Markit/Creditex and TriOptima.16 
ISDA conducted a study in 2013, however, that sheds light on CDS compression activity in the 
2005-2012 period. The data compiled by ISDA from Markit/Creditex and TriOptima for that 
period is shown in Exhibit 2 along with total notional amounts of CDSs outstanding as reported 
by the BIS. The blue portions of the columns in Exhibit 2 reflect BIS reported totals, and the 
green portions reflect compressed trading volumes. Total reported notional amounts are also 
provided for 2013-2015 for comparison purposes.17 
 
                                                            
15 https://www.markit.com/Product/Compression (last visited February 1, 2016). 
16 We attempted to obtain compression statistics from the two leading CDS compression providers – TriOptima and Markit (now IHS Markit) – but 
were unable to do so.  
17 Care must be taken not to infer that the sum of the blue and green columns in Figure 2 represents what notional amounts would have been 
outstanding in the absence of compression. The green bars in Figure 2 show the amount compressed in each year, but, depending on the maturities 






























Exhibit 2: CDS Notional Amounts Outstanding and Compressed
Reported Compressed




2. Single-Name CDSs by Type of Underlying 
Single-name CDSs can be based on specific reference entities (e.g., corporates and 
sovereigns), as well as specific assets. In particular, CDSs based on asset-backed securities 
(“ABSs”), including commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities, are known as 
ABCDSs or structured finance CDSs.18 Similarly, single-name CDSs based on the syndicated 
loans of a single reference entity are known as LCDSs, as noted earlier.  
Exhibit 3 shows the weekly gross notional amounts outstanding in single-name corporate 
and sovereign CDSs as compared to single-name ABCDSs and single-name LCDSs from 
October 2008 through October 2015. As Exhibit 3 demonstrates, the market for single-name 
CDSs is orders of magnitude larger than the markets for ABCDSs and LCDSs. For the week 
ending October 9, 2009, when the ABCDS market was at its high water mark level, the gross 
notional amount of ABCDSs outstanding was still only one percent of the gross notional amount 
of single-name CDSs outstanding.  
 
Like Exhibits 1 and 2, Exhibit 3 shows a significant decline in gross notional amounts of 
all three types of CDSs in the period from October 2008 through October 2015. Single-name 
CDSs are still relatively significant (i.e., roughly $7.2 trillion in gross notional outstanding for 
the week ending October 16, 2015) despite the pronounced decline from earlier periods, whereas 
                                                            
18 The “reference name” for an ABCDS is not a well-defined concept because the ABSs on which the CDSs are based are issued by special purpose 






















































































































Exhibit 3: Weekly Gross Notional Amounts of Single-Name CDSs Outstanding by Collateral 
Type
10/31/08 - 10/16/15




the ABCDS and LCDS markets have significantly contracted or virtually disappeared 
(respectively) as of the publication of this review. 
B. Significant Contract Terms and Trading Conventions 
The terms of a single-name CDS transaction are set forth in a pro forma master 
agreement together with any supporting credit supplement and the confirmations of individual 
transactions executed pursuant to a governing master agreement and credit supplement. The 
ISDA master agreements and ISDA credit support annex (“CSA”) are the most common 
documentation for CDSs.  
The significant economic terms of a single-name CDS contract specified in the 
underlying documentation include the following: (1) identity of the underlying reference entity; 
(2) contract’s maturity and time to maturity (a.k.a. “tenor”); (3) required payments (amounts and 
dates) by the protection buyer to the protection seller; (4) credit events that give rise to an 
obligation from the protection seller to the protection buyer; (5) method of settlement for any 
obligation arising following the occurrence of a credit event; and (6) conditions that securities 
must satisfy to be deliverable under physically settled CDSs after a credit event. 
Beginning around 2004, market participants had already started to consider the 
practicability and desirability of clearing certain CDSs through CCPs in an effort to reduce 
counterparty-specific, bilateral credit and settlement risks.19 To accommodate potential CCP 
clearing of CDSs, market participants began an effort to standardize certain significant economic 
terms of CDS contracts. The ultimate result was a series of changes implemented by ISDA and 
major CDS market participants beginning in 2009, which resulted in a more homogenous and 
standardized CDS product. Those initiatives involved changes in CDS contracts, trading 
conventions, and clearing, and are henceforth collectively referred to as the “2009 
Standardization Initiatives.”  
The significant contract terms and trading conventions for single-name CDSs and the 
most significant standardizations in those terms and conventions following the 2009 
Standardization Initiatives are discussed in Sections II.B.1 through II.B.6 below. 
1. Reference Entity 
An important differentiating factor in the market activity for single-name CDSs is the 
type of reference entity underlying CDS contracts. A related and yet distinct way to view single-
name CDS market activity is to summarize outstanding notional amounts based not on the type 
of entity but rather on the risk of the underlying reference entity. The next two subsections 
summarize recent single-name CDS activity along those two related but distinct dimensions. 
a) Type of Reference Entity 
As noted earlier, single-name CDSs can be based on the credit risk of securities issued by 
corporations, as well as national, state, and local securities issuers and state-owned enterprises 
(“SOEs”). Exhibit 4 shows gross notional amounts outstanding of single-name CDSs from end-
August 2004 through end-August 2015 by type of reference entity as reported by the BIS. 
Specifically, the dark-blue bars show notional amounts outstanding of single-name CDSs based 
                                                            




on non-financial corporate reference names, whereas the light-blue bars reflect notional amounts 
outstanding for financial corporate issuers. The green bars reflect notional amounts outstanding 
of CDSs based on sovereign debt. The solid red line indicates the proportion of all single-name 
CDSs outstanding based on corporate reference entities over the time period. 
As Exhibit 4 demonstrates, single-name CDSs based on corporate debt accounted for 70 
to just over 90 percent of the total notional amount of single-name CDSs outstanding over the 
period (with the sole exception of 2005H2). CDSs based on non-financial corporate debt 
experienced a significant spike in activity in 2011H1, which is consistent with increased hedging 
activity in response to the significant uptick in corporate defaults at the time. Since then, 
although sovereign debt remains a smaller segment of the single-name CDS market, sovereign 
CDSs have accounted for an increasing proportion of single-name CDS notional amounts 
outstanding.  
 
In this paper, our focus is on corporate and sovereign single-name CDSs. We did not 
review the literature on ABCDSs and LCDSs for two reasons. First, the markets for those 
products have shrunk to negligible amounts outstanding, as previously mentioned. Second, for 
ABCDSs in particular, the underlying economic issues and product designs are very different 
from single-name CDSs based on corporate or sovereign reference entities.20 We also do not 
                                                            
20 In particular, ABCDSs are documented using the pay as you go (“PAUG”) template, which allows for bidirectional periodic payments between 
a protection buyer and seller. For example, a CDS based on a mortgage-backed security typically requires the protection seller to pay the buyer for 








































































Exhibit 4: Notional Amounts Outstanding of Single-Name CDSs by Reference Entity Type, 
2004H2 - 2015H1





specifically discuss single-name CDSs based on municipal, state, or SOE reference names 
because of their limited activity.  
Exhibit 5 shows gross notional amounts outstanding of single-name CDSs based on the 
two types of reference entities on which we focus in this paper. The data in Exhibit 5 shows 
weekly notional amounts outstanding from July 2010 through October 2015 based on data 
compiled by ISDA. Unlike the generally systematic decline in single-name CDSs based on 
corporate reference entities over this period, notional amounts of single-name CDSs referencing 
sovereigns grew steadily from 2010 through 2013, stabilized around a roughly flat trend briefly, 
and then began gradually to contract in June 2014. 
 
For the period from July 2010 and July 2012, Berg and Streiz (2016) analyzed trading 
volume for sovereign CDSs on a weekly basis across 57 sovereigns. They determined that the 
five largest CDS markets during that period (measured based on net notional amounts reported to 
the Depository Trust Clearing Corp.’s Swap Data Repository) were Italy, France, Germany, 
Brazil, and Spain.  
Table 1 offers a slightly different perspective on single-name CDS market activity from 
2010 through 2015. Specifically, Table 1 summarizes the trading volume (as opposed to notional 
                                                            
CDS, by contrast, payments always flow in one direction – i.e., spread payments from buyer to seller before the occurrence of a credit event, and 
the final settlement payment from seller to buyer following a credit event. Although single-name CDSs are distinct from insurance contracts, in this 
specific sense they are similar to insurance – i.e., policy holders are never required to pay insurance companies anything in excess of the 


































































































Exhibit 5: Weekly Gross Notional Amounts of Single-Name CDS Outstanding by Reference 






amounts outstanding) in single-name CDSs during this period. As Table 1 indicates, single-name 
CDS trading fluctuated significantly from 2010 through 2014, and, in 2015, experienced a 
significant contraction in trading volume. Average weekly total gross notional amounts traded, 
average weekly per-contract sizes, and average weekly numbers of contracts traded all declined 
dramatically in 2015 vis-à-vis earlier years. Perhaps even more noticeably, the average number 
of reference entities for which single-name CDSs were traded in 2015 (through October) 
declined by about 15 percent vis-à-vis 2014. 
Table 1: Single-Name CDS Weekly Trading Volume, 2010 – 2015 
 Average Weekly Gross 
Notional Amounts 
Traded 
Average Weekly Gross 
Notional Amounts 
Traded per Contract 
Average Number of 
Contracts Traded per 
Week 
Average Number of 
Reference Names 
Traded per Week 
2010a $163,730,798,396 $6,969,026 24,557 916 
2011 $140,736,862,010 $6,838,293 20,739 891 
2012 $119,469,924,526 $6,077,910 19,753 837 
2013 $130,771,184,639 $5,968,713 21,944 832 
2014 $140,771,099,264 $6,033,745 22,492 808 
2015b $71,116,517,756 $5,116,167 13,652 684 
SOURCE: ISDA    NOTES: a: 7/17/2010 – 12/31/2010  b: 1/1/2015 – 10/16/2015 
 
b) Credit Risk of Reference Entity 
 We can also analyze the composition of the single-name CDS market based on the 
relative risk of the underlying reference entity. To that end, Exhibit 6 summarizes the credit 
ratings of reference entities on which single-name CDSs were based for the semi-annual periods 
from end-December 2004 through end-August 2015.  
From 2004H2 through 2006H2, the proportion of single-name CDSs based on 
investment-grade borrowers (i.e., reference entities rated BBB-/Baa321 or above) declined 
significantly, even though actual notional amounts of CDSs on such entities rose from 2005 
through 2006H2. The reason was the explosive growth in single-name CDSs based on 
speculative-grade (i.e., BB+/Ba1 and below) and unrated borrowers through 2007. As Culp 
(2013) and Culp and Forrester (2013, 2015) explain, the increased demand for CDSs based on 
speculative-grade and unrated borrowers during this period was not indicative of increases in 
underlying default rates in speculative-grade firms borrowing in leveraged finance markets, but 
rather was largely driven by the demand from collateralized loan obligation (“CLO”) managers 
and high-yield bond funds to sell credit protection on leveraged debt during a period of low 
interest rates and credit spreads, which had fueled a significant leveraged buy-out boom at the 
time.22  
                                                            
21 The rating before the slash indicates the rating frameworks of Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, for which BBB- is the lowest investment-grade 
rating. The rating after the slash uses the lexicon from Moody’s Investors Service, for which Baa3 denotes the lowest investment-grade rating.  
22 A CLO is a structure in which a special-purpose entity issues tranched debt instruments to finance either the purchase of loans or the collateralized 







 In 2007H1 when instability in U.S. subprime mortgage markets first began to impact 
subprime mortgage-backed securities, total notional amounts of CDS protection sold on 
investment-grade entities began to rise, whereas total protection sold on unrated entities began to 
decline. As the mortgage crisis spilled over first into U.S. leveraged finance markets (as 
discussed in Culp (2013)) and, in August 2007, to broader global credit markets, total notional 
amounts of credit protection sold on unrated entities contracted dramatically and continued a 
slow and steady decline through the end of 2011. As of 2015H1, less than 10 percent of the 
single-name CDS notional amount outstanding was accounted for by unrated reference entities.  
2. Maturity/Tenor 
The maturity date of a CDS contract reflects the last date on which credit protection is in 
force for the counterparties. In other words, the maturity date of a CDS is the date on which the 
credit protection expires. The maturity of a CDS does not necessarily depend on the maturity of 
the securities issued by the reference entity, as discussed further in Section II.B.6 below.  
The tenor of a CDS contract is its time-to-maturity as of the initial trade date. Even 
before the 2009 Standardization Initiatives, most single-name CDS tenors were annual with the 
most popular tenor being five years. The calendar dates of CDS contract maturities were not 
formally standardized until the 2009 Standardization Initiatives, by which time the market 
standard had coalesced around CDS maturity dates of March 20th, June 20th, September 20th, and 
















































































Exhibit 6: Notional Amounts Outstanding of Single-Name CDSs by Reference Entity Rating, 
2004H2 - 2015H1





name CDS on reference entity XYZ Corp. with a trade date of February 17, 2016, would have a 
maturity date of March 20, 2017, under the 2009 Standardization Initiatives. 
Five years remains the most popular tenor for new CDS transactions. Exhibit 7 shows 
total gross notional amounts of CDS protection bought as of end-August and end-December 
from August 2004 through August 2015. The solid and dashed lines represent single- and multi-
name CDSs, respectively. The green, red, and blue lines represent times to maturity for the CDSs 
– i.e., one year or less, over one and up to five years, and greater than five years, respectively.  
 
As Exhibit 7 shows, CDSs with one to five years remaining to maturity have regularly 
accounted for the largest proportion of both single- and multi-name CDSs outstanding. CDSs of 
all types and tenors experienced declines in gross notional protection purchases beginning in 
2007H2 or 2008H1 (i.e., the outbreak of the credit crisis). During August 2011, gross notional 
amounts outstanding of short-term CDSs (with maturities of one year or less) began to exceed 
notional amounts outstanding for CDSs with more than five years to maturity, with the trend 
being more pronounced for single-name CDSs than for multi-name CDSs. Purchases of CDS 
protection for more than five years experienced the largest relative contraction in market activity. 
Exhibit 7 also demonstrates that from 2009H2 through 2013H1, the markets for multi-
name and single-name CDSs with times to maturity of over one year and up to five years (i.e., 
the medium-term tenor bucket) behaved rather differently. During that period, gross notional 
amounts outstanding of single-name CDS purchases in that tenor bucket declined steadily, 

































Exhibit 7: Gross Notional Amounts of CDS Protection Purchased by Type and Time to 
Maturity, 2004H1 - 2015H1
1 year or less Over 1 year and up to 5 years Over 5 years




gross notional amount of medium-term tenor single-name CDSs was only about four percent 
larger than protection purchased with multi-name CDSs in the same maturity bucket. From end-
August 2013 through end-August 2015, however, gross notional amounts of multi-name CDSs 
declined at a more rapid rate than gross notional amounts of single-name CDSs in the medium-
term tenor bucket. A similar phenomenon occurred from 2007H2 through 2009H2, when both 
single- and multi-name medium-term CDS notional amounts outstanding shrunk but with the 
latter contracting at a more rapid pace. 
3. Coupon/Spread 
In a single-name CDS, the credit protection purchaser must pay a contractually specified 
and fixed coupon (also known as a spread23) periodically over the life of the contract to the 
protection seller. In a fully customized market, the CDS coupon will be the spread over the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) that equates the discounted present value of coupon 
payments to the discounted expected payments from the protection seller following the 
occurrence of a credit event.  
The CDS coupon is fixed on the trade date and does not change over the life of the CDS 
contract. If the perceived credit risk of the reference entity changes over the life of the CDS 
contract – as it surely will, at least to some degree – then the value of that CDS and the mark-to-
market credit spread will fluctuate accordingly. For example, suppose a single-name CDS based 
on reference entity XYZ Corp. has a one-year tenor and a contractual coupon rate of 100 basis 
points (“bps”), which was at-market on the trade date.24 If XYZ Corp. is downgraded shortly into 
the life of the CDS, investors in a new CDS following the downgrade with a maturity date 
identical to the original CDS would require a higher coupon to compensate for the heightened 
perceived credit risk of XYZ Corp. – say, e.g., 125bps. With a then below-market contractual 
coupon rate of 100bps, the original CDS will trade below its par value.  
For standardized CDSs, coupon payments are made by protection buyers to sellers 
quarterly on March, June, September, and December 20th.25 CDS coupons are quoted on an 
annualized basis, and the actual payment amount is computed using the notional amount of the 
CDS contract and an Actual/360 day-count convention. The actual payment, moreover, is based 
on an accrual period that begins with the previous standardized coupon payment date and ends 
with the current coupon payment date minus one day (except for the last coupon payment which 
is based on an accrual through the final maturity date). If a credit protection buyer purchases 
CDS protection in the middle of a quarter, the first coupon payment is in arrears and based on an 
accrual period from the last standard coupon payment date (i.e., not the actual trade date). In 
other words, the protection buyer must pay for coverage from the previous standard coupon date 
even when the trade date occurs later. 
Consider, for example, the aforementioned one-year single-name CDS on XYZ Corp., 
and suppose that the counterparties agree on a February 17, 2016, trade date to a 100bp 
annualized coupon. The first coupon payment date is due on March 21, 2016 (i.e., the Monday 
                                                            
23 The term “spread” is used because the CDS spread is analogous to the spread over LIBOR on a floating-rate bond issued by the reference entity 
underlying the CDS.  
24 A basis point is equal to 1/100th of a percentage point. For example, 100bps is equivalent to one percentage point.  
25 Unless otherwise specified in the transaction documentation, if the 20th falls on a weekend or holiday, the payment is due on the first business 




following Sunday, March 20, 2016), and is based on an accrual period from Monday, December 
21, 2015 (i.e., the coupon payment date for the standard 2015Q4 coupon payment), through 
March 20, 2016 (i.e., the day before the 2016Q1 standard coupon payment date). The standard 
coupon dates and corresponding amounts payable by the protection buyer to the protection seller 
in this exemplar transaction (with an assumed notional amount of $25 million) are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Coupon Payments for a One-Year CDS on XYZ Corp. with a 100bp Coupon 
and $25mn Notional Amount 










1st Coupon 12/21/2015  3/20/2016  3/21/2016 90 $62,500  
2nd Coupon  3/21/2016  6/19/2016  6/20/2016 90 $62,500  
3rd Coupon  6/20/2016  9/19/2016  9/20/2016 91 $63,194  
4th Coupon  9/19/2016 12/19/2016 12/20/2016 91 $63,194  
5th Coupon 12/20/2016  3/20/2017  3/20/2017 90 $62,500  
 
Part of the 2009 Standardization Initiatives was an effort to shift CDSs toward standard 
coupon rates in order to promote the ease with which CDSs could be cleared by CCPs. These 
standard coupons vary by geographical region. For example, single-name CDSs based on North 
American corporate and sovereign reference entities generally have standard coupon rates of 
either 100bps or 500bps per annum for investment-grade and high-yield reference names, 
respectively.  
In practice, very few CDSs have at-market coupon rates of either exactly 100bps or 
500bps on their trade dates. As a result, credit protection buyers usually make upfront payments 
to protection sellers (or vice versa depending on whether the market credit spread is above or 
below the standard coupon rate) that reflect the difference in the discounted present values of 
cash flows on the CDS valued using the standard coupon rate and the current market-based rate, 
as well as any accrued coupons.26 
4. Credit Events 
The basic concept of a credit event – i.e., an adverse development to a reference entity’s 
financial condition that exposes its lenders to heightened credit risk – has not changed since 
single-name CDSs first began trading. The specific definitions of different scenarios that give 
rise to credit events (and the process by which determinations are made as to when credit events 
occur) are articulated in ISDA’s Credit Derivatives Definitions (“Definitions”). In response to 
various issues concerning the credit events experienced by specific reference entities and in the 
aftermath of the credit crisis, ISDA (in coordination with market participants) has made several 
significant revisions to its Credit Derivatives Definitions. We review the most important of these 
revisions in the sections below. 
                                                            
26 Market participants can also still negotiate a specific coupon rate by entering into two CDSs with different notional amounts that result in the 
desired blended coupon rate. For example, if a firm wishes to buy credit protection on XYZ Corp. at a 75bp coupon rate for one year, the firm can 
buy protection on a $15.9375 million notional amount at the standardized 100bp spread and simultaneously sell protection on a $937,500 notional 




a) The 1999 and 2003 Definitions 
The original 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions specified six types of credit 
events for single-name CDSs: 
• Bankruptcy: the reference entity becomes insolvent or admits in a regulatory, judicial, or 
administrative proceeding to its insolvency; 
• Obligation Acceleration: one or more obligations of the reference entity (with an aggregate amount in 
excess of a specified “Default Requirement” threshold) are due and payable before their scheduled 
payment date as a result of an event of default or default-like condition (excluding “Failure to Pay” 
events); 
• Obligation Default: one or more obligations of the reference entity (with an aggregate amount in 
excess of the Default Requirement) are capable of being declared due and payable before their 
scheduled payment date(s) as a result of an event of default or default-like condition; 
• Failure to Pay: the reference entity fails to make a required payment when and where it is due on one 
or more of its obligations (following the expiration of a contractually specified grace period);  
• Repudiation/Moratorium: the reference entity (or a governmental authority) disaffirms, rejects, 
disclaims, repudiates, or challenges the validity of one or more obligations (in excess of the Default 
Requirement) or imposes a moratorium on the payment of one or more obligations (in excess of the 
Default Requirement), provided that the reference entity has experienced a failure-to-pay or 
restructuring event (without regard to the Default Requirement) on or prior to the 
repudiation./moratorium “evaluation date”; or 
• Restructuring: the reference entity restructures one or more obligations (including through an 
“Obligation Exchange” – i.e., a mandatory transfer of securities, obligations, or assets) in excess of 
the Default Requirement as a result of any of the following and provided that the following were the 
direct or indirect result of a deterioration in the reference entity’s credit quality: (i) reductions in 
accrued or payable interest; (ii) reductions in principal payable or premiums payable on redemption 
dates; (iii) deferrals of interest or principal repayment dates; (iv) changes in the priority/subordination 
of an obligation; or (v) changes in the currency denomination of interest and/or principal payments to 
an impermissible currency. 
 
In 2003, ISDA released a revised version of its Credit Derivatives Definitions. Among 
the changes to the 1999 credit events reflected in the 2003 revision were refinements to the 
bankruptcy, repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring credit event definitions.  
For single-name CDSs, restructuring events have presented market participants with 
some significant challenges over the years, both for corporate and sovereign reference entities. 
These challenges have involved both the definition of a restructuring credit event (mainly an 
issue for sovereign reference entities) and the obligations deliverable under physically settled 
CDSs following a restructuring event (primarily an issue for corporate reference entities). The 
issue of deliverable obligations is discussed later in Sections II.B.5 and II.B.6. 
For sovereign CDSs, the three primary triggering events are failure-to-pay, 
repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring.27 Historically, the most prevalent credit event 
triggering sovereign CDSs is the restructuring event. (Pan and Singleton, 2008; Longstaff, Pan, 
Pedersen, and Singleton, 2011; Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch, 2012) The definition of a 
                                                            




sovereign restructuring event, however, has evolved in the underlying ISDA documentation over 
time as specific sovereign defaults have highlighted issues about which market participants 
desired clarification. In particular, the restructurings of Argentine sovereign debt in 2001 and 
Greek sovereign debt in 2012 both resulted in disputes over the meaning of the definition of the 
restructuring event, and both events precipitated revisions in ISDA’s 2003 Credit Derivatives 
Definitions. 
One change in the 2003 definitions occurred following the announcement in November 
2001 by the Argentine Republic (“Argentina”) of its plan to “voluntarily restructure” $95 million 
of its $132 billion in outstanding debt by exchanging the $95 billion in 15 percent bonds for 
bonds with interest rates capped at seven percent.28 Argentina claimed that because the bond 
exchange was voluntary that it did not constitute a restructuring event and that dedicated tax 
revenues had been earmarked to cover the interest payment obligations on the new bonds. Rating 
agencies and analysts disagreed, however, and contended that Argentina’s declining tax revenues 
were insufficient to support the old bonds and, hence, that any investor not swapping old bonds 
for news ones would be subject to an even greater risk. As such, the rating agencies and many 
analysts claimed that the proposed debt swap was de facto involuntary. (Pollack, 2003) 
Based on two sovereign CDS transactions outstanding with JPMorgan as its counterparty, 
HBK Master Fund LP (“HBK”) provided JPMorgan in December 2001 written notice that it 
believed a restructuring event had occurred on Argentine sovereign debt underlying its CDSs in 
which HBK was the credit protection purchaser. Under the 1999 Definitions, the definition of a 
restructuring depended heavily on the definition of an “Obligation Exchange,” defined as “the 
mandatory transfer (other than in accordance with the terms in effect as of the later of the Trade 
Date or date of issuance of the relevant Obligation) of any securities, obligations or assets to 
holders of Obligations in exchange for such Obligations.” JPMorgan responded to HBK that a 
restructuring event had not occurred because the Argentine restructuring was a voluntary one 
and, as such, no Obligation Exchange had occurred. HBK responded that, regardless of whether 
any actual Obligation Exchange had occurred, the exchange constituted a restructuring event 
because it triggered a reduction of principal and interest and a deferral of the maturity dates on 
the Argentine sovereign debt. (Collins and Sackmann, 2003; Pollack, 2003) Eternity Global 
Master Fund Limited (“Eternity”) filed a similar lawsuit against JPMorgan.29  
Both the HBK and Eternity lawsuits resulted in drawn-out litigation and generated 
significant controversy amongst market participants about the term Obligation Exchange in the 
definition of a restructuring event in the Definitions. As a result, the 2003 ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Definitions eliminated the term Obligation Exchange from the definition of a 
restructuring event. Under the 2003 Definitions, a restructuring credit event was defined solely 
based on the occurrence of any of the five events defined in the 1999 definitions as long as such 
events bind all holders of any obligations to the restructuring.  
b) The 2009 “Big Bang Protocol” and Supplement to the 2003 Definitions 
As part of the 2009 Standardization Initiatives, ISDA redefined the means by which a 
credit event is determined. Prior to the 2009 Initiatives, a protection purchaser typically notified 
its counterparty when it believed a credit event had occurred. In the event of a dispute between 
                                                            
28 BBC News, “Argentina Announces Debt ‘Default’ Plan” (November 2, 2001). 




counterparties (such as those that occurred in the HKB and Eternity disputes with JPMorgan), 
the documentation of the transaction and the facts of the circumstances were subject to the 
determination of a court.  
In consultation with market participants and various regulatory agencies, ISDA 
implemented the 2009 Standardization Initiatives by promulgating the 2009 ISDA Credit 
Determinations Committees, Auction Settlement, and Restructuring Supplement to the 2003 
ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, more commonly known as the “Big Bang Protocol.” 
Specifically, the Big Bang Protocol resulted in three significant changes to CDS contract terms: 
(i) the creation of “determinations committees” (“DCs”) for each major geographical region 
together with the definition of the roles and responsibilities of DCs and corresponding changes in 
CDS documentation; (ii) the incorporation of common “look-back” provisions for credit and 
succession events; and (iii) the introduction of “Auction Settlement” as a default method settling 
single-name CDSs. Components (i) and (ii) of the Big Bang Protocol are discussed below, and 
the third component is discussed in Section II.A.5.(c). As of its April 8, 2009, effective date, 
over 2,000 market participants opted to adhere to the Big Bang Protocol.30 
In the first prong of the Big Bang Protocol, adherents to the protocol agree that instead of 
counterparties to a CDS making determinations about the occurrence of a credit event, the 
relevant geographical DC will make such determinations. DCs may accept requests from eligible 
market participants (including non-members of ISDA) to consider whether or not a credit event 
has occurred at a particular reference entity. The ISDA DCs consist of up to 10 voting dealer 
members, five voting non-dealer members, and up to three consultative non-voting members 
(two dealers and one non-dealer). Dealer members are selected annually based on their firms’ 
CDS trading volumes from the previous year, and non-dealer members are selected at random 
from a pool of buy-side firms with CDS activity in excess of specified minimum size thresholds.  
If an eligible market participant petitions the DC under its own name and asks the DC to 
determine whether or not a credit event has occurred, at least one member of a DC must accept 
the question before the issue is put to a vote before the whole DC. “General interest” questions 
can also be submitted to a DC in which the submitter does not disclose its name, and such 
questions must be accepted by at least two members of the DC before the whole committee 
considers whether or not a credit event has occurred. 
Apart from their responsibilities for determining the occurrence of credit events, the 
responsibilities of DCs also include deciding whether or not an auction will be held to determine 
final CDS settlement values and selecting the deliverable obligations eligible for submission in 
the auction (as discussed in Sections II.B.5 and II.B.6, respectively). 
The second component of the Big Bang Protocol – i.e., the creation of a common look-
back provision – was intended to deal with the basis risk to which traders were previously 
exposed (see Sections III.A.1.(a) and V.A.4) in the event that they purchased and sold credit 
protection on the same reference entity on different dates. Prior to the Big Bang Protocol, credit 
protection began for the purchaser one day after the trade date T. For example, a CDS on XYZ 
Corp. purchased on April 26, 2016, would go into effect on April 27, 2016. If the protection 
purchaser subsequently decided to reverse out its protection purchase – say, on May 1, 2016 – 
the protection sale went into effect on May 2, 2016. If a credit event occurred anytime from 
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April 27th through May 2nd, the protection purchase was in force but the protection sale was not. 
As such, seemingly offsetting exposures did not actually offset and gave rise to basis risk for 
would-be hedgers.  
To address this concern, the Big Bang Protocol specifies that CDS protection is in force 
at T-60 for credit events.31 This modification of CDS documentation was intended to help 
promote fungibility across individual CDSs transactions by eliminating the basis risk arising 
from any “stub period” occurring between the initial protection purchase (sale) in-force date and 
the in-force date for a subsequent protection sale (purchase) hedge or reversal of the original 
protection purchase (sale). Market participants refer to the rolling 60-day look-back period for 
credit events as their “statute of limitations.”32 
c) Example of the Determinations Process: The Hellenic Republic Credit Event 
The determination process and revised restructuring event guidelines were both tested 
during the European sovereign debt crisis – specifically with respect to the debt obligations of 
the Hellenic Republic (i.e., Greece). Public recognition of Greece’s financial difficulties moved 
under the microscope in October 2009, when the newly elected federal government announced 
that previous statistics had badly understated the actual amounts of Greek sovereign debt and the 
sovereign’s deficit. Following several months of continuing bad news from Greece regarding its 
economic condition and public sector spending, several of the rating agencies downgraded Greek 
sovereign debt. By April 2010, spreads on Greek sovereign debt had risen to as much as nine 
percent higher than otherwise-similar German sovereign bonds.33 
In May 2010, E.U. country leaders agreed to a comprehensive “bailout” package that 
involved increased lending to Greece (conditional on certain fiscal reforms), the creation of a 
European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) to provide up to €440 billion in loans to troubled 
E.U. sovereigns, and the authorization of the ECB to engage in secondary purchases of troubled 
E.U. sovereign debt to help reduce yields and stabilize the markets. The May 2010 intervention 
by Eurozone leaders did indeed stabilize the market, but only briefly. By mid-2011 the situation 
in Greece (as well as several other E.U. countries) had deteriorated even further. By the summer 
of 2011, many market participants anticipated that the Hellenic Republic’s sovereign debt was 
rapidly becoming (or had already become) unsustainable unless substantial additional public 
sector assistance was provided.34 
On July 21, 2011, leaders of the Eurozone countries convened and agreed on another set 
of reforms and rescue measures designed to provide an additional estimated €109 billion to the 
Hellenic Republic. This time, the rescue package called for a combination of public sector loans 
from the EFSF and International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) together with contributions from the 
private sector. Of the total €109 billion in additional planned bailout funds, €37 billion was 
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expected to come from voluntary private sector involvement (“PSI”) – specifically, through 
voluntary agreements by Greek creditors to exchange their existing debt for new debt issued on 
terms more favorable to Greece.35 
By October 2011, many market participants, politicians, and commentators believed that 
the reforms proposed in the July 2011 summit would be insufficient to ensure the sustainability 
of Greek sovereign debt without significant additional reforms, including substantial PSI.36 The 
official statement following the E.U. summit on October 26, 2011, thus included the following 
“invitation”: “We invite Greece, private investors and all parties concerned to develop a 
voluntary bond exchange with a nominal discount of 50% on notional Greek debt held by private 
investors.”37 Although large investors in Greek debt (e.g., German banks) were subject to 
pressure from their local regulators (known as “moral suasion”) to accept this invitation from the 
E.U., non-E.U. investors in Greek debt (e.g., U.S. banks and asset managers) were skeptical of 
the proposal.38  
Leading up to and immediately following the October 2011 E.U. summit, numerous 
market participants had already informally questioned whether the latest proposed reforms would 
constitute a restructuring event under the ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and 
determinations process. Such concerns and questions had become so frequent leading up to the 
July 2011 summit that ISDA published a “Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A” on July 8, 2011. On 
October 27, 2011, ISDA updated its Q&A and stated the following: 
The determination of whether the Eurozone deal with regard to Greece is a credit 
event under CDS documentation will be made by ISDA’s [Europe, Middle East, 
and Africa (“EMEA”)] Determinations Committee when the proposal is formally 
signed, and if a market participant requests a ruling from the DC. Based on what 
we know it appears from preliminary news reports that the bond restructuring is 
voluntary and not binding on all bondholders. As such, it does not appear to be 
likely that the restructuring will trigger payments under existing CDS contracts. In 
addition, it is important to note that the restructuring proposal is not yet at the stage 
at which the ISDA Determinations Committee would be likely to accept a request 
to determine whether a credit event has occurred.39 
On February 21, 2012, the ministers of finance for the Eurozone countries issued a 
statement indicating that an agreement had been reached with Greece that, consistent with the 
broad goals of the October 2011 E.U. summit, would involve an exchange of existing debt for 
new debt with a face value of about 53.5 percent of the nominal amount of the original debt.40 
On February 23, 2012, the Greek Parliament enacted the “Greek Bondholder Act” to provide for 
the voluntary redemption of bonds on those terms. On February 24, 2012, the Greek Ministry of 
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Finance issued a statement indicating that it had approved the terms of invitations for such debt 
exchanges to private-sector investors outside the United States and issued a statement in which it 
said:  
Under the collective action procedures introduced by the Greek Bondholder Act, 
the proposed amendments will become binding on the holders of all the Republic’s 
Greek-law governed bonds issued prior to 31 December 2011 identified in the act 
of the Ministerial Council approving the PSI invitations, if at least two thirds by 
face amount of a quorum of these bonds, voting collectively without distinction by 
series, approve the proposed amendments.41 
On the same day as the Greek Ministry of Finance’s statement, the ISDA DC responsible 
for deciding whether a restructuring event had occurred for Greece – i.e., the EMEA (Europe) 
DC42 – received its first question, which was submitted by HBK Capital Management (i.e., the 
same fund manager that sued JPMorgan regarding the Argentine restructuring event). The DC 
agreed to accept the question on February 28, 2012,43 and to resolve the question by February 
29, 2012.44 The question posed by HBK to the EMEA DC was as follows: 
Does the announcement of the passage by the Greek parliament of legislation that 
approves the implementation of an exchange offer and vote providing for collective 
action clauses (“CACs”) that impose a “haircut amounting to 53.5%”…constitute 
a Restructuring Credit Event in accordance with Section 4.7 of the [ISDA 2003 
Credit Derivatives Definitions as amended in 2009] because (i) the [ECB] and 
National Central Banks benefitted from “a change in the ranking in priority of 
payment” as a result of the Hellenic Republic exclusively offering them the ability 
to exchange out of their “eligible instruments” prior to the exchange and 
implementation of the CACs, thereby effectively “causing the Subordination” of 
all remaining holders of eligible instruments, and (ii) this announcement results 
directly or indirectly from a deterioration in the creditworthiness or financial 
condition of the Hellenic Republic?45 
Before the DC issued its answer to the first question, it received a second question on February 
29, 2012.46 This question, submitted by Bracebridge Capital LLC, raised related concerns:  
Does (i) the agreement that has been reached between the Hellenic Republic and a 
number of private sector holders of Greek debt…exchange the Designated 
Securities for new securities…; (ii) the enactment of [the Greek Bondholder Act] 
and (iii) the statement by the Ministry of Finance of the Hellenic Republic on 21 
[sic.] February 2012…constitute a Restructuring Credit Event in accordance with 
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Section 4.7 of the [ISDA 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions as amended in 2009] 
because (i) a reduction in the amount of principal or premium payable at maturity 
or at scheduled redemption dates of the Designated Securities has been agreed 
between the Hellenic Republic and a sufficient number of holders of the Designated 
Securities to bind all holders of the Designated Securities and (ii) this agreement 
results directly or indirectly from a deterioration in the creditworthiness or financial 
condition of the Hellenic Republic? [emphasis added]47 
 
On March 1, 2012, the EMEA DC issued a statement that “it had not received any 
evidence of an agreement which meets the requirements of Section 4.7(a) of the [ISDA 2003 
Credit Derivatives Definitions as amended in 2009] and therefore based on the facts available to 
it, the EMEA DC unanimously determined that a Restructuring Credit Event has not 
occurred….”48 For the first question, all 15 of the DC’s voting members agreed that “the specific 
fact pattern...does not satisfy…the definition of Subordination as set out in the [ISDA 2003 
Credit Derivatives Definitions as amended in 2009] and therefore a Restructuring Credit Event 
has not occurred….”49 For the second question, the DC provided no additional details.  
On March 6, 2012, however, the Greek Public Debt Management Agency announced that 
if the Republic… 
receives sufficient consents to the proposed amendments of the Greek law governed 
bonds identified in the [February 24, 2012] invitations for the amendments to 
become effective, it intends…to declare the proposed amendments effective and 
binding on all holders of these bonds. Consequently, all obligations of the Republic 
to pay holders of those bonds any amount on account of principal will be amended 
to permit the Republic to discharge these obligations in full by delivering to the 
holders of the amended bonds on the settlement date the consideration described in 
the invitations. [emphasis added]50 
In other words, if enough market participants accepted the voluntary request from the Hellenic 
Republic to exchange their existing debt for new debt at lower face values and/or on less 
favorable terms, Greece intended to impose those new terms on all bond holders – even those 
which did not consent to the proposed exchange.  
 On March 9, 2012, the Greek Ministry of Finance announced that of the roughly €177 
billion in outstanding sovereign Greek debt governed by Greek law and eligible for voluntary 
exchange under the Greek government’s invitations, investors in approximately €152 billion 
(face value) in Greek debt had consented to and tendered for the proposed debt exchange. 
Accordingly, the Hellenic Republic advised that it intended “to accept the consents received and 
amend the terms of all of its Greek law governed bonds, including those not tendered for 
exchange pursuant to the invitations, in accordance with the terms of the Greek Bondholder Act. 
[emphasis added]”51 In other words, on March 9, 2012, the Hellenic Republic declared its 
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intention to impose reductions of principal on all holders of enumerated Greek sovereign debt 
instruments, even if investors did not consent, thus rendering the restructuring involuntary. 
On March 9, 2012 (i.e., the same date as the announcement by the Greek Ministry of 
Finance), UBS submitted a question to the EMEA DC asking whether or not a restructuring 
credit event had occurred in the Hellenic Republic as a result of the latest statements by the 
Greek government. The DC accepted the question the same day and also reached a determination 
that same day (by unanimous consent of all 15 members) that Greece’s latest actions did 
constitute a restructuring credit event as defined in the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions 
as amended in 2009.52 
d) The 2014 Definitions 
On February 21, 2014, ISDA published a new and substantively revised version of its 
Credit Derivatives Definitions (the “2014 Definitions”). The new definitions reflected a number 
of substantive changes to the 2003 Definitions (as amended in 2009). The most significant 
changes are discussed below. 
First, the 2014 Definitions added “governmental intervention” as a credit event. Such a 
triggering event occurs when an announcement or action by a governmental authority results in 
any of the following for obligations in excess of the Default Requirement threshold: 
• Changes in creditors’ rights so as to cause: 
o Reductions in interest payable or accrued; 
o Reductions in principal or premiums payable upon redemption; 
o Postponements or deferrals of interest payable or accrued and/or principal/premium 
payable beyond the originally scheduled dates;  
o Changes in the priority (seniority) of an obligation that results in an increased depth of 
subordination; 
• Expropriation (i.e., any event that mandatorily changes the beneficial holder of an 
obligation);  
• Mandatory cancellation, conversion, or exchange of an obligation; or 
• Any other event that has an analogous effect to the other above events. 
The governmental intervention trigger was added to the ISDA Credit Derivatives 
Definitions to address forced “bail-ins” of creditors – i.e., situations in which governmental 
authorities force creditors to participate in a bail-out of a distressed firm. For example, the Dutch 
Ministry of Finance nationalized SNS Reaal bank on February 1, 2013,53 which resulted in the 
expropriation of the bank’s subordinated debt. Under the 2003 Definitions (as amended in 2009), 
significant uncertainty existed as to whether a mandated debtor bail-in qualified as a 
restructuring event.54 The new triggering event eliminates any such ambiguities and explicitly 
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defines governmentally mandated creditor bail-ins as a credit event that will trigger 
corresponding single-name CDSs. 
Second, the 2014 Definitions allow counterparties in a single-name CDS to elect 
“Financial Reference Entity Terms” in a confirmation, which separates credit event 
determinations for governmental intervention and restructuring events that impact CDSs based 
on senior and subordinated obligations of the reference entity differently. In the case of SNS 
Reaal, the expropriation of subordinated debt resulted in all CDSs on SNS Reaal being triggered 
under the restructuring event even though the senior debt holders of SNS Reaal were unaffected 
by the intervention.55 Under the 2014 Definitions, if counterparties opt for Financial Reference 
Entity Terms, a governmental intervention or restructuring event that affects subordinated debt 
but not senior debt will not trigger protection payments on corresponding senior single-name 
CDSs. 
Third, the credit events experienced by both SNS Reaal and Greece highlighted issues 
associated with mandatory exchanges of debt that persisted even with the elimination of the term 
“Obligation Exchange” in 2003. Following the determination that SNS Reaal had experienced a 
credit event following the expropriation of its subordinated debt holders, all of the single-name 
CDSs on SNS Reaal obligations were triggered. The DC determined that the final value of CDSs 
referencing SNS Reaal would be determined by auction settlement (see Section II.B.5) at a final 
auction price that included only senior obligations (because the subordinated debt had been 
expropriated) despite that senior obligations were unaffected by the mandatory expropriation of 
subordinated debt. As a result, CDSs referencing the SNS Reaal entity were settled at prices that 
were too high relative to the actual expected recovery rates on the expropriated subordinated 
debt.  
To address the various problems associated with mandatory debt exchanges, the 2014 
Definitions introduced the concepts of an “Asset Package Delivery” and an “Asset Package 
Credit Event.” For Financial Reference Entities, these provisions allow credit protection buyers 
in physically settled single-name CDSs to deliver a portfolio of assets resulting from the 
exchange of “Prior Deliverable Obligations” or “Package Observable Bonds.”  
Finally, the 2014 Definitions introduce the concept of a “Standard Reference Obligation,” 
which we discuss in more detail in Section II.B.6.  
5. Settlement Methods 
Credit protection purchasers in single-name CDSs are compensated following the 
occurrence of a credit event in one of three ways: cash settlement; physical settlement; and 
auction settlement. We discuss the three settlement methods below. 
a) Physical Settlement 
Historically, the most prevalent CDS settlement method is physical. In a physically 
settled CDS, the protection buyer must deliver any eligible deliverable obligation (see Section 
II.B.6) to the protection seller in return for a cash payment equal to the notional amount of the 
swap. In that situation, a protection buyer that initially owns the underlying XYZ Corp. 
obligation receives the par amount of that obligation (assuming it matches the notional amount of 
                                                            




the CDS) and neither benefits from any subsequent improvements in the recovery rate expected 
by market participants at the time nor suffers any losses arising from later declines in the 
recovery rate. Instead, the protection seller in the CDS now bears this risk and return potential. If 
the protection seller holds the bond until the bankruptcy trustee makes a final distribution of 
assets (which is not usually the case) and the final recovery rate exceeds the expected recovery 
rate reflected in the market price of the bond at the time of the CDS settlement, the protection 
seller will be better-off ex post than if it had entered into an otherwise identical cash-settled 
CDS. But if the final recovery rate is below the expected recovery rate reflected in bond prices at 
the time of the CDS settlement, the protection seller will be worse-off ex post for electing 
physical rather than cash settlement. 
Beginning in 2005, market participants began to express concerns with the physical CDS 
settlement process. As long as the total amount of CDS credit protection sold is less than the 
amount of underlying deliverable obligations corresponding to that CDS – as is generally the 
case for sovereign CDSs – physical and cash settlement should not generate significantly 
different payments by credit protection sellers to buyers. As discussed in more detail in Section 
III.B.2, however, a credit protection purchaser in a CDS need not own any obligation of the 
reference entity underlying the CDS and may instead be using the position to take a short 
position on the credit risk of the reference entity. When the notional amount of credit protection 
sold for a given reference entity significantly exceeds the amount of actual debt issued by that 
reference entity and deliverable into single-name CDSs based on that entity, problems can arise.  
A classic “short squeeze” occurs when market participants establish a short position using 
a physically settled derivatives contract based on an asset that participants do not own at the time 
in order to try and benefit from subsequent price declines in the underlying asset. In order to 
realize any economic benefits from such price declines, however, the trader must eventually 
acquire the asset in order to deliver it to its counterparty. When the underlying supply of the asset 
is less than the amount of derivatives based on that asset, traders that have open positions when 
the derivatives contract matures are forced to buy the asset in the spot market. Knowing that such 
“naked shorts” cannot realize the benefits of their derivatives transactions unless they acquire the 
underlying asset, the actual holders of the asset may “squeeze” those shorts and sell the 
underlying asset for more than what it is actually worth. 
For example, suppose XYZ Corp. experiences a credit event at a time when it has a total 
amount of debt equal to $100 million that could be eligible for delivery into physically settled 
CDSs but that a total of $500 million notional in physically settled CDSs is outstanding. To take 
the most extreme case, suppose the holders of XYZ Corp.’s $100 million debt have not 
purchased CDS protection, so that the purchasers of all $500 million in notional CDS protection 
have “naked” short positions – i.e., they do not own an XYZ Corp. debt instrument at the time 
they purchase credit protection and thus cannot receive a protection payment from their CDS 
counterparties without acquiring XYZ Corp. debt in the secondary bond market. For the 
protection purchaser in a naked physically settled short CDS position, the delivery of an eligible 
XYZ Corp. bond will result in a payment of 100 percent of the par value of an eligible XYZ 
Corp. obligation. Such a credit protection purchaser thus would potentially be willing to pay up 
to 99.99 percent of the par value of such securities in the secondary market. Yet, if protection 
purchasers do indeed bid up the price of the underlying $100 million in available securities, the 
result will be that the price of the XYZ Corp. obligations may be well above the actual expected 




demand from naked short CDS purchasers for deliverable securities thus may impose losses on 
hedgers that have purchased cash-settled CDS protection. 
In 2005, market participants expressed concern that short squeezes could create basis risk 
for counterparties using CDSs to hedge their actual credit exposures to underlying reference 
entities. For example, when Delphi Corp. (“Delphi”) declared bankruptcy in 2005, the firm had 
about $5.2 billion in par value of bonds and loans outstanding but had an estimated $28 billion of 
single-name CDSs outstanding. From one week prior to Delphi’s bankruptcy filing to one week 
after, weekly trading volume increased from about $1.5 billion to more than $3 billion. As a 
percentage of the total par amount of Delphi obligations outstanding, weekly trading volume 
grew from roughly 75 percent to over 150 percent between the week prior to and after Delphi’s 
bankruptcy filing. The secondary market price of Delphi’s bonds following its bankruptcy filing, 
moreover, reached a peak in the low 70s, despite that Delphi bonds traded below that level for 
about three months prior to the bankruptcy.56  
b) Auction Settlement 
To address potential problems arising from short squeezes in bonds deliverable into 
physically settled CDSs, ISDA introduced a third CDS settlement method in 2005 called auction 
settlement. The auction settlement essentially converts physically settled CDSs into cash-settled 
CDSs and defines the price at which cash settlement occurs through a rule-bound auction 
mechanism for the bonds underlying the defaulting reference entity. Specifically, following the 
occurrence of a credit event, buyers and sellers of single-name CDS protection could choose to 
agree to a protocol provided by ISDA that entitled those counterparties to convert physically 
settled CDSs to auction-settled contracts for which the final settlement payment from the 
protection seller to the buyer was equal to the notional amount of the CDS less the final auction 
price of the reference entity’s deliverable obligation.  
The final auction price is determined based on a two-stage process. In stage one, the main 
participants are dealers that have committed to place minimum bids or offers along with any 
bids/offers for physical settlement at the final price. Those stage one bids and offers establish an 
initial market midpoint (“IMM”) price, which is a constraint on the final auction price. In stage 
two, limit orders from customers of dealers are added to the original stage one limit orders to 
arrive at a stage two auction price that clears the total net open interest. If the stage two auction 
price falls within a specified range (known as the “cap”) of the IMM, the stage two auction price 
is the final auction price. If the stage two auction price is greater than the IMM plus the cap (for 
auctions in which the first-stage net open interest for physical settlement at the final auction price 
is for a purchase of the bonds), the final auction price is set to the IMM plus the cap. Conversely, 
if the net first-stage open interest is for a sale of the bonds, the final auction price is limited by 
the IMM minus the cap. The IMM and cap are intended to prevent large off-market limit orders 
from being submitted in an effort to manipulate the price.57 Manipulation is also discouraged by 
the imposition of a penalty for off-market submissions in stage one. 
In 2009, the Big Bang Protocol (see Section II.B.4) “hardwired” CDS documentation to 
specify auction settlement as the default settlement method, provided that the relevant DC (see 
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Section II.B.4.(b)) determines that there is a sufficient amount of CDSs outstanding to justify an 
auction. For reference entities with either a small amount of total outstanding debt or with total 
face values of debt well above the DC’s estimate of total CDS protection bought and sold, the 
DC may choose not to hold an auction, in which case the settlement method chosen by 
counterparties in the master agreement and trade confirmations will remain in force. Another 
common occurrence when a reference entity has a significant quantity of senior debt but only a 
small amount of subordinated debt is for a DC to hold a senior CDS auction but not a 
subordinated CDS auction, in which case the subordinated CDSs revert to settlement through 
their fallback mechanism (i.e., almost always physical). Table 3 in Appendix C indicates a 
number of situations in which separate auctions were held for the senior and subordinated 
obligations of a reference entity.  
A list of all single-name CDS auctions held from 2005 through May 2016 is shown in 
Table 3 in Appendix C. Sovereign reference entities are shown in italics. There were four 
sovereign default events during the period – i.e., the Republic of Ecuador in 2009, the Hellenic 
Republic in 2012, the Argentine Republic in 2014, and the Republic of Ukraine in 2015. Another 
122 auction events shown in Table 3 involved single-name CDSs with corporate or SOE 
reference entities. 
Helwege, Maurer, Sarkar, and Wang (2009) analyzed the results of 43 CDS auctions 
from 2005 through 2009 in order to evaluate how well final auction prices approximate expected 
recovery rates implied by cash bond market transactions. They find that final auction prices are 
generally very close to cash bond prices on the day before and the day of a CDS auction. The 
authors also report that the cash price of the bond on the date of the occurrence of the credit 
event is a good predictor of the final auction price (with the exceptions of Lehman Brothers and 
Washington Mutual) and thus conclude that the bond market was generally effective in providing 
price discovery prior to the CDS auction. Notably, the authors do not explicitly consider whether 
or not CDS auctions play price discovery roles for post-auction cash bond trading.  
Coudert and Gex (2010c) reviewed the results of 27 senior CDS auctions from 2005 
through 2009. They find that the difference between the secondary market price of a defaulted 
bond and the final CDS auction price declines from the date of the credit event through the date 
of the auction. Examining secondary market bond prices on the date the CDS auction is settled 
(which is several days after the CDS final auction price is determined), the authors find 
significant differences between secondary market prices on the settlement date and final auction 
prices. In most cases, secondary market prices rose (in some cases significantly) from the auction 
date to the settlement date. Similar results of under-valuations of bond prices in the CDS auction 
are documented in many of the other studies reviewed below.  
Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) examine 26 CDS auctions involving U.S. 
corporate reference entities between 2005 and December 2011. The authors compare the final 
auction prices to market prices of the bonds traded in the secondary market and reported through 
the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (“TRACE”) maintained by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). Their evidence indicates that the bonds analyzed were 
undervalued in the CDS auctions by six percent on average on the dates of the auctions, and that 
the amount of undervaluation is directly related to the total amount of bonds exchanged in stage 
two of the auctions – i.e., the larger the net open interest, the greater the underpricing of the 




Lieu (2011) also compares CDS auction prices to cash bond prices obtained from 
TRACE for 23 auctions involving U.S. corporate in 2008 and 2009. Unlike Chernov, Gorbenko, 
and Makarov (2013), Lieu (2011) does not analyze mispricings on the auction date but rather 
examines the price discovery role of the auction and its impact on secondary market trading in 
the five days subsequent to the auction. His results suggest that CDS auctions play an important 
role in price discovery and that auction prices are generally fair despite a slight increase in bond 
prices on average following the auction date. (The latter result is consistent with Chernov, 
Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013), whereas the former is not.) At odds with the price-discovery 
role Lieu (2011) finds being played by the CDS auction, however, he also documents a 
significant increase in bond price volatility after an auction than in the pre-auction five-day 
window. His finding that post-auction trading volume is significantly higher than pre-auction 
volume suggests that the higher post-auction volatility may be the result of new market 
participants trading the bonds after the direct and indirect offers from auction participants have 
been satisfied.  
Gupta and Sundaram have written two studies of CDS auction performance. In Gupta and 
Sundaram (2015a), the authors analyzed 22 CDS auctions from 2008 through 2010. Like Lieu 
(2011), the authors focus on the price discovery auction and confirm the results in Lieu (2011) 
that CDS auctions play a critical role in providing information to market participants for post-
auction price formation in the cash market. In fact, the authors find that when the final auction 
price is taken into consideration, no pre-auction price or volume information at all helps explain 
post-auction secondary market prices – i.e., all of the information on which post-auction trading 
is based is driven by the auction process. Gupta and Sundaram (2015a) also report that final 
auction prices are biased despite being informative. They attribute the pricing bias primarily to a 
combination of “winner’s curse” issues influencing order placement, strategic bidding related to 
the size of bidders’ net CDS positions, and illiquidity in the secondary bond market.  
In Gupta and Sundaram (2015b), the authors evaluate 30 CDS auctions from November 
2006 through December 2013 to examine the extent of any mispricings between the CDS auction 
final price and the pre- and post-auction cash market prices of the bonds. They report a 
systematic underpricing of bonds in CDS auctions where the net open interest is on the sell side 
and a systematic overpricing of bonds in auctions dominated by buy orders. Although they 
estimate that an arbitrageur could earn as much as 15 percent by exploiting these mispricing 
patterns, they also attribute that return to a liquidity risk premium compensating arbitrageurs for 
illiquidity in the underlying bond market.  
Most of the studies of CDS auctions have two major common conclusions – i.e., CDS 
final auction prices tend to be biased (often on the side of undervaluing the underlying bonds), 
but the auction process is a critical component in the price discovery process for post-auction 
cash bond trading. Many of the studies, moreover, attribute pricing differences around auctions 
to illiquidity in the underlying bond market. We discuss the empirical relations between CDS 
spreads and cash bond credit spreads in more detail in Section VI.D. 
c) Cash Settlement 
Although rarely used historically and virtually non-existent in recent years, a third CDS 
settlement mechanism is cash settlement, which involves a single payment by the protection 
seller to the protection buyer equivalent to the notional amount of the CDS less the expected 




purchaser to receive subsequent payments on the underlying reference entity’s debt from its 
bankruptcy trustee (or the equivalent). The actual recovery of a bondholder is, of course, 
determined well after (sometimes many years later than) the occurrence of the credit event on 
which the corresponding CDS is based. As such, cash-settled CDSs generally rely on the market 
price of a bond at the time of CDS settlement (which should, in principle, equal the market-based 
expected recovery value) or a pre-specified recovery rate as fraction of par value based on the 
credit rating of the reference entity and/or historical recovery data. 
For example, suppose a credit protection purchaser that owns a $1 million face value 
bond issued by XYZ Corp. enters into a $1 million notional CDS on XYZ Corp. in which the 
protection payment from the seller to the buyer is based on the market-determined expected 
recovery rate (i.e., the price of an obligation of XYZ Corp.) on the final settlement date of the 
CDS. Suppose that the market price of a representative XYZ Corp. bond on the CDS settlement 
date is 40 (implying a 40 percent expected recovery rate). In that case, the protection seller must 
make a payment of $600,000 to the protection purchaser (i.e., the par value of $1 million less 
expected recovery of $400,000). In such a cash-settled CDS, the protection purchaser locks in 
the market-based expected recovery rate (i.e., 40 percent) as of the CDS settlement date.  
If in this example the bankruptcy court eventually distributes more than 40 percent to 
XYZ Corp. bond holders – say, e.g., 50 percent – then the CDS protection purchaser that also 
owns the bond will actually experience a net gain – i.e., $600,000 received from its CDS 
protection seller counterparty plus $500,000 received upon surrender of the actual bond to the 
bankruptcy trustee, resulting in a total received of $1.1 million on a $1 million hedged bond 
investment. Conversely, a determination by the bankruptcy trustee that the recovery rate is less 
than 40 percent – say, e.g., 30 percent – then the CDS protection buyer that owns the bond will 
be under-compensated for its actual losses. It will receive $600,000 from its CDS counterparty 
but will only receive $300,000 from the bankruptcy trustee, resulting in a net loss of $100,000 
vis-à-vis the $1 million par value of the XYZ Corp. bond it owned.  
6. Deliverable Obligations 
Prior to the 2009 Standardization Initiatives, the debt obligations issued by a reference 
entity that were deliverable in a physically settled CDS were specified in the original transaction 
documentation. After the implementation of the 2009 Standardization Initiatives, the applicable 
DC applies the conditions contained in market-standard documentation to the available bonds in 
order to determine which bonds qualify for physical delivery and trading in the CDS auction. 
Eligible market participants are entitled to submit proposed obligations for the DC to consider, 
and such market participants may also submit objections to the DC regarding the inclusion of 
certain obligations on the deliverable obligations list.  
For most reference entities, any plain vanilla debt can be delivered in the CDS auction or 
by the protection purchaser in a physically settled CDS, usually subject to a maximum maturity 
of 30 years and to the constraint that subordinated debt cannot be delivered to satisfy the 
requirements of a senior CDS. As such, the CDS protection purchaser holds a cheapest-to-deliver 
(“CTD”) option that drives the pricing of the corresponding CDS contract. In other words, the 
market-based spread on a single-name CDS is based not only on the credit risk of the underlying 
reference entity, but also on the probability that the protection seller will receive the lowest-
possible valued deliverable obligation (e.g., long-dated, high-duration, subordinated bonds) in 




For CDS auctions involving restructuring credit events, moreover, the deliverable 
obligations are often constrained by the contractual maturities of the underlying bonds and 
CDSs. This can give rise to auctions for different “buckets” of obligations issued by the 
reference entity as defined by the insolvency proceedings. For example, in the auction for 
Northern Rock (Asset Management) PLC (“NRAM”) held on February 2, 2012, the EMEA DC 
elected to hold two auctions. In making this determination, the DC classified NRAM’s senior 
and subordinated obligations into four maturity buckets, in which the obligations in buckets one, 
two, three, and four had approximately 2.5, five, 7.5, and 10 years to maturity, respectively. The 
DC decided to hold auctions for Buckets 1 and 2, in which senior and subordinated obligations 
within the covered maturities were deliverable. The DC opted not to hold auctions for the longer-
dated maturity buckets, presumably because of the low number of deliverable obligations – viz., 
Buckets 1 and 2 included 355 transactions, whereas Buckets 3 and 4 only included 22 
transactions.58  
In the 2014 Definitions, ISDA also introduced the concept of a standard reference 
obligation (“SRO”). Although deliverable obligations under single-name CDSs are not limited 
exclusively to SROs, the SROs for a reference entity (published by ISDA periodically for 
frequently traded CDSs) are a minimum subset of deliverable obligations. In any physically 
settled CDSs, the protection buyer is contractually obligated to deliver the SRO to the protection 
seller before the latter makes a payment to the former. SRO designations are intended to further 
reduce the basis risk associated with the CTD option and to promote consistent pricing across 
CDS contracts.  
 
  
                                                            




III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SINGLE-NAME CDSS 
 In this section we provide a brief introduction to the main potential benefits and costs of 
CDSs. Prior to the credit crisis, the emphasis in the literature was tilted toward the benefits of 
CDSs (primarily as credit risk-transfer mechanisms). Since the crisis, relatively more discussion 
in the academic literature has centered on the potential costs of CDSs. We briefly discuss these 
primary benefits and costs (as a matter of theory) in this section, leaving the detailed literature 
survey and review of the empirical evidence to the rest of the paper. 
A. Potential Benefits of Single-Name CDSs 
There are four frequently noted potential benefits of single-name CDSs to their users and, 
in some cases, to other market participants: facilitating credit risk transfer, increasing the supply 
of loanable funds, providing opportunities for relatively lower-cost synthetic bond investments, 
and promoting price discovery and information aggregation. We discuss each of these potential 
benefits in the sections that follow. 
1. Credit Risk Transfer 
The classic rationale for CDSs (as with most other derivatives) is to provide a risk-
management solution for lenders to manage their credit exposures to borrowers. Prior to the 
advent of credit derivatives, there were mechanisms for firms to manage their corporate and 
sovereign credit exposures, but those credit risk transfer mechanisms were often inefficient, 
costly, and/or inaccessible to certain market participants. For example, bank lenders primarily 
managed and laid off their credit exposures to corporate borrowers through the loan syndication 
market and through the sale of loan participations on loan trading desks.59 Until the mid-1990s, 
however, the syndicated loan market was largely non-standardized and not easy for non-financial 
institutions to access except through loan or prime funds and early CLOs.   
Asset managers and other investors in corporate and sovereign debt were limited to 
hedging in the cash bond markets, where a bond investor concerned about the credit risk of the 
bond issuer could either sell the bond or utilize repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repos 
to construct synthetic bond forward contracts. The former option deprived the bond investor of 
any ongoing exposure to the issuer, and the latter alternatives were often prohibitively expensive 
and gave rise to significant basis risks.  
The introduction of single-name CDSs fundamentally altered the availability of risk-
sharing mechanisms by creating a new, more efficient product that enabled market participants to 
customize their credit risk profile. Instead of being forced to sell a bond or loan investment or 
rebalance a whole portfolio, single-name CDSs presented a more surgical and precise risk 
management tool. (Duffee and Zhou, 2001) In addition to facilitating more tailored credit risk 
transfer solutions, single-name CDSs are also more liquid and accessible to would-be hedgers 
than cash bond and loan markets.  
The risk management applications of single-name CDSs can be classified into two 
distinct categories: (i) firms that purchase credit protection to cover future potential losses that 
would be realized following a credit event; and (ii) firms that acquire credit event protection 
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using CDSs to hedge the risk of periodic changes in the market values of a reference entity’s 
obligations resulting from changes in market participants’ expectations of future potential 
adverse credit event-related losses and other market factors.   
a) Managing Realized Default Risk 
The first category of hedgers relies on single-name CDSs for credit protection to cover 
realized losses following the occurrence of a credit event. These participants are generally 
unconcerned about interim changes in market expectations of the probability of default and/or 
expected recovery rates on the underlying reference entity. Although these hedgers must be 
attentive to funding liquidity risks arising from initial and variation margin, their main risk 
management objective is to protect themselves against an actual credit event, which could give 
rise to realized economic losses if unhedged.  
For example, consider an asset manager that has invested in a large amount of bonds 
issued by XYZ Corp. If the asset manager believes that the market price of XYZ Corp. bonds 
and CDSs referencing XYZ Corp. reflect an excessively optimistic view of the true default risk 
on XYZ Corp. obligations, the asset manager may keep its bond holdings and purchase what it 
perceives as relatively cheap protection against the risk of default-related losses on XYZ Corp. 
bonds. Changes in market perceptions of XYZ Corp.’s default risk can result in potentially 
significant volatility in the prices of the asset manager’s holdings in actual XYZ bonds and CDSs 
and may present potentially significant funding requirements should the prices of XYZ Corp. 
bonds decline. Although the asset manager will have achieved its risk management objective of 
locking in the final value of its hedged bond position, it must pay close attention to the impacts 
of mark-to-market spread changes on its interim cash flows and funding liquidity. 
Although often compared to bond insurance, CDSs differ from bond insurance in several 
important ways that are particularly relevant for hedgers. A typical indemnity credit insurance 
contract (e.g., bond or loan insurance that reimburses lenders for losses arising from a borrower 
default) provides a lender with a reimbursement of actual losses sustained following a default by 
the borrower (subject to a first-loss retention (a.k.a. deductible) and a policy limit). Because 
CDSs are based on a reference entity and not a specific individual security, there is some basis 
risk for a hedger that wishes to manage its credit exposure to a given firm using single-name 
CDSs. For example, suppose an investor purchases a short-term, senior bond issued by Firm 
ABC and also purchases an auction-settled CDS on reference entity ABC. The CDS spread will 
reflect the CTD option and, to the extent that Firm ABC also has significant amounts of longer-
term and subordinated debt outstanding, the investor will pay a higher CDS coupon than 
suggested by the risk of the actual short-term senior obligation it holds. The final price in the 
CDS auction, moreover, will reflect the valuations of all of Firm ABC’s outstanding deliverable 
debt, which could also result in Firm ABC receiving a lower payment from its protection seller 
counterparty than what the bond it holds is worth. The contract is thus not equivalent to an 
indemnity contract that reimburses actual losses and is not considered insurance.  
b) Managing Interim Mark-to-Market Risk 
The second category of hedgers use single-name CDSs to manage their risk of actual 
economic losses or mark-to-market accounting losses (generating lower-quality and noisier 
earnings estimates) arising from interim changes in market expectations about the reference 




following a credit event prior to the maturity of the CDS contract. Consistent with their risk 
management objectives, such CDS users can manage their risks by adopting appropriate “hedge 
ratios” (i.e., the proportions of CDS hedge positions vis-à-vis actual exposures to the reference 
entity). A typical hedge ratio will roughly match changes in mark-to-market values of CDS 
spreads (with opposite market directional exposure) to changes in the firm’s corresponding risk 
exposure.60 
2. Increased Supply of Loanable Funds 
Financial institutions, including bank lenders to CDS reference entities, are major 
participants in the CDS market. If creditors selectively trade single-name CDSs linked to their 
borrowers, CDS positions can change the creditor-borrower relationship and play an important 
role in determining the borrower credit risk that defines the value of the CDSs and the likelihood 
of the borrowers experiencing a credit event that will trigger the CDSs. Because single-name 
CDSs enable creditors to hedge their credit exposures, moreover, CDSs (prior to Basel III) freed 
up economic and/or regulatory capital that enabled some lenders to increase the supply of credit 
either to the same underlying firm or more generally. Improved access to capital for borrowers, 
in turn, can increase their financial flexibility and resilience to financial distress. Cebenoyan and 
Strahan (2004) confirm that banks engaging in loan sales and other credit risk transfer 
mechanisms hold less capital, extend larger amounts of credit to relatively high-risk borrowers, 
and have lower overall risks and larger profits than other banks.  
This gives rise to several empirical questions that we will examine in Section V.A: To 
what extent do banks actually use single-name CDSs to hedge the credit risk of their borrowers? 
Does the use of CDSs by banks result in an increased supply of loanable funds to either the 
reference entities underlying the CDSs on which the bank has purchased protection or to other 
borrowers? Does the use of CDSs by banks lead to increased risk-taking by banks?  
3. Synthetic Bond Investments 
Unlike insurance, single-name CDSs do not oblige protection purchasers to own any of 
the underlying bonds issued by the reference entity. As such, single-name CDSs can be used by 
firms to take a position on the credit risk of the underlying reference entity either to add to or 
reduce/neutralize the same side of an existing bond position or to create a new credit exposure. 
Because single-name CDSs facilitate the standardized trading of underlying credit exposures, 
investors can usually make their desired economic trade in the underlying bond using CDSs as 
opposed to trading in fragmented, commoditized bond issues. The ability of investors to use 
CDSs as synthetic bond investments, moreover, indirectly benefits hedgers (all else equal) by 
bringing additional liquidity to the CDS market. 
4. Price Discovery and Information Aggregation 
Yet a fourth manner by which single-name CDSs provide a benefit to market participants 
is through their role in information aggregation. Like other derivatives contracts, single-name 
CDS market prices (i.e., spreads) reveal market participants’ expectations of the probability that 
the underlying reference entity will experience a credit event before the CDS contract matures 
and/or that the market-implied recovery rate and LGD will change. Even for firms that are not 
                                                            




actively engaged in credit protection purchases or sales, market-determined CDS spreads still 
contain information that is potentially useful regarding market participants’ expectations about 
the credit risk of reference entities underlying single-name CDS contracts with various 
maturities.  
B. Potential Costs of Single-Name CDSs 
Single-name CDSs also have potential costs that are subject to empirical examination. 
The major potential costs that have been discussed in the literature are summarized below. Note 
that several of these potential costs have been analyzed extensively in the theoretical financial 
literature but have not been subject to significant empirical analysis.  
1. Increased Risk-Taking and Diminished Monitoring by Banks 
The widespread availability of single-name CDSs as credit risk transfer instruments can 
potentially give banks an incentive to take on greater risks. According to some, the easier it is for 
banks to protect themselves from the risk of borrower defaults, the more banks will have an 
incentive to originate larger and riskier loans. In other words, readily available credit risk transfer 
solutions can give rise to moral hazard and induce banks to make riskier lending decisions. (See, 
e.g., Hakenes and Schnabel (2010).) Similar criticisms have been levelled at mortgage lending as 
well as leveraged finance markets. In both of these markets, the originate-to-distribute model of 
lending dominates the traditional originate-to-hold model.   
A related concern is that banks that hedge their credit risk exposures to borrowers will 
engage in insufficient monitoring of borrower credit risks – i.e., another form of moral hazard. 
(See, e.g., Pennacchi (1988) generally and Morrison (2005) for a CDS-specific discussion.) 
Monitoring involves screening borrowers ex ante in order to identify good credits and measure 
their risk and then following borrowers over the course of their loans in order to both prevent 
them from engaging in opportunistic and excessively risky behavior and to penalize them when 
they fail to meet contractual obligations. To the extent that bank lenders can hedge their 
borrower credit exposures on a relatively low-cost basis, single-name CDSs could attenuate 
banks’ incentives to monitor the credit quality of borrowers and shift monitoring responsibilities 
to credit protection sellers with relatively less skill and expertise than lenders have. The counter-
argument, however, is that, to the extent the information about the credit risk of the reference 
entity reflected in CDS spreads is reliable, it may actually be a better source of information (even 
for the original bank lenders themselves) about the credit quality of borrowers than passive or 
even active borrower-specific credit risk monitoring. 
Yet another similar concern is that CDSs can make it “too easy” for investors and banks 
to increase their credit risk exposures. The mere fact that the uses of single-name CDSs can 
sometimes lead to increased risk is not, however, an indictment of CDSs if the firms’ managers 
and shareholders have a preference for greater risk-taking and the corresponding potential for 
higher returns. On the contrary, given that single-name CDSs enable firms to achieve their 
desired risk/return targets is an indication that single-name CDSs are effective in facilitating 
firms’ specific risk management and investment objectives. 
2. Empty Creditors and Negative Economic Interests 
Concerns have been expressed that when debt holders in a company purchase too much 




creditors” may no longer have an incentive to renegotiate their debt or make concessions even 
when it is efficient for them to do so, thereby forcing the debtor into inefficient bankruptcy or 
liquidation. (Hu and Black, 2008a, 2008b; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011)  
A more extreme version of this theory known as the “negative economic interest” 
problem is that hedged creditors may have an incentive to buy up a significant amount of a 
firm’s debt, purchase protection in a much larger notional amount, and try and drive the firm into 
bankruptcy to make a net profit on its CDS protection purchases. (Hu and Black, 2008b). The 
Economist characterized this potential concern as follows: “By purchasing a material amount of 
a firm's debt in conjunction with a disproportionately large number of CDS contracts, rapacious 
lenders (mostly hedge funds) can render bankruptcy more attractive than solvency.”61 
We discuss the empty creditor and negative economic interest concerns in more detail 
and survey the related empirical evidence in Section V.B.3. 
3. “Excessive” Volatility Arising from Speculation 
The use of CDSs to replicate bond positions synthetically has been an important source of 
demand for single-name CDSs in the past, but has also been a significant source of controversy. 
As noted in the previous section, single-name CDS contracts are (by design) derivatives and not 
insurance contracts. As a result, the insurable interest doctrine does not apply to protection 
buyers and, as such, they are not obliged to own an underlying bond issued by the CDS reference 
entity. This investment activity thus is often described in the popular press as “speculation” or 
“uncovered selling” or “naked shorting.” 
A potential benefit of synthetic bond investors and speculators is, of course, the potential 
for added liquidity in the CDS marketplace. Greater liquidity benefits hedgers by reducing 
market liquidity risks. The presence of speculators also helps ensure that the information 
reflected in market prices is not biased toward either primarily optimistic or pessimistic 
investors.  
Dating back to the earliest days of U.S. futures regulation, however, many have held the 
belief that speculators can be a de-stabilizing influence and can cause an increase in market 
volatility not just in the derivatives product but in the cash market underlying the derivatives 
product. For example, in 1947 President Harry S. Truman said:  
Another factor that contributes to high prices of food is gambling in grain. Grain 
prices naturally respond to the laws of supply and demand, but they should not be 
subject to the greed of speculators who gamble on what may lie ahead in our 
commodity markets….I say this because the cost of living in this country must not 
be a football to be kicked about by gamblers in grain.62 
Such beliefs persist today. For example, during the European sovereign debt crisis, 
numerous media, public policy, and political commentators blamed naked shorting in sovereign 
CDS markets for the seemingly excessive volatility on the prices and rates of European 
sovereign debt and for the decline in sovereign debt prices in the cash market. The European 
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regulators’ concerns escalated to a ban on naked shorting of sovereign debt through sovereign 
CDSs effective as of November 1, 2012. Excluded from the ban are protection purchasers that 
own the underlying bonds, have borrowed or arranged to borrow the underlying bonds, or had an 
arrangement with a third party confirming the source from which the deliverable bonds would be 
obtained.63  
The empirical evidence does not provide support for regulators’ concerns. For example, 
Duffie (2010) shows that the growth in the net open interest of CDSs on Eurozone countries that 
were perceived as potential default risks in 2010 was not particularly volatile, which indicates 
that most CDS protection purchases were buy-and-hold hedges and not short-term speculative 
attempts to “take a view” on those countries. Duffie (2010), moreover, finds no statistically 
significant relation between net changes in open sovereign CDS positions and weekly changes in 
the CDS coupon rates for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, or Spain. In fact, the empirical 
evidence indicates that the E.U. ban on the naked shorting of sovereign debt using sovereign 
CDSs adversely impacted the market by reducing liquidity (Duffie, 2010; Pu and Zhang, 2012b; 
Silva, Vieira, and Vieira, 2016) and interfering with price discovery (Ni and Pan, 2011; Silva, 
Vieira, and Vieira, 2016).  
Related to concerns that single-name CDSs provide relatively low-cost and liquid 
instruments for speculators to take a view or make a synthetic investment in the underlying 
reference entity is the concern expressed by some that single-name CDSs may provide market 
participants with a mechanism to manipulate CDS prices in order to generate profits in related 
financial instruments (e.g., the reference entity’ stocks or bonds). This concern is usually based 
on a perceived opacity in single-named CDS trading – i.e., a perceived lack of transparency in 
single-name CDSs makes cross-market manipulations harder for other market participants to 
detect and prevent. (See, e.g., Anderson (2010) and Williams Brown (2010).) 
4. Systemic Risk 
Although there is very little empirical evidence that single-name CDSs were either the 
proximate cause of the credit and Eurozone sovereign debt crises or that single-name CDS 
markets stopped functioning during the crises (unlike other markets, such as collateralized debt 
obligations (“CDOs”) backed by subprime mortgage-backed securities), many still contend that 
single-name CDSs are a source of potential interconnectedness and systemic risk across financial 
institutions that could serve as a transmission mechanism for contagion in the event of a systemic 
financial disruption.64 This concern has been the focus of both academic researchers and 
government regulators, such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).   
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IV. THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF CDS SPREADS 
One of the most important and well-recognized aspects of the market-based price system 
is the informational role of prices. (Hayek, 1945) Prices that reflect all available information are 
essential in guiding and promoting efficient resource allocation across time and space. Financial 
asset prices, in particular, aggregate the information and expectations of a wide variety and 
number of market participants. (See, e.g., Fama (1970, 1991).)  
Prices of derivatives contracts reflect market participants’ information and expectations 
about the asset or reference rate underlying the derivatives contract. For example, the current 
price of a forward or futures contract on a commodity to be delivered in three months can be 
interpreted as the current expected value of the spot price of wheat three months from now.65 
Furthermore, prices can contain information about other exogenous market determinants. For 
example, Roll (1984) documented that, as a result of the strong relation between orange juice 
production and weather, orange juice futures prices provide better information about weather 
forecasts than weather forecasts themselves. 
CDS spreads are a type of market-determined price and, like other asset prices, contain 
potentially valuable information. In this section, we review the academic literature on the 
informational content of CDS spreads along three dimensions: (i) the information contained in 
CDS spreads about the credit risk of the underlying reference entity; (ii) the other economic 
variables that influence and are reflected in CDS spreads; and (iii) the use of CDS spreads to 
estimate the significance of firm-specific information releases (e.g., credit rating actions) and 
general market news announcements. The empirical research on these three issues can help us 
gain a better understanding of how well connected single-name CDS spreads are to the credit 
risk of their underlying reference entities and other economically relevant variables and, hence, 
how well single-name CDSs can function as credit risk transfer and synthetic investment 
mechanisms.  
A. Reference Entity Credit Risk 
Single-name CDS spreads reflect important information about market participants’ 
expectations concerning the future probability of default and the recovery rate (and, hence, LGD) 
for underlying reference entities. Before reviewing the empirical evidence in Section IV.B, a 
brief review of two anecdotal examples will help motivate the subsequent discussion. 
1. CDS Spreads and the Greek Restructuring Event 
Exhibit 8 shows single-name CDS spreads with one-, five-, and 10-year tenors on the 
Hellenic Republic from 2009 through March 9, 2012 (i.e., the date on which the EMEA DC 
declared that a restructuring event had occurred, as discussed in Section II.B.4). For scaling 
purposes, the data is presented in two sub-exhibits: Exhibit 8(a) presents Greek CDS spreads 
from 2009 through September 30, 2011, and Exhibit 8(b) shows spreads from October 3, 2011, 
through March 9, 2012.  
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Exhibit 8(a): CDS Spreads for the Hellenic Republic, 1/2/09 - 9/30/11
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Exhibit 8(b): CDS Spreads for the Hellenic Republic, 10/3/11 - 3/9/12
1-yr 5-yr 10-yr




The Greek CDS spreads shown in Exhibit 8 unsurprisingly and consistently track the 
major news events surrounding the Hellenic Republic’s mounting fiscal crisis. Tran (2013) 
confirms that sovereign CDS spreads on Greek debt provided a significant early warning to debt 
holders as much as three to six months in advance of the actual credit event determination. In 
Exhibit 8(a), for example, the increase in CDS spreads is pronounced prior to the May 2010 E.U. 
bailout announcement, as is the subsequent retrenchment of spreads after the creation of the 
EFSF was announced (see Section II.B.4). The significant increase in the volatility of credit 
spreads around the July 2011 E.U. summit is also apparent.  
In Exhibit 8(b), we can see that following the October 26, 2011, invitation by the Greek 
government for investors to engage in a voluntary debt exchange, credit spreads fell, albeit only 
briefly and from already exorbitant levels. As Exhibit 8(b) further shows, moreover, spreads 
generally then rose through mid-December, with one-year spreads exceeding 20,000bps per 
annum. A purchase of €1 million in notional credit protection on senior Greek debt in mid-
December 2011 thus would have cost over €500,000 per day.  
Also noteworthy from Exhibit 8 is the relation between CDS spreads of different 
maturities, more generally known as the term structure of CDS spreads.66 Beginning in mid-
January 2010, one-year spreads rose above five-year spreads, and five-year spreads began to 
exceed 10-year spreads. That remained true more often than not through 2010 and was 
consistently true in 2011 and 2012. In other words, the cost of purchasing credit protection on 
Greek debt (on an annualized basis) was higher for a one-year tenor than for a five- or 10-year 
tenor. Indeed, the cheapest credit protection on Greek debt (on an annualized basis) was for the 
purchase of 10-year default protection. Such inversions in the term structure of credit spreads 
(known in futures parlance as “backwardation”67) are common for reference entities 
experiencing financial distress. In essence, market participants generally expect the firm or the 
sovereign either to fail in the short run or, if it survives, to experience a subsequent improvement 
in its financial condition and credit quality, which leads to lower conditional default probabilities 
and CDS spreads for more deferred maturities. We discuss the term structure of CDS spreads in 
more detail in Section IV.B.2. 
2. CDS Spreads and the Lehman Credit Event 
The one-, five-, and 10-year spreads on senior CDSs referencing Lehman Brothers 
presented in Exhibit 9 tell a similar story for Lehman to that shown in Exhibit 8 for Greece. The 
cost of purchasing credit protection on Lehman senior debt began to increase noticeably in 
August 2007, when what had previously been limited to a U.S. subprime mortgage and leveraged 
loan crisis suddenly erupted into a broader global credit crisis. Spreads then became relatively 
more volatile and increased through the March 14, 2008, announcement by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York that it would provide temporary liquidity to facilitate the sale of ailing 
investment bank Bear Stearns.  
                                                            
66 A true term structure of CDS spreads would typically include all available maturities and not just the three shown in Exhibit 8.  
67 Backwardation is a term used to describe futures markets for which prices of contracts for near-term expiration exceed prices of longer-dated 
contracts. (See, e.g., C. L. Culp, Risk Transfer: Derivatives in Theory and Practice (John Wiley & Sons, 2004).) In the context of CDSs, this concept 






Beginning late May of 2008, as Exhibit 9 indicates, the one-year CDS spread began to 
increase significantly. Five- and 10-year spreads also rose, but not by nearly as much as the one-
year spread. Although the slope of the term structure of Lehman CDS spreads had been mostly 
negative since late 2007, the degree of backwardation increased sharply in Lehman’s final 
months. On July 15, 2008, for example, the cost of purchasing credit protection on Lehman’s 
senior debt for one year was eight percent per annum as compared to 3.93 and 3.10 percent per 
annum for the cost of five- and 10-year protection, respectively.  
B. Determinants of CDS Spreads 
Although the CDS spreads and slopes of the CDS term structures on Greek and Lehman 
debt leading up to the two entities’ credit events tell a plausible story that single-name CDSs 
reflect market participants’ expectations of future credit events, the mere graphical depictions of 
spreads does not empirically substantiate that numerical default probabilities and recovery rates 
can be extracted with confidence from observed CDS spreads. To accomplish that, more rigorous 
econometric analyses are required. Such analyses are also required to determine which other 
economic variables may influence and be reflected in single-name CDS spreads.  
Significant attention has been paid in the academic literature to the empirical 
determinants of CDS spreads. In other words, what actually determines the price that protection 
purchasers must pay to transfer their credit risk or initiate a new synthetic bond position on 



































































Exhibit 9: CDS Spreads for Lehman Brothers, 1/3/07 - 9/15/08
1-yr 5-yr 10-yr




At a broad level, the market-determined spread on a single-name CDS is comprised of 
two components. The first component is the expected credit loss associated with the underlying 
reference entity – i.e., the probability that the reference entity experiences a credit event over the 
life of the CDS contract, and the LGD if a credit event occurs (i.e., the expected loss less 
expected recoveries). Protection sellers demand a CDS coupon rate that compensates them for 
these expected credit-related losses. We review the empirical research on expected credit loss 
information reflected in CDS spreads in Sections IV.B.1 and IV.B.2. 
In addition to the expected credit loss component of CDS spreads, protection sellers also 
demand a risk premium from protection buyers to compensate for the risk that actual payouts on 
the single-name CDS protection sales they write may exceed expected credit losses. (Pan and 
Singleton, 2008) As we discuss in Section IV.B.3, the risk premium reflected in CDS spreads is 
not limited to a credit risk premium; protection sellers in single-name CDS appear also to require 
compensation for non-credit risks.  
Many of the economic variables discussed in the sections below have their theoretical 
roots in the classic characterization of corporate debt as a put option on the assets of a firm plus a 
risk-free loan originally pioneered by Merton (1974).68 A large literature has evolved that 
expands on and modifies the original lognormal Merton model, tests the original version of the 
model and many of its successors, and empirically examines the related issue of the “credit 
spread puzzle” (i.e., actual credit spreads are often much higher than those implied by the Merton 
model). Those theoretical and empirical studies are beyond the scope of this paper, but interested 
readers are directed to the useful surveys by Jarrow (2009) and Sundaresan (2013). 
1. CDS Spreads and Expected Credit Losses 
A significant amount of research has investigated the forecasting power of CDS spreads 
with respect to the credit risk of underlying reference entities. The evidence indicates that CDS 
spreads (both spreads and changes in spreads) contain information that can be used to estimate 
the probability of future adverse credit events. Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Finnerty, 
Miller, and Chen (2013), and others confirm this hypothesis where negative rating events 
(primarily reviews for downgrade) are the adverse credit events. Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, 
Ferguson, and Schranz (2005), moreover, find that over 70 percent of the variation (across 
different reference entities) in five-year single-name corporate CDS spreads is explained by 
corresponding expected default frequencies (“EDFs”) measured using the Moody’s KMV 
model.69 Other studies of CDS spreads have confirmed that a reference entity’s credit risk 
(measured by credit rating or market-based measures like EDFs) is a primary determinant of 
credit spreads during normal market conditions – see, e.g., Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko, and 
Huang (2002), Abid and Naifar (2006), Fabozzi, Cheng, and Chen (2007), Jakovlev (2007), 
Chen, Cheng, and Liu (2008), Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013), and 
Kolokolova, Lin, and Poon (2015). 
Some papers have focused specifically on the informational content of CDS spreads for 
banks or other financial institutions. Chiaramonte and Casu (2010) find that single-name CDS 
                                                            
68 The Merton (1974) insight can be used as a non-parametric empirical benchmark for credit risk analyses, as discussed in Culp, Nozawa, and 
Veronesi (2015). 
69 Moody’s KMV model is based on the Merton (1974) structural model of credit spreads. EDFs are estimates of default probabilities specifically 
obtained from the Moody’s KMV model, and subsequent uses of the EDF acronym in this review refer to probabilities of default obtained or 




spreads on senior U.S. bank debt reflect the same information as bank balance sheet ratios and 
are a good proxy for bank credit risks. The authors also deduced that the relationship between 
CDS spreads and balance sheet ratios grew even stronger during the credit crisis. Norden and 
Weber (2012) find a similar result for CDSs on the senior debt of European banks and further 
document that CDSs on subordinated bank debt provide an early indication of bank default risk 
(which they measure using credit ratings and financial statement information). Not surprisingly, 
they show that CDSs on subordinated bank debt are more risk-sensitive than CDSs on senior 
debt.  
Avino, Conlon, and Cotter (2016) examine the senior and subordinated CDS spreads of 
60 European and U.S. banks and confirmed the results in the earlier two studies that changes in 
CDS spreads provide strong information about forthcoming financial distress at banks. They 
authors estimate that a one standard deviation increase in CDS spreads is associated with as 
much as a 15 percent increase in the probability of the reference bank’s failure. 
Single-name CDS spreads not only reflect the probability that the underlying reference 
entity will experience an event of default,70 but also market participants’ expectations about the 
recovery rate and LGD of the reference entity.71 In a classic paper, Pan and Singleton (2008) 
estimate the nature of default arrivals and recovery rates implied by the term structure of 
sovereign CDS spreads using data from Mexico, Turkey, and Korea from 2001 to 2006. They 
show that the probability of default and LGD can be separately estimated from the term structure 
of sovereign CDS spreads. Christensen (2007), Schneider, Sögner, and Veža (2010), Elkamhi, 
Jacobs, and Pan (2014), and Schlӓfer and Uhrig-Homburg (2014) also find that separate 
estimates of default probabilities and expected recovery rates or LGDs can be extracted from 
observed CDS spreads and that the risk of changes in expected recovery rates gives rise to a risk 
premium for which protection purchasers demand to be compensated.  
2. The Term Structure of CDS Spreads 
The term structure of CDS spreads is normally upward-sloping. At least two different 
explanations have been posited for this phenomenon. The first and most obvious explanation for 
a positively sloped CDS term structure is that investors may perceive the firm’s credit quality to 
be declining over time, resulting in rising costs of default protection and CDS spreads. 
Sometimes known as the expectations hypothesis, this explanation essentially adopts the view 
that current CDS spreads are good forecasts of future default probabilities and recovery rates.  
A significant amount of theoretical research has been conducted to try and connect the 
slope of the term structure of CDS spreads to underlying theories of credit risk. The idea is that 
the term structure of single-name CDS spreads should be upward-sloping for relatively high-
quality, low-risk reference entities because of the direct link between CDS spreads and 
conditional default probabilities. To put it simply, the probability of a firm defaulting over the 
course of one year starting at time t – conditional on the firm having survived up to time t – is 
higher for larger values of t because expected future credit quality is perceived as lower than 
current credit quality. For example, the conditional probability of default from year five to year 
                                                            
70 The probabilities of default extracted from the CDS term structure are known as “risk-neutral” probabilities – i.e., probabilities that a risk-neutral 
agent would perceive. Risk-neutral probabilities can be converted into “true” default probabilities by making some additional assumptions about 
investor risk aversion and systematic risk. See, e.g., J. H. Cochrane, Asset Pricing, rev. ed. (Princeton University Press, 2001). 
71 CDS spread valuation models often assume a fixed recovery rate. To the extent that recovery rates are not fixed, however, spreads estimated in 




six for a firm that has survived to year 5 is lower than the conditional probability of default from 
year nine to year 10 for a firm that has survived to year nine, thus implying a higher one-year 
CDS spread at year nine than the one-year CDS spread at year five.  
For relatively riskier, lower-quality firms – especially those experiencing financial 
distress – the opposite is true, and the term structure of CDS spreads is generally downward-
sloping, as shown in Exhibits 8 and 9 for CDS spreads on Greece and Lehman Brothers, 
respectively. For such firms, the one-year conditional probability of default at time t is 
decreasing in t – i.e., a firm that survives the short run is expected to have subsequent 
improvements in its credit quality, thus leading to lower conditional default probabilities and 
CDS spreads.  
An alternative to the expectations hypothesis is that CDS spreads for different maturities 
reflect not only expected future credit losses but also a risk premium that investors require as 
compensation to bear the risk that future losses are unexpectedly higher than the reference 
entity’s expected credit loss and for other non-credit risks to which protection sellers (and 
buyers) may be exposed. This explanation is known as the risk premium hypothesis. Like the 
expectations hypothesis, the risk premium hypothesis also implies a positively sloped term 
structure of CDS spreads on average for relatively low-risk firms – i.e., potential unexpected 
losses in excess of expected losses are perceived to be greater for dates further off in the future 
and lower for near-term risk horizons.  
Both the expectations and risk premium theories of the CDS term structure have a 
common testable implication – i.e., the CDS term structure is upward-sloping for high-quality 
issuers and downward-sloping for the riskiest issuers. Using pre-crisis single-name CDS data 
from July 1999 through December 2003, Lando and Mortensen (2005) find that the data is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction. For example, reference entities whose 5-year CDS 
spreads exceeded 1,200bps had downward-sloping term structures from the 1-year tenor through 
the longest-dated tenor. The term structures of CDS spreads for issuers in the middle ground 
from a risk perspective tend to be hump-shaped. For example, reference entities whose 5-year 
CDS spreads are above 600bps had downward-sloping CDS term structures beginning with the 
3-year tenor and thereafter. (Lando and Mortensen, 2005) The impact of accounting information 
and associated uncertainties about reference entity credit risks on the CDS term structure has also 
been investigated by Duffie and Lando (2001), Das, Hanouna, and Sarin (2009), Griffin (2014), 
and Trujillo-Ponce, Samaniengo-Medina, and Cardone-Riportella (2014). 
Han and Zhou (2011) analyze the relation between the slope of the CDS term structure 
(measured as five-year minus one-year single-name CDS spreads) and the expected returns on 
the stocks of those firms. Using North American corporate reference entities from 2002 through 
2009, Han and Zhou find a negative relation between the slope of the CDS term structure and 
stock returns. Specifically, reference entities whose CDS term structures are steeply upward-
sloping have negative abnormal stock returns on average, and firms with a mildly upward-
sloping CDS term structures have positive abnormal returns. The abnormal returns, moreover, 
seem to persist for up to six months.  
Calice, Mio, Štĕrba, and Vašíček (2015) analyze the CDS term structure (measured as the 
difference between 10-year and five-year spreads) using sovereign CDSs on five European 
sovereign reference entities over the period from September 2007 through February 2012. As in 




yield curve slope is driven primarily by market liquidity, returns on local stock markets, and 
investor risk aversion. They also conclude that the sensitivity of the slope of the sovereign CDS 
term structure is regime-dependent and can be as much as 10 times higher during periods of 
unusually elevated market volatility.  
The term structure of expected recovery rates implicit in CDS spreads exhibit opposite 
patterns from the term structure of CDS spreads themselves, which is also consistent with the 
testable implications of both the expectations and risk premium hypotheses. Doshi (2011) 
documented that the term structure of expected recovery rates is normally downward-sloping for 
healthy firms, but reverses and becomes upward-sloping when the reference entity is distressed. 
Doshi (2011) interprets the positively sloped term structure of recovery rates during distress as 
an indication of market participants’ expectations that future expected recovery rates for the firm 
will be higher provided the firm survives its short-run distress. 
3. Determinants of CDS Risk Premiums 
As discussed previously, CDS spreads reflect both expected credit losses and a risk 
premium that reflects potential unexpected losses and other economically relevant variables. A 
significant literature has been developed that analyzes both single-name CDS risk premiums and 
the determinants of CDS spreads. The economic variables that influence CDS spreads can be 
classified into three categories: (i) reference entity-specific risks; (ii) risks related both to the 
reference entity and market-wide factors; and (iii) purely systematic or market-wide risks. We 
discuss these sources of risk to single-name CDS market participants in the next three 
subsections, respectively.  
a) Reference Entity-Specific Risks 
According to the Merton (1974) model, higher volatility of a firm’s assets should lead to 
increases in the firm’s credit spread (resulting from more asset value uncertainty as well as a 
higher probability of bankruptcy). Empirically, the literature confirms a strong relation between 
the volatility of a reference entity’s equity price and that entity’s single-name CDS spread. All 
else equal, the higher the volatility of a firm’s equity price volatility, the larger will be the spread 
on that firm’s single-name CDS contracts – see, e.g., Skinner and Townend (2002), Aunon-
Nerin, Cossin, Hricko, and Huang (2002), Abid and Naifar (2006), Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo 
(2009), Greatrex (2009a), Zhang, Zhou, Zhu (2009), Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2010), Tang and Yan 
(2010), Raunig and Scheicher (2011), Conrad, Dittmar, and Hameed (2013), Doshi, Jacobs, and 
Zurita (2014), González and Naranjo (2014), Castellanos, Constantinou, and Ng (2015), Hasan, 
Liu, Zhang (2015), and Leccadito, Tunaru, and Urga (2015).72 Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) 
find that an adverse shock to the equity valuations of financial intermediaries leads to increases 
in those entities’ CDS spreads that is both immediate and persistent.  
The Merton (1974) model also indicates that the greater a firm’s leverage, the higher the 
credit spread. Empirical studies support the importance of leverage in determining corporate 
single-name CDS spreads – see, e.g., Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko, and Huang (2002), Ericsson, 
Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009), Di Cesare and Guazzarotti (2010), Gamba and Saretto (2013), and 
Hasan, Liu, Zhang (2015). Some studies have also examined the extent to which accounting 
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information (e.g., earnings and accruals) help explain corporate single-name CDS spreads. Such 
studies generally conclude that accounting numbers do have some explanatory power, but that 
accounting measures are at best noisy proxies for the default risks of the reference entities. See, 
e.g., Callen, Livnat, and Segal (2009), and Batta (2011). 
b) Both Reference Entity-Specific and Systematic Risk Factors 
Berndt, Jarrow and Kang (2007) compare single-name corporate CDS spreads on 
contracts that define restructuring as a triggering credit event vis-à-vis CDS contracts in which 
the counterparties exclude restructuring events. They estimate that the average risk premium 
demanded by protection sellers for bearing restructuring risk is six to eight percent of the no-
restructuring CDS spread. The authors also find that the restructuring risk premium depends both 
on firm-specific balance-sheet variables and a systematic macroeconomic risk factor. 
The academic literature also empirically substantiates that market liquidity and liquidity 
risk are strong determinants of single-name CDS risk premiums. More specifically, single-name 
CDS risk premiums appear to include a risk premium for reference entity-specific liquidity risk 
and for market-wide liquidity risk.73 As concerns the former, relative illiquidity and higher 
bid/ask spreads on both single-name CDSs and bonds issued by the reference entity have an 
impact on single-name CDS spreads. With respect to the latter, various measures of market 
liquidity risk have been shown to affect CDS spreads – namely, when markets conditions 
deteriorate and market liquidity risk rises, protection sellers demand a higher CDS coupon to 
compensate for the risk that they may be unable to hedge or offset their CDS protection sales 
quickly and/or without a resulting adverse price impact precipitated by the hedge or offsetting 
transaction. Studies that have documented the empirical relations between single-name CDS 
spreads and a liquidity risk premium include Düllmann and Sosinska (2007), Fabozzi, Cheng, 
and Chen (2007), Tang and Yan (2007), Dunbar (2008), Remolona, Scatigna, and Wu (2008), 
Greatrex (2009a), Chen, Fabozzi, and Sverdlove (2010), Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen 
(2011), Pu, Wang, and Wu (2011), Chen, Cheng, and Wu (2012), Coro, Dufour, and Varotto 
(2012), Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic, and Sarno (2012), Qiu and Yu (2012), Yeh (2012), 
Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013), Bao and Pan (2013), Calice, Chen, and 
Williams (2013), Díaz, Groba, and Serrano (2013), Gündüz, Nasev, and Trapp (2013), 
Mayordomo, Rodríguez-Moreno, and Peña (2014), Calice, Mio, Štĕrba, and Vašíček (2015), 
Kolokolova, Lin, and Poon (2015), Meine, Supper, and Weiβ (2015), and Pires, Pereira and 
Martins (2015). Brigo, Predescu, and Capponi (2010) and van der Merwe (2015) present surveys 
of the different modeling methodologies proposed in the academic literature for measuring 
liquidity risk for CDSs.  
Liquidity risk is also a determinant of spreads on single-name CDSs with sovereign 
reference entities. Badaoui, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2013) analyzed sovereign CDS spreads and 
estimated that default risk explains 55.6 percent of sovereign CDS spreads, but that market 
liquidity risk accounts for another 44.3 percent. (The authors find that correlation risk explains 
the remainder.) Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) also find that sovereign default risk and 
liquidity risk account for most variations in sovereign credit spreads, especially for relatively 
higher-risk countries. We discuss the issue of differential liquidity between CDS and bond 
markets again in Section VI.D. 
                                                            




c) Systematic Risk Factors 
Another important empirical determinant of single-name CDS spreads is investor 
sentiment and risk aversion (often measured using the VIX index as a proxy). Irrespective of the 
perceived credit risk of the underlying reference entity, an increase in market-wide risk aversion 
leads to increases in CDS spreads, which Remolona, Scatigna, and Wu (2008), Berndt and 
Obreja (2010), Tang and Yan (2010), Aizenman, Hutchinson, and Jinjarak (2013), Zinna (2013), 
Doshi, Jacobs, and Zurita (2014), Calice, Mio, Štĕrba, and Vašíček (2015) Leccadito, Tunaru, 
and Urga (2015), and others have all empirically substantiated. 
Macroeconomic variables are also important systematic risk factors that impact CDS 
spreads and risk premiums, especially when interaction effects are taken into account (e.g., the 
correlation between default rates and interest rates) – see, e.g., Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), 
Chen, Cheng, and Wu (2012), Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), Doshi, Ericsson, Jacobs, and 
Turnbull (2013), González and Naranjo (2014), and Schlӓfer and Uhrig-Homburg (2014). The 
empirical evidence also indicates that uncertainty about macroeconomic conditions is a 
significant explanatory variable for CDS spreads. (See, e.g., Baum and Wan (2010).) 
A significant amount of empirical research has been conducted to ascertain whether the 
primary driver in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads is a global economic common 
factor or whether country-specific effects dominate. Through the end of the credit crisis and up 
to the beginning of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, most of the evidence indicates that strong 
co-movements in sovereign credit spreads were driven by a common global economic factor 
(generally thought to be changes in the U.S. financial market conditions instead of domestic 
macroeconomic shocks) – see, e.g., Pan and Singleton (2008), Borri and Verdelhan (2012), 
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) and Ang and Longstaff (2013). For example, 
Longstaff et. al. (2011) studied sovereign credit risk using sovereign CDS data for 26 countries 
over the 2000-2010 time period and found that sovereign CDS spreads had a significant common 
component that was more related to U.S. financial market conditions than to local economic 
measures. They estimated that, on average, the default risk premium accounts for about one-third 
of CDS spreads, and that the expected credit risk of the specific sovereign reference entity 
accounts for the remaining two thirds of the credit spread.  
Dieckmann and Plank (2012) and Eyssell, Fung, and Zhang (2013) also find that the 
condition of the global financial system is an important determinant of sovereign CDS spreads. 
Other studies whose conclusions indicate that global risk factors dominate country-specific risk 
factors in explaining sovereign CDS spreads include Fender, Hayo, and Neuenkirch (2012), and 
Sapriza, Zhao, and Zhou (2009). 
Beginning with the advent of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, several studies have 
also found linkages between sovereign distress and domestic (rather than global) financial 
distress – see, e.g., Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) and Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci 
(2016). For example, Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci (2016) find that a 1bp increase in domestic 
banks’ risk-weighted exposures to foreign banks is associated with a 0.4bps increase in 5-year 
sovereign CDS spreads. (See Section VII.C for further discussion of the public-private 
connection between sovereign and commercial credit risk.) 
Augustin (2013) examines sovereign CDS spreads for tenors of one, two, three, five, 
seven, and 10 years on 44 countries in the EMEA region, as well as Latin America, from January 




risk are important drivers of sovereign CDS risk premiums and the term structures of sovereign 
CDS spreads. Specifically, he finds that local shocks to domestic economies and financial 
systems have a stronger impact on sovereign CDS spreads than global shocks for countries 
experiencing distress. For countries not experiencing any significant distress, shocks to the 
global economy and financial markets tend to dominate shocks to the local economy in their 
impact on sovereign CDS premiums and term structure slopes.  
C. Single-Name CDS Event Studies 
A standard tool in empirical financial economics is the event study.74 The purpose of an 
event study is to analyze the informational impact of a significant event on the prices of an 
issuer’s securities. Specifically, event studies can be used to answer two questions about a 
particular event: (i) Was the event and its impact on the price of the asset in question anticipated 
in advance by market participants (i.e., “anticipation effect”)?; and (ii) Did the event itself have a 
statistically significant impact on asset prices when and after it occurred (i.e., “announcement 
effect”)?  
Event studies are an important and large part of the broad financial economics and 
econometrics literatures. Most event studies have historically focused on examining abnormal 
stock returns. Abnormal returns are either higher or lower than the returns predicted by one or 
more common risk factors. For example, the classic and original version of an event study by 
Fama, Fischer, Jensen, and Roll (1969) uses the market model to compute predicted returns – 
i.e., a model in which the returns on a stock are driven by a measure of the broad market (e.g., 
the value-weighted index of stocks maintained by the Center for Research in Security Prices, the 
S&P 500 index, etc.).  
Since the advent of single-name CDS trading, academic research began to utilize single-
name CDSs in addition to or in lieu of equities to examine the informational content of 
announcements and events. To control for market-wide common factors influencing CDS 
spreads, CDS event studies generally examine spreads relative to an appropriate benchmark or 
index. The difference between the spread on a CDS for an individual reference entity and the 
most relevant CDS index is generally known as the adjusted or abnormal spread. Event studies 
then quantify the size and statistical significance of changes in adjusted spreads both before the 
event date (to ascertain an anticipation effect) and after (to estimate any announcement effect).  
The anticipation and announcement effects of an event are inter-related. At the extreme, 
if an event is perfectly anticipated by market participants, the entire impact of that event on CDS 
spreads should result in strong abnormal spreads prior to the event (i.e., the anticipation effect) 
and virtually no abnormal changes following the actual event (i.e., the announcement effect). 
Conversely, if the event is a total surprise to market participants, we would expect to see no 
abnormal spreads prior to the event (i.e., no anticipation effect) and significant abnormal CDS 
spreads following the announcement (i.e., a strong announcement effect). When we observe 
significant abnormal spreads both before and after the event, we can infer both an anticipation 
and announcement effect. This often occurs when market participants anticipate only part of the 
information related to the announcement (e.g., the magnitude of the event but not its timing, the 
likelihood of the event but not its magnitude, etc.).  
                                                            




In this section, we review the literature on event studies involving single-name CDSs. 
More specifically, we review the literature on what CDS spreads reveal the about informational 
content of corporate credit rating actions, how adverse credit events at one reference entity may 
have spillover effects on other borrowers, the impact of corporate announcements on specific 
financial results, and more.  
1. Credit Rating Actions 
Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) analyze the relationship between CDS spreads 
(primarily for five-year CDSs on corporate, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign issuers) and ratings 
announcements over a period from 1998 through 2002. They find that rating agency reviews for 
downgrade (i.e., “negative watch” events) have a significant impact on CDS spreads, whereas 
actual downgrades and negative outlooks do not. All three types of credit rating actions, 
moreover, are anticipated by market participants, although rating reviews are less anticipated 
than actual downgrades.  
Like Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Norden and Weber (2004) find that rating agency 
reviews for downgrades lead to significant abnormal changes in CDS spreads and that market 
participants anticipate rating actions before they occur, with reviews for downgrades being less 
anticipated than actual downgrades. Unlike Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Norden and 
Weber (2004) find that actual downgrades do not seem to matter – i.e., the impact of actual 
downgrades is fully reflected in single-name CDS spreads prior to the downgrade itself. The 
results in Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) regarding the 
anticipation and reaction effects for negative ratings announcements in the single-name corporate 
CDS market have been generally confirmed in other academic studies, including Daniels and 
Jensen (2005), Di Cesare (2006), Imbierowicz and Wahrenburg (2009), Brandstack (2010), Galil 
and Soffer (2011), Bedendo, Cathcart, El-Jahel, and Evans (2013), Finnerty, Miller, and Chen 
(2013), Norden (2014), and Berg and Streitz (2016). Taking into account intra-industry effects, 
Cizel (2013) finds that S&P’s negative announcements impact intra-industry CDS spreads but 
that Moody’s and Fitch’s negative announcements do not. 
Most single-name corporate CDS event studies indicate that CDS market participants do 
not anticipate positive rating actions and only focus on negative rating actions. An exception is 
Finnerty, Miller, and Chen (2013), who find that positive credit rating events can have a 
significant positive impact on CDS spreads (i.e., causing them to narrow significantly), despite 
being less anticipated than downgrades.75 The data sample in Finnerty, Miller, and Chen (2013), 
moreover, contains a significantly larger number of observations than most other research on this 
topic.  
Other event studies involving single-name corporate CDSs have yielded additional 
insights on the informational content of CDS spreads. For example, Norden and Weber (2012) 
analyze abnormal price reactions around negative watch rating events for CDSs on both senior 
and subordinated European bank debt and find evidence that spreads on both CDS types react 
significantly to downgrade announcements and that, prior to the credit crisis, CDS spreads on 
subordinated debt reacted more than CDS spreads on senior debt. By contrast, the authors find 
that reactions of CDSs on senior and subordinated debt were comparable during the crisis.  
                                                            




As another example, Imbierowicz and Wahrenburg (2009) find that the size of the 
anticipation effect depends on the underlying reason for the rating agency action. In particular, 
the majority of the anticipation effect for negative rating announcements appears to depend on 
events related to issuers’ operating performance.  
 Lehnert and Neske (2006) find evidence for the announcement effect – i.e., spreads 
respond to rating actions and are informative. Their empirical results, however, are at odds with 
the rest of the literature on the anticipation effect in the single-name corporate CDS market. 
Specifically, they find that different types of rating announcements are not anticipated by market 
participants. Their sample size, however, is restricted to just 100 European firms and only covers 
the period from 2001 through 2003. Most papers on this topic published after 2006 confirm or 
extend the earlier results of Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004), 
suggesting that the results in Lehnert and Neske (2006) may be sample-specific.  
Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2014) also find that CDS spreads reveal information about 
forthcoming adverse credit events. In addition, they find that equity options markets reveal such 
anticipated negative news around the same time as CDS spreads but that equity markets do not 
respond to such changes in option prices unless the anticipated adverse credit event is also 
already reflected in CDS spreads. 
2. Spillover Effects from Adverse Credit Events 
a) Corporate Reference Entities 
 A slightly different branch of the CDS event study literature focuses on the impact that 
the downgrade of one reference entity may have on other entities. Jorion and Zhang (2007) 
present a comprehensive analysis of intra-industry spillover effects. Specifically, they analyze 
single-name corporate CDS spreads to examine potential “contagion” or “spillover” effects – i.e., 
situations in which an adverse event at one firm causes CDS spreads to increase for other firms 
in the same industry – and potential “competitive effects” in which an adverse event at one firm 
benefits one or more competitors to that firm and thus causes the other firms’ CDS spreads to 
decline. They find evidence of contagion effects following Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings and 
evidence of competitive effects following Chapter 7 filings. Huang and Cheng (2013) extend the 
analysis of Jorion and Zhang (2007) and find that inter-industry contagion effects are more 
pronounced for firms with higher “information uncertainty” (measured by the authors as 
dispersions in analyst forecasts).  
In a later paper, Jorion and Zhang (2009) extend their earlier analysis and examine 
spillover effects on creditors arising from bankruptcy announcements through direct counterparty 
effects. They find that creditors to firms that announce bankruptcy filings exhibit negative 
abnormal equity returns (in an event-study context) and higher CDS spreads.  
Huang, Shen, and Chen (2012) analyze the reactions of major companies to rival 
company defaults during the 2007 and 2008 credit crisis years. They investigate two competing 
hypotheses – i.e., the failure of a rival creates a crisis of confidence for all firms in the same 
industry (and, hence, a positive correlation between CDS spreads for single reference entities in 
the same industry), or the deterioration in the credit quality of one firm in a given industry results 
in higher investor confidence in the credit quality of its rivals, thereby causing a negative 
correlation between changes CDS spreads for the downgraded firm and the credit spreads of its 




support for the contagion hypothesis – i.e., spreads on single-name CDSs with financial firms as 
reference entities generally rise both before and after default events experienced by other 
financial firms. The authors also find support for earlier research that market participants react 
more to negative credit events than to positive ones, and that CDS market participants anticipate 
negative shocks. The authors further conclude that, to the extent there are any inter-dependencies 
in the CDS spreads of non-financial reference entities, those effects were competitive in the early 
period of the crisis and contagious later in the crisis.  
b) Sovereign Reference Entities 
For sovereign issuers, spillover effects have been examined as the result of rating agency 
actions using the event-study methodology. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) analyze single-name 
CDSs on 22 emerging market sovereigns around credit rating announcements. They find a strong 
anticipation effect for negative rating actions – i.e., market participants anticipate negative rating 
announcements – and no significant change in CDS spreads in the two days following the actual 
announcements, although some spillover effects can be observed. Positive rating announcements, 
however, lead to an immediate and significant reaction in CDS spreads and a strong spillover 
effect to other emerging market countries from the event country. The degree of the spillover 
effects of positive events is affected by the credit ratings of the non-event countries and the 
spillover effect of negative events is affected by the credit rating of the event country. 
Blau and Roseman (2014) adopt an approach similar to Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) 
and estimate spillover effects on European sovereigns resulting from the downgrade of the 
United States on August 5, 2011. They estimate no significant change in U.S. Government CDS 
spreads following the downgrade, which is consistent with the corporate CDS literature in which 
negative watch announcements impact CDS spreads but actual downgrades often do not. Their 
event-study methodology indicates, however, that European CDS spreads experienced 
significant increases following the U.S. downgrade and that at least some aspect of the U.S. 
downgrade was anticipated by sovereign CDS market participants.  
Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes (2012) analyze 24 European sovereign issuers and the 
reactions of their CDS spreads to rating agency announcements. The results in Afonso, Furceri, 
and Gomes (2012) regarding the reaction effect are more consistent with the findings for 
corporate borrowers discussed in Section IV.B.1 than the sovereigns analyzed by Ismailescu and 
Kazemi (2010). Specifically, Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes (2012) estimate a significant reaction 
of credit spreads to negative rating announcements and only a minor reaction to positive 
announcements. They did not find a significant anticipation effect except within a week or two of 
the rating announcement date. Consistent with Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), the authors 
document a spillover effect, especially from lower-rated to higher-rated countries. 
3. Other Corporate Performance Announcements 
Single-name corporate CDS spreads can also be used to examine what market 
participants anticipate regarding announcements related to specific corporate financial 
information. For example, the informational content of earnings announcements and “surprises” 
(i.e., deviations of announced earnings from expected earnings and earnings targets), is examined 
by Callen, Livnat, and Segal (2009), Greatrex (2009b), Lok and Richardson (2011), Shivakumar, 
Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang (2011), and Elkamhi, Jacobs, Langlois, and Ornthanalai (2012) using 




(i.e., CDS spreads respond to earnings announcements). Greatrex (2009b) finds that negative 
earnings announcements are anticipated, and Elkamhi et. al. (2012) conclude that the impact of 
accounting information releases on CDS spreads is more than double the impact of credit-related 
news about reference entities.  
Palmgren and Tamule (2009) study the reaction of single-name corporate CDS spreads to 
corporate dividend reduction announcements. The authors present some evidence of both 
anticipation and announcement effects, although their empirical analysis is based on a small 
sample of only seven firms and their paper does not indicate whether or not the results are 
statistically significant.  
Sturm (2013/14) analyzes the responses of single-name CDS spreads on bank reference 
entities related to losses of €1 million or more arising from operational risks, such as fraud. 
Although Sturm finds little evidence of a CDS market reaction to the first public announcements 
of operational risk-related losses, he does find evidence that CDS spreads rise on the settlement 
dates of such losses. He also documents that banks with relatively higher credit ratings 
experience greater increases in their CDS spreads following the settlements of operational risk-
related losses and that, all else equal, the larger the loss, the larger the increase in the spread.  
4. Other Announcements and Information 
The event-study framework can also be used to examine the perceived impact of public 
policy initiatives, such as government interventions and bailouts. For example, using a novel 
methodology, Veronesi and Zingales (2010) rely on CDS spreads to estimate the costs and 
benefits of the U.S. bank bailout plan announced on October 13, 2008. They find significant 
wealth transfers from taxpayers and stockholders of the banks to the bondholders of the banks 
receiving bailout funds. Other studies have also used event studies involving CDSs to estimate 
the benefits and/or costs of bank bailout programs – see, e.g., King (2009), Panetta et. al. (2009), 
and Greatrex and Rengifo (2012).  
 Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) examine the influence of bank size and government 
deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads using a sample of banks in 20 countries over the 
2001-2008 period. Under the belief that some banks may be too big to save (“TBTS”), the 
authors analyze the relations between bank equity valuations and the country’s fiscal balance 
(which should be positive for TBTS banks) and CDS spreads and fiscal balances (which should 
be negative for TBTS banks). An alternative transmission channel is that large fiscal deficits 
associated with prior bank bailouts will tend to reduce banks’ equity capital and increase bank 
CDS spreads. (See the related discussion in Section VII.D.) The authors find a significant inverse 
relation between the state of a country’s finances and the valuation of systemically important 
banks – i.e., the less public funds are available to bail out the large banks, the lower are the 
amounts of those banks’ equity capitalizations. For the same reason, they also concluded that 
bank CDS spreads were inversely related to a country’s fiscal condition (although this finding is 
called into question in the authors’ robustness checks). 
Using an event-study framework, Bertoni and Lugo (2014) analyze the impact of 
investments by sovereign wealth funds in target investment companies and ascertain that CDS 
spreads of such target companies decline upon the investment announcement. Eisenthal, 
Feldhutter, and Vig (2016) adopt the event-study methodology to examine how the 




single-name CDS spreads as a measure of LBO target firms’ credit spreads, the authors find that 
spreads rise significantly over the 22 days prior to the announcement and during the two-day 
announcement period but remain stable thereafter. They also find that CDSs with longer-dated 
maturities exhibit larger spread changes, and that increases in spreads are more pronounced for 
investment-grade LBO targets.  
The use of event studies to analyze the informational content of an event is not confined 
to announcements and can also be based on information provided by market-based events (e.g., 
severe credit deteriorations as indicated by significant changes in CDS spreads). The use of the 
event-study methodology to examine the implications of market-based events is often associated 
with studies of price discovery (see Section VI.A) or the analysis of contagion and spillover 





V. IMPLICATIONS OF SINGLE-NAME CDS TRADING FOR CREDITORS AND CDS 
REFERENCE ENTITIES 
The dominant view prior to the credit crisis was that financial innovations are beneficial 
to most market participants. (See, e.g., Miller (1986, 1992), Kane (1988), Ross (1989), Finnerty 
(1992), and Merton (1992, 1995).) Useful surveys of financial innovation and economic activity 
can be found in Tufano (2002) and Frame and White (2004). Most credit markets (e.g., the 
market for CDOs backed by subprime ABS) broke down during the crisis. Although single-name 
CDS markets continued to function during the crisis, many market participants have nevertheless 
been reassessing their pre-crisis view of general credit markets and products including single-
name CDSs. 
In this section, we review the academic literature on the potential benefits and costs of 
single-name CDSs in the context of relations between CDS reference entities and their lenders. 
In the first section, we consider how and why CDSs are used by bank lenders, whether bank 
CDS usage impacts banks’ monitoring of borrower credit risk, and whether the availability of 
CDSs changes the risk-taking behavior of banks. In Section V.B, we examine the impact of 
single-name CDSs on the reference entities underlying traded CDSs – specifically, the relations 
between banks’ usage of single-name CDSs and the availability and price of bank credit, and 
how the beginning of trading of single-name CDSs may impact the reference entities underlying 
the CDSs.  
A. The Impact of Single-Name CDSs on Bank Lenders 
Firms are typically financed using equity and/or debt. Bank loans, publicly traded bonds, 
and privately placed debt are prevalent types of debt financing. Single-name CDSs provide a 
mechanism whereby lenders to corporate and sovereign borrowers can mitigate and transfer their 
credit risks to other firms more willing to bear such risks (including other hedgers as well as 
speculators, as discussed in Sections III.A.1 and III.A.3, respectively.)  
We begin this section with a discussion of the determinants of banks’ credit risk transfer 
decisions – i.e., when and why banks use single-name CDSs. Related to that issue is whether or 
not the choice of single-name CDSs as a credit risk transfer mechanism has an impact on banks’ 
monitoring of borrower credit risks. In the second subsection below, we consider the empirical 
evidence on whether single-name CDSs enable banks to achieve their desired risk/return profiles 
through their risk management investment processes.  
1. Determinants of Bank Usage of Single-Name CDSs and Implications for Monitoring 
Several papers have analyzed the economic factors that lead certain lenders to retain their 
ongoing credit exposures to borrowers vis-à-vis reducing or eliminating their ongoing credit risk. 
In the latter case, the literature analyzes the empirical determinants of banks’ decisions whether 
to engage in loan sales (through primary syndications or on the secondary market), 
securitizations, or hedging with single-name CDSs. As discussed in Section III.B.1, a common 
concern about banks that utilize single-name CDSs for credit risk transfer is that such banks face 
diminished incentives to monitor the credit quality of their borrowers once the banks have 
significantly reduced or eliminated their borrower credit exposures using CDSs. This is a testable 
hypothesis, and we review the relevant academic research in this section along with the related 




Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) examine the use of single-name CDSs by U.S. 
bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. They 
find that only a few of the sample companies (i.e., 23 large banks out of a sample of 395) use 
CDSs and that those banks only use credit derivatives in their capacity as dealers rather than for 
hedging their own credit exposures. Their explanation for the apparent lack of single-name CDS 
usage for hedging is related to the alternatives available to banks for credit risk transfer during 
their sample period – namely, loan sales and securitizations (usually accomplished by 
syndications and sales to CLO managers).  
If a bank is willing to bear some of the ongoing credit risk but prefers to eliminate the rest 
of its exposure, the bank can either sell loan participations or the equivalent through the 
syndication process or convey parts of the loan or loan participations to a balance-sheet CLO. 
Securitizing the loan by selling it to a CLO, however, only mitigates part of the lender’s credit 
risk. Bank sponsors of balance-sheet CLOs could face moral hazard issues (i.e., incentives to 
engage in excessively risky lending or inadequate monitoring as a result of a planned 
securitization) or incentives to engage in adverse selection (i.e., selling only the riskiest of its 
loans). CLO investors thus advocate that banks which securitize loans to CLOs maintain the 
first-loss exposure. This customary arrangement ensures that the bank bears the first default-
related losses on the underlying loan collateral. (See, e.g., Duffee and Zhou (2001).) Loan sales 
are also often accompanied by put-back provisions that enable investors to exchange a loan in 
the event that it is revealed to have materially different risk characteristics than represented by 
the seller. In other words, put-back provisions obligate bank sellers to replace non-compliant 
loans or loans with defective representations with compliant loans. 
Hedging with single-name CDSs, by contrast, enables a bank to transfer potentially all of 
its credit risk while keeping the loan on its balance sheet. Yet, banks using CDSs in turn bear 
counterparty and certain other risks to which loan sales and securitizations do not expose them. 
In addition, single-name CDSs include the CTD option for sellers. A physically settled CDS 
hedge thus exposes a bank to the basis risk that the actual bonds and/or loans of the reference 
entity being hedged with the CDS do not experience similar price changes as the CTD loan 
driving the pricing of the CDS. Especially for leveraged borrowers, the leveraged loan and high-
yield bond spread can be very volatile, thus making this an important consideration for why 
banks might prefer loan securitization to CDS hedging.  
An implication of the analysis in Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) is that a bank’s 
preference is generally to sell or securitize loans (or to use LCDSs once they became available in 
2004). Single-name CDSs are more likely to be used for credit risk transfer when they are more 
cost-effective than selling or securitizing loans. Indeed, during the 1999-2005 sample period 
studied by Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), the appetite of CLOs for high-yield debt in 
particular offered very attractive spreads. Between those low spreads and the basis risk of 
hedging a loan credit exposure with a single-name CDS, the authors’ finding that banks did not 
make significant use of single-name CDSs to hedge their lending activities is not surprising.  
Beyhaghi, Massoud, and Saunders (2016) also analyze banks’ risk management choices 
for their syndicated loan exposures. Specifically, the authors consider the characteristics of both 
lenders and borrowers to analyze when banks engaged in secondary market loan sales, CDS 
hedges, or retained borrower credit risk on their balance sheets. The authors determine that 
capital- and liquidity-constrained banks are more likely to engage in some form of credit risk 




constraints, the authors ascertain that relationship bankers are more likely to retain credit risk 
from their loans on their balance sheets, whereas larger banks are more likely to engage in loan 
sales or hedging with CDS protection purchases. Beyhaghi, Massoud, and Saunders (2016) also 
find that of those loans whose lenders are engaged in credit risk transfer, loans to borrowers with 
a higher perceived ex ante risk profile are more likely to be sold, whereas loans to relatively 
higher-quality borrowers are more likely to be hedged with CDSs.  
Like Beyhaghi, Massoud, and Saunders (2016), Parlour and Winton (2013) find that loan 
sales are typically used by banks to manage their exposures to higher-risk credits and that CDS 
protection purchases are chosen for higher-quality loans and borrowers. The authors also 
conclude that the availability of loan sale and CDS credit risk management solutions leads to 
excessive monitoring by banks of high-risk credits and insufficient monitoring of lower-risk 
borrowers. Furthermore, the authors find that this effect is exacerbated for banks with higher 
costs of equity capital.  
Norden, Buston, and Wagner (2014) examine the extent to which banks use single-name 
CDSs to manage the credit risks of their loans and loan portfolios and/or to reduce economic or 
regulatory capital and how these uses of single-name CDSs were impacted by the credit crisis. 
The authors also consider the possibility that CDSs can increase borrower risk (putting upward 
pressure on spreads) if credit risk transfer by bank lenders leads to incentive problems regarding 
loan originations and monitoring. To disentangle these effects, they examined banks’ gross CDS 
positions, net CDS positions, and loan pricing. Their results provide evidence that banks use 
CDSs to manage their own credit exposures more effectively than if other credit risk transfer 
solutions were chosen, and that corporate borrowers benefit from banks’ CDS hedging activities 
through lower spreads. The authors suggest that these benefits of single-name CDSs persisted 
through the crisis.  
Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) analyze the extent to which the impact of single-name 
CDSs on lenders’ monitoring incentives results in the conservatism of reference entities’ 
financial reporting. The authors conclude that reference entities underlying traded CDSs do 
indeed adopt less conservative financial reporting. The authors also determine that less 
conservative reporting occurs when lenders face lower reputation costs from diminished 
borrower credit risk monitoring, covenants on reference entities’ debt are more restrictive when 
CDSs are introduced, and lenders engaged in more scrupulous monitoring prior to the 
introduction of CDSs and their use of those CDSs to hedge their credit exposures.  
2. Single-Name CDSs and Risk-Taking by Banks and Insurers 
As discussed in Section III.B.1, the availability of single-name CDSs on the risk-taking 
decisions of bank lenders is ambiguous as a matter of pure theory. On the one hand, the 
availability of single-name CDSs as a credit risk management tool may give rise to moral hazard 
that results in banks making riskier loans and engaging in inadequate ongoing borrower credit 
risk management. On the other hand, the ability of banks to manage borrower credit risks using 
single-name CDSs may increase the debt capacity of banks and facilitate additional lending 
without giving rise to additional risks. The implication of the availability of single-name CDSs 
on the risk-taking and risk-management decisions of banks thus is an empirical question. 
Shao and Yeager (2007) analyze the behavior of bank holding companies to evaluate 




Specifically, the authors examine whether the impact of their CDS activities (taken from Call 
Report data) on their risk and return, capital, and lending performance was consistent with 
whether the banks were protection buyers, sellers, or active users. Their findings indicate that 
credit protection buyers significantly reduced their total risk and increased their capital, which is 
consistent with using single-name CDSs to hedge the risk of their lending activities.  
By contrast, Shao and Yeager (2007) find that credit protection sellers experience 
increases in their equity volatility, capital ratios, and returns, which makes sense for banks 
wishing to use CDS as hedging instruments that would allow them to take on higher risk and 
achieve higher expected returns. Active users of CDS with no apparent directional trend in their 
protection purchases and sales, moreover, are found to experience a small increase in risk, a 
small reduction in returns, and no significant impact on capital. The small reduction in returns, 
moreover, could be offset by revenues earned elsewhere in the bank – e.g., a bank may be 
willing to act as an intermediary for a customer at a small apparent loss to preserve its long-term 
fee-based customer relationship. On the whole, the research of Shao and Yeager (2007) indicates 
that banks are using CDSs in a manner consistent with their hedging and investment objectives.  
In a similar study, González, Gil, Agra, and Santomil (2012) investigate whether the use 
of single-name CDSs by banks reduced or increased the risk profile of European banks. Like 
Shao and Yeager (2007), they find that European banks using CDSs for hedging experienced an 
improvement in their level of financial stability, whereas those opting to use CDSs for synthetic 
bond investments experienced an increase in firm-specific risks.  
Fung, Wen, and Zhang (2012) conduct a study of how the use of single-name CDSs by 
U.S. life and property/casualty insurers impacted the risk-taking decisions of those firms and 
their valuations. The authors conclude that such firms often use CDSs to generate income and 
not to hedge their credit exposures, and, as a result, their risk profile became more aggressive. 
The paper further concludes that insurers’ use of single-name CDSs were associated with 
reduced financial performance and lower firm valuations.  
Although there are a number of articles in the academic literature that present theoretical 
models for how bank usage of CDSs can lead to increased bank risk-taking (e.g., Duffee and 
Zhou, 2001; Morrison, 2005), there is little empirical evidence in support of this. One exception 
is Phuong (2015), who presents empirical evidence that European banks that are more active in 
CDS markets tend to originate more risky assets and that increased risk-taking by banks is 
associated with larger CDS protection purchases.  
Another exception is Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), who find that banks actively engaged 
in single-name CDS trading have significantly lower capital ratios. They also find that such 
banks curtailed lending and raised capital during the credit crisis more than banks with little or 
no CDS usage, despite having higher pre-crisis operating performance and stock returns.  
3. Single-Name CDSs and Banks’ Monitoring of Borrowers’ Credit Risks 
As noted in Section III.B.1, a widespread concern about single-name CDSs is that their 
usage by bank lenders can give rise to moral hazard in which banks make riskier loans and/or 
engage in suboptimal amounts of monitoring borrower credit risks. Yet, even the theoretical 
literature on bank usage of single-name CDSs is ambiguous on this point. For example, Chiesa 
(2008) describes various situations in which properly constructed credit risk transfer strategies 




monitoring. The issue of how the availability of single-name CDSs impacts banks’ monitoring of 
borrower credit risks thus is an empirical question. 
The availability of single-name CDSs as instruments by which bank lenders can hedge 
their credit exposures to borrowers, moreover, impacts bank lending and risk-taking behavior 
depending on the structure of the underlying loan facility. A bank loan facility76 is typically 
“transactional” (i.e., akin to public debt issuance and involving one-off lender assessments of 
borrower credit risks) or “reputational” (i.e., loan facilities in which the borrower and lender 
have non-public information that materially impacts the terms of the loan and that is not 
observable to other market participants). (Boot and Thakor, 2000) Syndicated loans are a hybrid 
of transactional and reputational loans in which a lead arranger conducts the initial credit risk 
assessment and engages in ongoing monitoring of borrower credit risk but underwrites or 
allocates portions of the loan to other syndicate members, whose sole function is to provide 
capital and purchase their allocated share of the loan. Loan syndicate participants typically retain 
a relatively small total part of the loan facility (known as the “pro rata” portion of the loan) and 
then sell the remainder of the loan (known as the “institutional” portion of the loan) in the 
primary or secondary market to asset managers or CLO sponsors and warehousing agents.77  
In a typical syndicate, a lead arranger is responsible for both the original credit risk 
review of the borrower and the ongoing monitoring of borrower credit quality. Lee and 
Mullineaux (2004) find that loan syndicates have fewer participants when information about the 
credit risk of the borrower is more limited, thus suggesting that the membership and structure of 
a loan syndicate are driven at least in part by the need for enhanced monitoring of borrower 
credit risks. The authors also find that when syndicates place explicit limits on loan sales to non-
syndicate members, larger and more diffuse syndicate structures result, which forces non-lead 
syndicate members to rely relatively more heavily on the lead arranger for the upfront and 
ongoing credit assessments of the borrower.  
Because the actions of a lead arranger in a syndicate are generally not directly observable 
by other syndicate members whose primary role is to purchase allocated amounts of “pro rata” 
loans and loan participations, lead arrangers typically must hold larger shares of syndicated pro 
rata loans than other syndicate members to mitigate the risk of moral hazard. (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007) The ability of a lead arranger to lay off its credit risk to the 
borrower using single-name CDSs without the knowledge of other syndicate members, however, 
limits the ability of the lead arranger to signal its greater monitoring efforts arising from larger 
pro rata loan allocations, and, indeed, defeats the purpose of such larger allocations. (Parlour and 
Winton, 2013) 
Streiz (2016) analyzes how the availability of single-name CDSs impacts the structure of 
loan syndicates. Specifically, he compares syndicate structures before and after the introduction 
of single-name CDSs with syndicates that lend to borrowers with no actively traded single-name 
CDSs. The results of his empirical analysis indicate that lead arrangers sell on average three 
percent less of their pro rata loans after the introduction of CDSs and that the availability of 
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single-name CDSs as hedging instruments is associated with more concentrated syndicates with 
fewer lender participants. (Streiz, 2016) 
Song (2013) presents an interesting alternative to the more conventional moral hazard 
perspective on how CDSs can affect bank credit risk monitoring for syndicated loans. 
Specifically, Song (2013) suggests that if a lead arranger instead sells protection in a single-name 
CDS with the borrower as the reference entity, the lead arranger has essentially pre-committed to 
higher-quality monitoring. In other words, because a borrower default would impose losses on 
the lead arranger on its allocated share of the pro rata loans and its protection sales, the lead 
arranger has an incentive to engage in even greater upfront due diligence and ongoing 
monitoring.  
The empirical results in Song (2013) support the hypothesis that lead arrangers selling 
CDS protection is a substitute for lead arrangers taking larger allocations of pro rata loans and 
loan participations.78 In particular, Song’s evidence shows that banks with larger amounts of 
CDS protection sales have smaller amounts of pro rata syndicated loan allocations. She also 
finds that active CDS dealers functioning as lead arrangers in loan syndicates are associated with 
larger syndicates and larger loans to borrowers. On the other hand, the presence of multiple 
active CDS participants or dealers in the same syndicate can attenuate this effect to the extent 
that non-lead syndicate members sell protection on the borrower to non-syndicate members. 
B. The Impact of the Availability of Single-Name CDSs on Reference Entities 
We now consider how the availability of single-name CDSs can impact the reference 
entities underlying those CDSs. We first review the empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
single-name CDSs on the supply and cost of bank credit (both to reference entities and in 
general). In Section V.B.2 we summarize the results of academic research concerning the impact 
of single-name CDS trading on the capital structure decisions of borrowers underlying traded 
CDS contracts. A third section below discusses evidence regarding the potential positive and 
negative externalities arising from the introduction of a single-name CDS. Section V.B.4 
concludes with a review of the literature regarding the impact of single-name CDSs and 
borrower hedging on the bankruptcy decisions of underlying reference entities.  
1. Impact on the Supply of Credit 
An often-cited benefit of single-name CDSs is their positive impact on the economy. 
Because single-name CDSs enable lenders to reduce their credit exposures and monitoring costs, 
single-name CDSs should, in principle, lead to increased availability of credit and decreased 
borrowing costs for reference entities, which enables them to use those additional funds to 
finance productive investment opportunities, thereby increasing aggregate investment and 
economic growth. (See, e.g., Jarrow (2011).) Whether or not the availability of single-name 
CDSs actually does lead to reduced borrowing costs for reference entities is an empirical 
question, and the results are mixed. 
Hirtle (2009) empirically analyzes whether increased CDS usage changed the amount of 
bank borrowing by CDS reference entities by comparing U.S. commercial bank holdings of 
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CDSs and data on commercial and industrial loans issued by U.S. banks for the period from 1997 
to 2006. Hirtle’s analysis shows that an increase in the use of CDSs is associated with an 
expansion in the supply of term loans to large borrowers. Hirtle (2009), however, found no 
increase in the volume of loan commitments or small term loans. Hirtle’s analysis also 
demonstrates that large firms (so-called “named credits”) are the primary beneficiaries of CDSs 
but that those benefits are limited to increases in the tenors and/or sizes of their term loans.79 
Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014) empirically analyze the relation between the availability of 
single-name CDSs and bank lending. The authors find that banks actively engaged in single-
name CDS trading extend more credit and make larger loans. Such banks, moreover, are more 
likely to extend larger loans to the reference entities underlying traded single-name CDSs.  
Unlike Hirtle (2009) and Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014), Saretto and Tookes (2013) 
examine the impact of the introduction of single-name CDSs on all types of borrowings by 
reference entities. Their results indicate that the availability of single-name CDSs as hedging 
instruments leads to an increase in credit to reference entities, as well as longer debt maturities. 
The improved access to credit stems mostly from higher lending through the corporate bond 
market than the bank lending channel. They also find that the impact of CDS availability leads to 
greater increases in credit and debt maturities during periods in which credit supply is 
constrained or when unexpected shocks to local credit supplies occur (i.e., when the ability of 
lenders to hedge borrower credit exposures is the most important).  
2. Impact on Reference Entity Borrowing Costs 
The empirical literature indicates that the availability of CDSs as credit risk transfer 
mechanisms has an ambiguous overall impact on reference entity borrowing costs and that the 
net impact depends on the type of borrower.  
Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find that the introduction of single-name CDS trading leads 
to improvements in the borrowing terms for safe and transparent firms in which banks’ 
monitoring incentives are not likely to play a major role. In contrast, borrowing costs are higher 
for riskier and informationally opaque borrowers following the introduction of CDSs, which the 
authors attribute to the attenuated incentives of banks to engage in relatively costly borrower 
monitoring. Despite the ostensibly negative aspect of reduced bank monitoring of more opaque 
enterprises, the results in Ashcraft and Santos (2009) suggest that the introduction of single-name 
CDSs do provide an important economic benefit by making it easier for lenders to identify 
creditworthy borrowers, thereby mitigating adverse selection problems in which “good” and 
“bad” borrowers cannot be distinguished and are charged a single price. (Akerlof, 1970; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Hirtle (2009) also finds a separation effect in which the impact of 
CDS trading depends on the characteristics, reputation, and transparency/opacity of the reference 
entity. 
Ismailescu and Phillips (2015) analyze the impact of CDS trading in sovereign debt 
markets and found that the informational role of CDSs is beneficial for closed economies with a 
high risk of default and for which relatively little financial information is available (absent the 
CDSs). Ismailescu and Phillips (2015) also show that CDSs improve market liquidity and lower 
                                                            




borrowing costs for investment-grade sovereigns, but that CDSs reduce market liquidity and 
increase borrowing cost for speculative-grade sovereign borrowers. 
For large corporate borrowers, the evidence indicates that although the availability of 
credit and the size of loan facilities are higher after the introduction of single-name CDSs, the 
increased credit supply is accompanied by higher borrowing costs on loans by banks that actively 
hedge using single-name CDSs. For large banks that do not actively hedge, credits extended 
increase and borrowing costs for reference entities decline. (Hirtle, 2009; Shan, Tang, and Yan, 
2014)  
The introduction of single-name CDS trading is also associated with an increase in the 
maturity of term loan facilities. (Hirtle, 2009; Saretto and Tookes, 2013) Although a non-price 
term of bank credit facilities, borrowers often consider longer-term debt more desirable – 
especially large and transparent firms and firms that expect a deterioration in their credit ratings. 
(See, e.g., Diamond (1991) and Barclay and Smith (1995).) In this sense, the impact of listing 
CDSs on the maturity structure of borrowers’ debt may also be beneficial for certain borrowers. 
Norden, Buston, and Wagner (2014) analyze how and through which channel the use of 
single-name CDSs affect banks’ hedging and how borrowers may benefit from any such 
hedging. They find that banks using single-name CDSs for credit risk transfer purposes do 
indeed pass the associated benefits and cost savings along to borrowers. They also determine that 
banks using CDSs to hedge exhibited smaller losses and a more stable supply of loans during the 
credit crisis.  
The borrowing costs of reference entities underlying traded single-name CDSs are also 
affected by whether or not the corresponding loan facilities specify a credit spread (over a base 
floating rate like LIBOR) that is fixed or indexed to the borrower’s CDS spread. As discussed in 
Sections IV.A and IV.B, the CDS spread is an observable measure of the reference entity’s credit 
risk. Banks can thus use CDSs to monitor borrower credit quality. Since 2008, moreover, banks 
have increasingly used single-name CDS spreads for reference entities over the term of loans 
they have extended in order to calculate the interest payable by borrowers on such loans. The 
practice of incorporating CDS spreads explicitly into loan pricing is referred to as “market-
based” loan pricing, and is especially prevalent on revolving credit lines. 
Ivanov, Santos, and Vo (2016) study how market-based pricing has impacted corporate 
borrowing costs. They ascertain that the borrowing cost on loans with market-based pricing are 
lower than on similar loans priced with fixed credit spreads, both at origination and over the lives 
of the loans. The authors attribute the lower cost on loans with market-based pricing to savings 
arising from reduced monitoring costs, which is supported by the evidence they present that 
market-based loans have more simplified covenants than loans with fixed credit spreads. 
Although the authors considered the possibility that loans with market-based pricing could lead 
to lower costs because such loans would be easier to hedge with the corresponding CDS, they 
did not find empirical support for that explanation and attributed the lower borrowing costs 
exclusively to savings realized by banks and passed on to borrowers arising from the 
replacement of costly credit monitoring with the information reflected in single-name CDS 
spreads. The evidence and conclusions in Ivanov, Santos, and Vo (2016) raises concerns that 
greater reliance by banks on the information contained in CDS spreads could result in an 
excessive decline in loan and borrower credit monitoring by bank lenders, as discussed in 




in CDS spreads is higher quality than the credit information a given lender would collect through 
an enhanced monitoring process, however, this concern is unfounded, and, in fact, CDS-based 
borrower credit monitoring is in that case preferable to bank-specific monitoring.  
3. Impacts on Reference Entity Corporate Financing Decisions and Capital Structure 
Perhaps the most important principle of corporate finance is the Modigliani-Miller 
(“M&M”) proposition that the value of a firm is independent of its financing decisions – i.e., a 
firm cannot realize a higher valuation simply by altering its capital structure. (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958) In contrast to actual financial markets, the M&M theory assumes that capital 
markets are “perfect” (e.g., no taxes, no costs of financial distress or bankruptcy, no transaction 
costs), information is equally shared by all market participants (i.e., information is “symmetric”), 
and that all securities issuers can access the capital markets on equal terms. (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958; Fama, 1978)  
In an M&M world, the mere fact that a single-name CDS is available to trade for a given 
reference entity should have no impact on the corporate financing decisions (e.g., capital 
structure, leverage ratio, dividend policy, hedging policies) of that firm or its cost of capital. 
With asymmetric information, market frictions and transaction costs, costs of financial distress 
and bankruptcy, and unequal access to financial markets, however, the existence of single-name 
CDSs can in principle impact the financial policies and condition of the reference entity 
underlying those CDSs. As Miller (1988) explained: 
[T]he view that capital structure is literally irrelevant or that “nothing matters” in 
corporate finance, though still sometimes attributed to us (and tracing perhaps to 
the very provocative way we made our point), is far from what we ever actually 
said about the real world applications of our theoretical propositions. Looking back 
now, perhaps we should have put more emphasis on the other, upbeat side of the 
“nothing matters” coin: showing what doesn’t matter can also show, by implication, 
what does. [emphasis in original]80 
In this section, we consider the empirical research on how the trading of a CDS on a 
particular reference entity may impact the corporate financing decisions (e.g., capital structure 
and leverage) and costs of capital for that reference entity. The results are ambiguous and 
sample-specific.  
Saretto and Tookes (2013) consider how the trading of a single-name CDS affects the 
amount and maturity of a reference entity’s debt. Even for firms with similar credit ratings, 
Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that firms with traded CDSs have higher leverage ratios and 
longer debt maturities. Their argument is that because CDSs enable lenders to hedge their 
exposure to the borrower more easily, lenders are willing to increase the amount of credit 
available to firms with traded CDSs. Saretto and Tookes (2013) thus support the importance of 
single-name CDSs as a credit risk transfer instrument for lenders.   
Danis and Gamba (2016) developed a theoretical model to analyze how the onset of CDS 
trading would affect a firm’s trade-offs between investment, equity financing, and debt 
financing. Their model incorporates real world costs and frictions, such as equity issuance costs, 
bankruptcy costs, and debt renegotiation frictions. Danis and Gamba (2016) show that the 
                                                            




initiation of CDS trading is associated with increases in the reference entity’s leverage and 
investment but has no appreciable impact on its borrowing costs. In addition, the model shows 
that the existence of traded CDSs reduces the risk of strategic default but also increases the 
probability of bankruptcy. After calibrating the model to the underlying data, they find that the 
introduction of single-name CDSs on public U.S. companies results in an average increase of 
5.3% in firm value.   
4. CDS Externalities 
Externalities occur when the impact of a given activity (e.g., a CDS transaction) goes 
beyond the direct participants in the activity and conveys benefits or costs on other market 
participants that the original transacting parties cannot capture in the price of their transaction. In 
the classic microeconomics terminology, a positive externality exists when the marginal private 
benefit to the two counterparties of a transaction is less than the marginal social benefit (i.e., the 
benefit to other market participants). Conversely, a negative externality occurs when the private 
marginal cost of a transaction is less than the marginal social cost. (See, e.g., Samuelson (1954) 
and Bator (1958).)81 The difference between the marginal social benefit (cost) and marginal 
private benefit (cost) is known as the marginal external benefit (cost). 
As the Nobel Prize-winning work of Ronald Coase (and a huge literature that followed) 
demonstrates, externalities almost always occur when some aspect of market structure, law, 
regulation, or institutions interfere with the definition or enforcement of property rights for the 
transacting parties. (Coase, 1960)82 In particular, when the prices of transactions serve as a 
tangible benefit to parties that cannot be charged for the value those prices convey, a positive 
externality exists because the original parties do not have enforceable property rights in their 
prices (at least not in all senses).  
For example, in 1991 a tunnel system underneath the Chicago Loop flooded, leading to 
the temporary closure of the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”). During this time, grain 
elevators pulled down price quotes to farmers because they relied so heavily on futures prices to 
make their cash market quotes and did not repost those quotes until the futures markets re-
opened. (Kuserk and Locke, 1994) Although exchanges routinely charge (and generate 
considerable revenues) for access to their real-time price feeds (especially in today’s world in 
which high-frequency traders demand order book access down to the millisecond or 
microsecond), not all parties that benefit from those prices as signals of supply and demand can 
be charged for the value of the prices. (Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl, 1991) 
Studies of single-name CDSs contemplate both potential positive and negative 
externalities arising from the introduction of single-name CDS trading. One potential channel by 
which the trading of CDSs on a reference entity can generate externalities is through the 
information conveyed in CDS spreads. As discussed in Section IV, the empirical evidence 
confirms that single-name CDSs contain important information about reference entity credit risk 
and that CDS spreads reflect both anticipation and announcement effects regarding events that 
impact the financial conditions of reference entities. As we discuss later in Section VI.A, 
moreover, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly indicates that new information about 
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reference entity credit is reflected in CDS spreads before credit spreads observed in the less 
liquid cash bond market.  
The impact of the information contained in CDS spreads on other firms, however, is 
ambiguous as a matter of theory. On the one hand, this informational role of the CDS market 
could contribute to a reduction in the cost of a reference entity’s debt by reducing the 
information premium that investors demand on bonds to compensate for their perceived 
informational disadvantage and, similarly, by reducing the rents that banks can extract from 
borrowers in connection with their informational advantage. (Saretto and Tookes, 2013) On the 
other hand, if the introduction of CDS trading on a reference entity increases the perceived 
likelihood of financial distress for that firm (as found in Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 
(2014)), the resulting negative signal could impact the financial decisions of counterparties and 
commercial or trade creditors with exposures to the firm that in turn could adversely impact the 
reference entity. 
For example, Li and Tang (2016) postulate that commercial suppliers with trade and 
commercial exposures to the reference entity (and no listed CDSs on their own debt) may react 
to the perceived heightened financial distress risk of a reference entity customer through changes 
in their own leverage ratios. If a supplier’s reaction to the seemingly higher distress probabilities 
at a customer conveyed by the information in its CDS spreads is a perceived increase in revenue 
risk from that customer, the supplier may react by decreasing its own leverage to absorb 
potentially higher expected credit losses. Yet, if the listing of a CDS on a particular reference 
entity enables the lender to cross-hedge its indirect exposure to the supplier (which has no listed 
CDSs), that could increase the supplier’s debt capacity and access to funds, thereby leading to an 
increase in the supplier’s leverage. As Li and Tang (2016) emphasize, the impact of single-name 
CDSs based on customers of suppliers and on the leverage of those suppliers is an empirical 
question.  
Another possible source of positive externalities arising from CDS trading on a given 
reference name is improved pricing and compressed spreads for bond issuers resulting from 
enhanced cross-market integration. Specifically, because single-name CDSs involve both 
hedgers and speculators and trading frictions are relatively low for CDSs, CDS markets are 
generally more liquid than cash bond markets. (See Sections IV.B.3 and VI.D.) To the extent that 
inter-market arbitrage keeps CDS spreads and corresponding cash bond prices tightly in line (a 
subject to which we return in Section VI.D), CDSs thus can help reduce spreads for issuers and 
improve access to and costs of financing. (Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2015) To the extent that 
the introduction of a single-name CDS attracts new traders and inter-market arbitrage volume, 
moreover, CDSs can promote additional bond market liquidity. (Li, Zhang, and Kim, 2011; 
Sambalaibat, 2014; Shim and Zhu, 2014) 
5. The Empty Creditor and Negative Interest Problems 
a) Theory 
As discussed earlier in Section III.B.2, single-name CDSs can significantly impact 
debtor-creditor relationships by enabling creditors to separate their control rights from their cash 
flow rights and risk exposures. Specifically, creditors that hedge their exposures with single-
name CDSs can partially or fully eliminate their credit exposure to a borrower while retaining 




restructuring, and the like. One possible consequence of this separation is the creation of “empty 
creditors” that no longer have an economic interest in the efficient continuation of the debtor as a 
firm, which may lead such creditors to push the debtor into bankruptcy or liquidation even in 
situations when restructuring would be a more efficient solution. Some financial analysts and 
others have even raised concerns that CDS protection buyers could force a reference entity into 
bankruptcy in order to trigger a credit event under their CDS protection purchases, especially if 
the CDS documentation does not specify restructuring as a credit event. (See, e.g., Pollack 
(2003).) 
Not all empty creditor theories, however, yield adverse implications for borrowers. In a 
frequently cited paper, Bolton and Oehmke (2011) develop a model to analyze how the increased 
bargaining power of creditors arising from the availability of single-name CDSs can have a 
positive impact on reference entity bankruptcy filings. Their model assumes that a firm issues 
debt to finance a positive net present value investment project and that some lenders choose to 
purchase CDSs. The model also assumes that the firm cannot credibly commit to pay out cash 
flows in the future. This “limited commitment” feature of the Bolton and Oehmke model results 
in the firm being unable to write enforceable financial contracts based on its uncertain future 
cash flows.  
In the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model, the firm may fail to make payments on its debt 
for either of two reasons: (i) the firm does not generate sufficient interim cash flows sufficient to 
cover its contractual interest payment obligations (a “cash flow default”); or (ii) the firm’s cash 
flows are sufficient to service its debt but the firm prefers to use the cash for internal purposes 
instead of repaying its creditors (a “strategic default”). The possibility of strategic defaults has 
been widely recognized as a problem arising from incomplete corporate debt contracts.83 When 
firms cannot credibly commit to repay their debt (e.g., when their cash flows are observable but 
not verifiable) and payments are not legally enforceable, firms may choose to default on their 
debt to divert cash flows to themselves even when the cash flows are sufficient to service their 
contractual debt payment obligations. The risk that firms will engage in a strategic default 
increases the interest rate lenders will demand from such firms and reduces borrowers’ debt 
capacities. (Saretto and Tookes, 2013)  
The ability of lenders to purchase credit protection with single-name CDSs, however, 
gives creditors an advantage in distressed firm debt renegotiations and thereby attenuates the 
borrowers’ incentives to engage in strategic defaults or debt renegotiations that are to the 
detriment of lenders. According to Bolton and Oehmke (2011), the existence of creditors with 
increased bargaining power resulting from their CDS hedges actually plays a useful role by 
increasing a firm’s debt capacity – i.e., credit protection held by existing creditors may make 
them more willing to issue new debt to finance positive net present value investments, and the 
existence of hedged creditors with stronger bargaining power can also make other lenders more 
willing to extend more credit and at a lower rate. In other words, the availability of single-name 
CDSs can reduce the costs of contracting related to strategic defaults by improving the 
contracting technology and mitigating the limited commitment problem that firms face when 
making incomplete debt contracts.84  
                                                            
83 See, e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Hart and Moore (1998). 




Kim (2013) explains that CDSs make up for incompleteness in some debt contracts by 
serving as a pre-commitment device that deters firms from strategic default. Firms with high 
strategic default incentives thus can be expected to experience relatively larger reductions in 
their corporate bond spreads following the introduction of CDSs. By giving more credibility to 
borrowers’ commitments to repay their debt (assuming no cash flow default occurs), CDSs 
contribute to a reduction in the cost of corporate debt. Similar results by Saretto and Tookes 
(2013) confirm that the frictions CDSs introduce into renegotiation can reduce the risk of 
strategic default and hence increase debt capacity and/or lower the cost of debt. Salomao (2014) 
presents a similar argument that reference entities underlying sovereign CDSs are associated 
with lower sovereign default probabilities, greater debt capacity, and lower borrowing costs 
because of enhanced bargaining power held by lenders given the restructuring provisions 
included in typical sovereign CDSs.  
b) Empirical Evidence 
Because some models of the empty creditor hypothesis imply negative results for 
borrowers and other models have more constructive implications, it is unclear from first 
principles whether the existence of creditors hedged with single-name CDS protection purchases 
is a net benefit or cost to reference entities. Likewise, the empirical evidence on the relation 
between the existence of empty creditors and the value of firms with traded CDSs is also mixed.  
Several studies report empirical results that support the negative implications of the 
empty creditor hypothesis for firms with traded single-name CDSs. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and 
Wang (2014) perform an empirical analysis of the effects of CDS trading on the credit risk of 
reference entities using CDS data on 901 North American firms with CDSs trading between 
1997 and 2009. During this period, Standard & Poor’s reported 3,863 ratings downgrades and 
1,628 bankruptcy filings. The authors’ analysis shows that both the likelihood of a rating 
downgrade and the likelihood of bankruptcy of reference entities increased after CDSs started 
trading. On average, credit ratings decline by about half a notch within two years of the inception 
of CDS trading, and the probabilities of bankruptcy more than double (from 0.14% to 0.47%) 
over the two-year period after CDS trading begins. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) also 
find that the negative effects of introducing CDSs on reference entities are more pronounced for 
firms with larger amounts of CDSs outstanding and when the CDSs do not include restructuring 
as a credit event. 
Examining the period from 2001 through 2008, Peristiani and Savino (2011) find no 
systematic relation between the existence of CDS trading and bankruptcy events but did observe 
in the 2004-2008 period that firms with traded single-name CDSs were associated with higher 
EDFs, which is consistent with the negative implications of the empty creditor hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, the authors also identified other explanations for their results that do not depend on 
misaligned incentives and empty creditors. Specifically, Peristiani and Savino (2011) find that 
firms with larger-than-normal exposures to institutional investors experience a greater incidence 
of default, which is consistent with institutional pressures on such firms to engage in fire-sale 
losses to cover funding liquidity needs (as suggested in the models of Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009), Diamond and Rajan (2011), and Shleifer and Vishny (2011)).  
Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2014) analyze the relation between CDS activity and credit 
spreads empirically when creditors hedge using single-name CDSs. The authors conclude that 




from strategic default, but they also note that debt renegotiations in those situations could be 
costly and inefficient. The authors’ empirical analysis found that on net, opposing forces 
resulting from the presence of hedged creditors, higher costs imposed by empty creditors, and the 
deferral of strategic default are all in force but that the higher costs arising from empty creditors 
dominates the other effects. Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2014) show that on average, firms with 
a higher net notional CDS outstanding have higher cost of debt. The authors also find that the 
costs imposed by empty creditors are even higher for firms with lower expected recovery rates.  
Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri (2015) examine the relation between loan covenant 
violations and borrowers’ investment expenditures, loan spreads, overall performance, and 
bankruptcy filings for firms with traded CDSs relative to firms without CDSs. They find some 
support for the empty creditor hypothesis – namely, that firms with traded CDSs do not decrease 
their investment expenditures after covenant violations, but do pay higher loan spreads and 
experience decreased overall performance. Nevertheless, in contrast to the predictions of the 
empty creditor hypothesis, the authors also find that such firms do not file for bankruptcy at a 
higher rate than similar firms without traded CDSs.  
Mengle (2009) observes a number of potential practical problems with concerns about the 
negative impacts of empty creditors and their impact on bankruptcy decisions. In particular, he 
notes that the real choice faced by hedged creditors is whether to opt for restructuring within a 
bankruptcy proceeding or an out-of-court restructuring. Restructurings outside of bankruptcy are 
not typically considered credit events because they are not binding on all debt holders, as 
discussed in Section II.B.4. The empirical evidence suggests, moreover, that out-of-court 
restructurings can lead to higher recovery rates. (Altman and Karlin, 2009)  
Mengle (2009) also recognizes that restructuring within the confines of bankruptcy law 
has certain benefits – e.g., automatic stays, reduced conflicts amongst different security holders, 
access to debtor-in-possession financing, etc. Based on prior empirical corporate finance 
research, he concludes that firms most likely to benefit from out-of-court restructurings are those 
firms with complex capital structures (and the security holder conflicts to which they give rise), 
significant pension liabilities, costly labor contracts, and substantial legacy contingent liabilities 
(e.g., catastrophic environmental clean-up costs or long-tailed liabilities arising from, say, 
asbestos or silicosis exposures). 
Mengle (2009) contends that the impact of hedged creditors on a firm’s bankruptcy 
decision – i.e., whether the existence of empty creditors leads to more bankruptcy filings even 
when out-of-court restructurings would be more efficient – is an empirical question. In that 
context, Altman and Karlin (2009) show that the number of restructuring events (as a percentage 
of default events) between 1984 and 2009 increased significantly after 2003 (when, as discussed 
in Section II.B.4, a significant revision in the ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions occurred). 
The correlation between the frequency of defaults and restructurings (as a percentage of total 
defaults), moreover, is nine percent over the whole sample period but jumped to 90 percent after 
2003. Because the empty creditor theory implies a larger number of bankruptcies and a lower 
correlation between defaults and restructurings following the introduction of single-name CDS 
trading, the evidence summarized in Mengle (2009) and in Altman and Karlin (2009) calls into 
question (albeit indirectly) the negative implications of the empty creditor hypothesis. 
Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2016) analyze publicly traded U.S. firms (excluding 




relation between “strong shareholders” and empty creditors. They conclude that debt holders 
purchase greater amounts of credit protection using single-name CDSs when strong shareholders 
have a larger degree of bargaining power in order to ensure a seat at the table during potential 
debt renegotiations. Following the inception of CDS trading, the authors estimate that the 
distance to default (a measure of probability of default) declines by 7.9 percent on average. They 
also find, however, that firms’ investments and market valuations also decline by 7 percent and 
8.8 percent, respectively. The net impact of the availability of single-name CDSs for debt holders 
at firms with strong shareholders thus is ambiguous and depends on the channel through which 






VI. SINGLE-NAME CDSS AND INTER-MARKET RELATIONS 
In this section, we survey the significant academic literature on the relations between 
single-name CDSs and the debt, equity, and equity options for reference entities underlying the 
CDSs. We begin by addressing the issue of price discovery – i.e., in which of the related markets 
is new information about the reference entity first reflected? In Sections VI.B and VI.C, we 
summarize the empirical results in the literature concerning the impacts from the introduction of 
single-name CDS trading on liquidity and volatility in the reference entities’ debt and equity 
markets, respectively. We conclude this section with a discussion of the determinants of the 
CDS-bond basis and the related empirical research.  
A. Price Discovery 
Price discovery is the process by which trading incorporates new information and market 
participants’ expectations into asset prices. Thanks to the relatively low transaction costs and 
high market liquidity of many derivatives markets relative to their corresponding underlying cash 
markets, new information about assets is often reflected in derivatives prices first.85 In the 
discussion that follows, we refer to the market in which price discovery first occurs as the 
primary price discovery market (“PPDM”).  
1. CDSs vs. Bonds 
The empirical evidence regarding the PPDM for corporate reference entities is consistent 
across different studies and data samples. Namely, essentially all of the studies we reviewed 
strongly indicate that single-name CDSs lead corporate bonds in price discovery. The result is 
unsurprising given the illiquidity in cash corporate bond markets, both on an absolute basis and 
relative to single-name CDSs. The studies that provide empirical evidence in support of single-
name CDS markets as the PPDM for corporate reference entities include Longstaff, Mithal, and 
Neis (2003), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Dötz (2007), Alexopoulou, Andersson, and 
Georgescu (2009), Baba and Inada (2009), Forte and Peña (2009), Norden and Weber (2009), 
Delis and Mylonidis (2011), Norden and Weber (2012), Coudert and Gex (2010b, 2013), Das, 
Kalimipalli and Nayak (2014), and Giannikos, Guirguis, and Suen (2013). Furthermore, 
Alexopoulou, Andersson, and Georgescu (2009) and Coudert and Gex (2013) show that the 
price-discovery role of single-name CDSs was even more pronounced after the onset of the 
credit crisis.  
The results for sovereign reference entities are more ambiguous than the results for 
corporate borrowers and are sample-specific. The following studies empirically investigate the 
PPDM across sovereign CDS and debt markets:  
• Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) estimate price-discovery measures for emerging market economies and 
conclude that roughly equal price discovery occurs in CDS and bond markets in Bulgaria, Colombia, 
and Venezuela, but that the bond market leads the CDS market in Brazil and the CDS market leads 
the bond market in Russia; 
• Fontana and Scheicher (2010) examine Eurozone sovereign debt markets and conclude that the 
sovereign CDS market is the PPDM in half of their sample and that the sovereign debt market is the 
PPDM in the other half;  
                                                            




• Ammer and Cai (2011) analyze the sovereign debt of Brazil, China, Colombia, Mexico, the 
Philippines, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela and find that the cash bond market is the PPDM 
for the majority (but not for all) of the countries that the authors analyzed;  
• Carboni and Carboni (2011) examine 14 European countries, three Asian countries, and the United 
States and find that the sovereign CDS market is the PPDM for most countries; 
• Li and Huang (2011) evaluated 20 sovereign reference entities’ CDS and bond spreads and concluded 
that the PPDM depends on the particular country but that, over time, sovereign CDS markets have 
become increasingly more common as the PPDM for sovereign reference entities’ credit risks; 
• Delatte, Gex, and López-Villavicencio (2012) analyze European sovereign debt and CDS markets and 
ascertain that sovereign debt markets lead sovereign CDS markets for sovereigns experiencing little 
or no financial distress but that when sovereigns begin to come under pressure the sovereign CDS 
market becomes the PPDM (even for countries with relatively low-yield, low-risk bonds);  
• O’Kane (2012) evaluates price discovery in European sovereign CDS and debt markets and concludes 
that the PPDM for Greece and Spain is the sovereign CDS market, the PPDM for France and Italy is 
the sovereign debt market, and Irish and Portuguese sovereign CDS and debt markets exhibit a 
feedback loop that makes the PPDM econometrically indeterminate for those countries;   
• Alper, Forni, and Gerard (2013) compare CDS spreads with relative asset swap spreads (i.e., spreads 
between benchmark sovereign debt yields and par interest rate swap rates) for developed, major 
economies in the 2008-2010 period and ascertain that sovereign CDS markets are the PPDMs 
primarily as a result of their greater relative liquidity;  
• Coudert and Gex (2013) analyze both emerging market countries and developed countries in the 
Eurozone and conclude from their empirical analysis that the sovereign CDS market is the PPDM for 
emerging market countries but that the bond market leads the CDS market for Eurozone sovereigns;  
• Gyntelberg, Hördahl, Ters, and Urban (2013) analyze intraday data on Eurozone sovereigns and find 
that the sovereign CDS market is the PPDM for the vast majority of sovereign borrowers; and 
• Hassan, Ngene, and Yu (2015) investigate price discovery in several emerging markets and estimate 
that the bond market is the PPDM in Argentina, Colombia, Turkey, South Africa, and Brazil, and that 
the CDS market is the PPDM for Mexican and the Philippine sovereign debt. 
As the results in Coudert and Gex (2013) and Alper, Forni, and Gerard (2013) indicate, 
price discovery in sovereign debt markets depends on the relative liquidity of cash markets and 
sovereign CDS markets. Sovereign CDSs are more actively traded on lower-rated, higher-risk 
sovereign issuers and sovereigns experiencing financial distress, and are less actively traded for 
higher-rated issuers for which there is less demand for credit protection and less uncertainty 
about the prospect of an adverse credit event. This result is also consistent with the findings of 
Delatte, Gex, and López-Villavicencio (2012). The mixed results for sovereign debt thus are 
likely the result of differences in relative liquidity pools between sovereign debt and CDS 
markets and other sample- and country-specific considerations.  
2. CDSs vs. Equities 
Several academic studies have investigated the price-discovery role of single-name 
corporate CDSs compared to markets for equities issued by corporate reference entities 
underlying CDSs and options on those equities. In a significant and often-cited paper, Acharya 
and Johnson (2007) use equities as proxies for public information and examine potential insider 




revealed in the CDS market in addition to the information already available in the equity market 
and thus conclude that the single-name CDS market is the PPDM. Acharya and Johnson (2007) 
also find that the new information reflected in single-name CDSs on corporate borrowers is only 
associated with negative credit news for borrowers that experience actual negative credit 
developments. The authors also determine that the relative magnitude of increased price 
discovery in the single-name CDS market is directly related to the strength of the relationships 
between reference entity borrowers with their banks, which provides support that asymmetric 
information is at least partially responsible for determining the PPDM.86  
Single-name CDSs are also found to be the PPDM by Zhu (2006), Flannery, Houston, 
and Partnoy (2010), Eyssell, Fung, and Zhang (2013), and Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2014). Yet, 
other studies that have examined the role of single-name CDSs as compared to equity markets 
reach different conclusions. For example, although Forte and Peña (2009) and Norden and 
Weber (2009) confirm that the single-name CDS market is the PPDM when compared to 
corporate bonds, both studies also find that the equity markets of CDS reference entities are the 
PPDMs when compared to both single-name CDSs and corporate bonds. Bystrӧm (2005), 
Trutwein and Scheireck (2011), Marsh and Wagner (2012), and Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson 
(2015) also find evidence that equity markets are the PPDMs when compared to single-name 
CDSs.  
Some research indicates that the PPDM depends on market conditions. For example, 
Trutwein and Schiereck (2011) and Trutwein, Ramchander, and Schiereck (2011) analyze single-
name CDS spreads and corresponding reference entity equity before and during the credit crisis, 
and Forte and Lovreta (2015) examine 92 European corporate issuers from 2002 through 2008. 
Both studies found that equity markets were informationally dominant and function as the 
PPDMs (compared to CDS markets) during periods of financial distress. Using the longer and 
larger sample of the two papers, Forte and Lovreta (2015) also conclude that the single-name 
CDS market is the PPDM during relatively stable periods. Coudert and Gex (2010d) reach 
similar conclusions that the CDS market is the PPDM during non-crisis periods but find that 
equity markets lead CDS markets in price discovery during market dislocations.  
By contrast, Giannikos, Guirguis, and Suen (2013) find the opposite (based on an 
analysis of 39 U.S. issuers over the period from 2005 through 2008). Specifically, they conclude 
from their empirical analysis that the equity market is the PPDM during stable periods but the 
single-name CDS market is informationally dominant and the PPDM during the crisis period of 
2007 and 2008. Similarly, in a study of the 2008-2012 period of European sovereign debt, 
sovereign CDS, and equity markets located in those sovereign nations, Santamaría, Biscarri, and 
Benito (2014) find that broad-based equity markets were the PPDMs in the 2008-2009 period, 
but, when the sovereign debt crisis erupted in 2010, sovereign CDS markets became the PPDMs.  
The apparent inconsistency between the findings of Giannikos, Guirguis, and Suen 
(2013) and Santamaría, Biscarri, and Benito (2014), on the one hand, and Forte and Lovreta 
(2015), on the other hand, suggests that the relation between equity and CDS markets differs 
between the United States and Europe. Given the differences in regulations and market 
microstructures in the U.S. and E.U. and the resulting differential trading and regulatory costs 
faced by informed traders, this is a plausible explanation. Alternatively, the results may depend 
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on the individual reference borrowers in the sample. For example, different cost structures for the 
acquisition of information may depend on characteristics of individual reference entities (e.g., 
small- and large-cap issuers sometimes have differing costs of information acquisition), which 
could also explain the distinct results in these studies.  
Yet another possible explanation for these seemingly inconsistent results is that the 
PPDM varies depending on the type of new information the markets are processing. For 
example, Marsh and Wagner (2012) compare the speed of adjustment and lead/lag relations 
across single-name CDS and equity markets and ascertain that the equity market is the PPDM for 
new market-wide information and common risk factors but that the single-name CDS market is 
the PPDM (or that CDS spreads and equity prices reflect new information contemporaneously) 
for new information that is reference entity-specific. The authors also conclude from their 
empirical analysis that the CDS market is slower to process positive news than negative news 
about the underlying reference entity. 
Episodic changes in relative market liquidity and depth also appear to impact the price 
discovery process. For example, Mayordomo, Peña, and Romo (2011) find that the single-name 
CDS market is the PPDM prior to the outbreak of the credit crisis, but that during the crisis the 
bond asset swap market becomes the PPDM. In both periods, the cash bond market is the slowest 
to incorporate new information. 
Some research has also analyzed how options on the shares issued by firms that are 
reference entities underlying single-name CDSs process new information. For example, Berndt 
and Ostrovnaya (2014) find that equity markets do not respond to abnormal movements in option 
prices unless that information has already manifested itself in corresponding single-name CDS 
spreads. 
B. Impacts of Single-Name CDS Trading on Bond Market Quality 
As discussed in Section III.B.3, one potential cost of the introduction of single-name 
CDSs for a reference entity is the potential for adverse impacts on the cash bond market for debt 
issued by the reference entity. Those adverse impacts could include higher cash market volatility 
and/or reduced liquidity (to which we collectively refer as “market quality”). 
Concerns that the introduction of derivatives in general precipitates increased cash 
market volatility – which is usually blamed on the presence of potentially destabilizing 
speculators – have been expressed for many decades. Yet, the evidence generally indicates the 
opposite – i.e., the introduction of derivatives results in a reduction in the volatility of the 
underlying cash market volatility, both because the availability of derivatives to help commercial 
enterprises manage their price risks hedgers promotes stability in the market and because inter-
market arbitrage helps keep prices of derivatives and cash markets in line through the execution 
of arbitrage trades on opposite sides of the market (e.g., long a futures contract and short the 
cash) which over time reduces fluctuations in the cash market. 
For exchange-listed futures and options, Mayhew (2000) surveys the empirical literature 
over the 1896-2000 period and examines the impact of the introduction of commodity, fixed 
income, and stock index futures and individual equity options on the volatility of the underlying 
cash market products. In Table 5, the second column reports the number of research studies that 
he surveyed, and the third column reports the number of markets covered across all of those 




period that collectively examined 15 futures markets. (The markets often overlap across the 
studies.) The last three columns report the number of markets for which the introduction of 
derivatives led to lower cash market volatility, had no impact or a mixed impact, or led to higher 
volatility, respectively. As Table 5 indicates, the 77 studies indicate that only 11 percent of the 
87 markets analyzed across four asset classes over a period of more than 100 years experienced 
higher cash market volatility after the introduction of futures and/or options on those products. 
 
Table 5: Academic Studies of the Impact of the Introduction of Futures Contracts on 
Underlying Cash Market Volatility, 1896-2000 
Asset Class # Studies # Markets Lower No or Mixed Impact Higher 
Commodities 13 15 10 4 1 
Fixed Income 11 12 4 7 1 
Stock Index 36 43 8 28 7 
Equity Options 17 17 16 0 1 
Total 77 87 38 39 10 
Total (%)   44% 45% 11% 
SOURCE: Mayhew (2000) 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in 2011, 
regulators exhibited renewed interest in the impact of the introduction of CDSs on cash bond 
markets. For example, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Erik Sirri testified before 
the House Committee on Agriculture that “[the] SEC has a great interest in the CDS market 
because of its impact on the debt and cash equity securities markets and the Commission’s 
responsibility to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient securities markets. These markets are 
directly affected by CDS due to the interrelationship between the CDS market and the claims 
that compose the capital structure of the underlying issuers on which the protection is written.”87 
In this section, we summarize the academic research regarding the impact of the introduction of 
single-name CDSs on the quality of the markets for the bonds issued by the reference entities 
underlying those CDSs. 
Using an extensive sample of single-name CDS and bond trades between 2002 and 2008 
Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2014) show that the average trade size and average turnover 
(relative to the total outstanding) in corporate bond markets declines in the two-year period 
subsequent to the inception of single-name CDS trading. Because the CDS market involves 
active players and is dominated by financial institutions that typically are relatively better 
informed, it is not surprising that Das, Kalimpipalli, and Nayak (2014) also find evidence of 
large institutional traders migrating from corporate bond markets to single-name CDS markets 
after the latter were introduced. This exodus of institutional trades likely explains the apparent 
deterioration in bond market quality that the authors found following the introduction of single-
name CDSs. Similar empirical results have been documented for equity options and equity 
markets – i.e., after options on a stock are listed for trading, the price discovery function 
increasingly occurs in the option market, particularly when the options are more liquid and/or 
                                                            




options markets attract larger and better-informed traders. (Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998; 
Pan and Poteshman, 2006) 
Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011) study potential liquidity spillover effects 
from single-name CDSs to bonds and find that bonds with more liquid CDSs have lower yields 
than comparable bonds with less liquid CDSs. The seemingly adverse impact of the introduction 
of single-name CDSs on corporate bond markets reported by Das, Kalimpipalli, and Nayak 
(2014) thus may be a temporary phenomenon. Once liquidity in the single-name CDS market 
stabilizes, the results of Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011) suggest that some of 
that liquidity will positively impact corporate bond market liquidity (either through inter-market 
arbitrage transactions or through other channels).  
Despite the empirical evidence that the introduction of CDSs can have adverse impacts 
on bond market quality that may be deleterious to some cash bond market participants, there may 
be offsetting (or more than offsetting) benefits in the single-name CDS market such that there is 
a net benefit from the introduction of single-name CDSs across the two markets based on the 
same reference entity.  
For example, Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) present a framework for analyzing the 
implications for corporate bond markets resulting from the introduction of CDSs. Oehmke and 
Zawadowski (2016) describe the role of CDSs as being similar to liquidity transformation – i.e., 
single-name CDSs are more liquid alternatives to relatively illiquid corporate bonds for trading 
and managing the credit risk of a reference entity.88 The introduction of single-name CDSs, 
however, creates opposing forces on bond demand. Assuming (realistically) that trading costs are 
lower for single-name CDSs than for the corporate bonds, Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) 
identify three possible impacts on corporate bond prices resulting from the introduction of 
single-name CDSs: 
• Investors that previously held a long position in a bond may sell the bond and then sell CDS 
protection as a way of synthetically investing in the bond, which puts downward pressure on the cash 
bond price; 
• Investors that previously shorted the bond may unwind their short sales and buy CDS protection 
because the relatively illiquid bond often trades at a discount to the CDS (see Section VI.D.), which 
may reduce the amount of short selling and put upward pressure on the bond price; and 
• When the CDS spread of a reference entity is lower than the credit spread on a bond issued by that 
reference entity (see Section VI.D), some investors will become negative basis traders that 
simultaneously buy the bond and purchase CDS protection; because the combined position of a 
negative basis trade is hedged, basis traders can usually take leveraged positions that put potentially 
significant upward pressure on the corporate bond price.  
The impact from the introduction of single-name CDS trading on the prices of the reference 
entity’s bonds thus is ambiguous as a matter of theory, although Oehmke and Zawadowski 
(2016) conclude that inter-market arbitrage and cross-market basis trades ultimately compress 
the CDS-bond basis (see Section VI.D) and mitigate the impact of CDS transactions on cash 
bond prices. 
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Massa and Zhang (2012) consider the impact that an active single-name CDS market has 
on the corresponding corporate bond market from the perspective of large institutional investors 
such as insurance companies, banks, and pension funds. A drop in bond market value or a 
downgrade in bond ratings may force such institutions to raise additional equity or sell their bond 
investments to remain compliant with their risk-based capital requirements. Such forced bond 
sales can potentially create or exacerbate market liquidity risks for investors in corporate bonds. 
If those institutions purchase CDS protection, they could defer their sales of bonds until more 
stable market conditions prevail. The presence of single-name CDS may also induce arbitrageurs 
to enter the market. For example, if corporate bonds are temporarily underpriced because of 
market liquidity risks and shocks, inter-market arbitrage will result in greater liquidity in the 
bond market. 
C. Impacts of Single-Name CDS Trading on Equity Market Quality 
Because of the economic near-equivalence of single-name CDS protection sales and 
purchases of bonds issued by the reference entity underlying the CDS, the results summarized in 
the previous section that document the impacts from the introduction of CDS trading on 
corresponding corporate bond markets are not surprising. Why the introduction of a single-name 
CDS could impact the liquidity and volatility (i.e., quality) of the market for the stock issued by 
the reference is less obvious. 
The classic insight of Merton (1974) laid the theoretical foundation for our understanding 
of the relationship between a firm’s debt and equity in an options framework. Equity can be 
viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike price equal to the face value of the 
firm’s debt (“FV”), whereas zero-coupon debt can be viewed as a short put option on the firm’s 
assets with a strike price of FV plus a riskless loan of FV. Culp, Nozawa, and Veronesi (2015) 
analyze the empirical relations between credit spreads of “pseudo firms” that hold actual, traded 
securities as assets and document numerous similarities between the credit spreads on the debt of 
such pseudo firms and actual, observed credit spreads on both the single-name CDSs and cash 
bonds issued by comparable securities issuers.  
Any relative mispricing across the debt and equity securities issued by the same firm 
gives rise to potential capital structure arbitrage opportunities. Single-name CDSs are relatively 
low-cost, liquid, and attractive instruments with which firms can conduct capital structure 
arbitrage. As long as the gains from arbitraging the mispricing exceed transaction costs, such 
arbitrage activities help eliminate any relative mispricing of a reference entity’s debt and equity 
and thus enhances the firm’s capital structure efficiency, which can lead to a lower cost of capital 
for the firm.  
Yet, if single-name CDSs are predominantly traded by informed traders with complex 
and/or opaque strategies, the information reflected by single-name CDS trades may not be 
discernible to relatively less-informed traders. (Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes, 2015) In that case, 
market makers may perceive themselves to be at a relative informational disadvantage to 
informed traders, which will lead them to widen their quoted bid/ask spreads as compensation 
for providing liquidity to relatively better-informed traders. (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) Those 
higher transaction costs may in turn discourage capital structure arbitrage and allow perceived 




Using a sample of NYSE stocks during the period from 2003 through 2007, Boehmer, 
Chava, and Tookes (2015) investigate the impact of the introduction of CDSs on equity markets 
and ascertained that equity markets become less liquid and equity prices become less 
informationally efficient after a market for a single-name CDS emerges. The authors note an 
increased presence of informed institutional investors following the introduction of CDS trading, 
as well as a heightened price impact resulting from informed equity trades. The adverse impact 
of single-name CDS trading is more pronounced for firms that are closer to default and facing 
greater market uncertainty. Conversely, the authors find that the introduction of single-name 
CDSs has a less negative (and sometimes a positive) role for healthy firms. They conjecture that 
their results may be driven by the fact that there is more speculative trading in CDSs for firms in 
distress and when market conditions are volatile and that the activities of hedgers are more 
dominant during stable market conditions.  
Haas and Reynolds (2015) reach somewhat similar conclusions. They find that as 
liquidity in CDS markets tightens, equity market makers that rely on CDS spreads as important 
sources of information about the credit quality of reference entities reduce their liquidity 
provision in response to the reduction of information from the CDS market, thereby resulting in a 
spillover of any market illiquidity from single-name corporate CDS markets to the corresponding 
equity markets.  
D. The CDS-Bond Basis 
The CDS-bond basis is the difference in the credit spread for a given reference entity 
reflected in single-name CDS spreads and corporate bond spreads. Although the basis can be 
measured either way, the traditional measure of the CDS-bond basis is to subtract the corporate 
bond credit spread from the CDS spread. When the CDS-bond basis is negative, an arbitrageur 
can buy protection on the reference entity and contemporaneously purchase the corporate bond.89 
The arbitrageur in a negative basis trade profits by receiving the relatively higher bond yield and 
paying the cheaper CDS spread to hedge the credit exposure of the combined position.  
In a frictionless market with no impediments to trade and no transaction costs, inter-
market arbitrage keeps the prices of bonds and related CDS spreads in line and gives rise to a 
mean-reverting CDS-bond basis. During normal market conditions, the CDS-bond basis is close 
to zero, although various institutional details (discussed in Section VI.D.2 below) generally 
prevent the basis from being exactly zero. Because CDSs and bonds are often used in dynamic 
hedging or basis trading strategies – both of which depend on the convergence of CDS spreads 
and bond yield spreads – understanding the factors driving the CDS-bond basis and the related 
empirical evidence highlights the risks associated with these types of strategies. 
1. Measuring the CDS-Bond Basis 
In any empirical examination of the CDS-bond basis, care must be taken to properly 
define the basis so that credit spreads on bonds and CDSs are expressed consistently. To assess 
the relative value and credit risk of a bond and CDS based on the same reference entity, several 
                                                            





different measures of the CDS-bond basis have been developed. The most common such 
measures are as follows:90 
• Asset Swap/CDS Basis: This measure of the CDS-bond basis is the difference between the observed 
CDS spread and the asset swap spread on a bond issued by the reference entity underlying the CDS. 
The advantage of this measure is that it reflects the carrying cost (possibly negative) of the trade – 
i.e., the actual cash cost of holding the bond and buying protection on it. For bonds trading well away 
from par, however, this measure of the basis can be unreliable. 
• z-Spread/CDS Basis: The z-spread on a bond is the spread which, when added to maturity-specific 
rates on the zero-coupon swap curve at all maturities, reprices the bond to par. Because this is a zero-
coupon-equivalent rate, the actual CDS spread must also be adjusted to a zero-coupon-equivalent rate 
(e.g., by bootstrapping the par CDS curve). Although this measure of the basis does not reflect the 
cash carrying costs of a basis trade, it is generally considered to be a more economically informative 
measure of the basis than the asset swap/CDS basis for bonds trading at a discount to from par.  
• Adjusted z-Spread/CDS Basis: In this measure of the basis, default risk is explicitly incorporated into 
the potential cash flows on the bond, and the basis is defined as the difference between the z-spread of 
a bond whose price has been calculated using CDS spreads and the z-spread of the actual bond. This 
is the most direct comparison of theoretical and actual bond spreads. 
• Repo/CDS Basis: This measure of the basis is essentially the same as the adjusted z-spread except that 
the spread is expressed as a difference in yields rather than zero-coupon rates. Specifically, the yield 
is calculated on a hypothetical bond priced off the CDS curve and then compared to the observed 
yield on the actual cash bond in the repo market.  
• Arbitrage-Pricing Difference (“APD”): This measure uses the CDS curve to derive a CDS-implied 
theoretical bond price,91 which then is compared to the market price of the actual bond. The APD is a 
very robust measure of the basis that does not suffer the limitations identified in the other measures 
and can be used to identify relative value opportunities. For example, when the CDS-implied bond 
price exceeds the market price of the bond, the bond is cheap relative to the CDS, and it can make 
sense for arbitrageurs or investors to buy the bond and purchase CDS protection to exploit the 
negative basis. Conversely, a positive basis occurs when the market price of the bond exceeds the 
CDS-implied bond price and suggests a sale of CDS protection and sale of the bond.92 
2. Economic Factors Affecting the Basis 
Credit spreads on corporate and sovereign bonds and the single-name CDS contracts for 
the same reference entity reflect the same underlying credit risk. In principle, differences in the 
design of the products or differences in the risk premiums across the two products for non-credit 
risks should explain any situations where the CDS-bond basis is not zero (i.e., does not reflect 
“parity” between the CDS- and bond-implied credit spreads of the reference entity). No-arbitrage 
requirements stipulate that whenever the CDS-bond basis is sufficiently different from zero, it is 
theoretically possible to implement a basis arbitrage trade, selling (buying) credit risk in the bond 
market and buying (selling) credit risk in the CDS. For the basis trading strategy to be profitable, 
markets should be relatively liquid with narrow bid-ask spreads, funding for bond purchases 
should be readily available, and the interbank market should function efficiently. Even under 
these conditions, this arbitrage strategy is still imperfect as a result of product design differences 
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such as the CTD option owned by protection purchasers in physically settled single-name CDSs 
and the practical challenges involved with short-selling cash bonds, both of which tend to render 
the basis slightly positive during normal market conditions. (Duffie, 1999) 
One simple reason that the CDS-bond basis may not be exactly zero is that the no-
arbitrage relation between single-name CDSs and bonds for the same reference entity only holds 
strictly for floating-rate notes. (Duffie, 1999) As Hull and White (2000) observe, “The difference 
between the spread on par yield floaters and par yield fixed rate instruments is very small for flat 
term structures, but noticeable for non-flat term structures.”93  
A second significant reason for divergences of the CDS-bond basis from parity is relative 
differences in liquidity across the single-name CDS and cash bond markets. In particular, the 
relatively greater illiquidity in the corporate bond market can give rise to a non-zero CDS-bond 
basis. (See, e.g., Gârleanu and L.H. Pedersen (2011).) In fact, this belief is so deeply ingrained in 
the academic literature that the CDS-bond basis is sometimes used as a measure of the market 
liquidity risk premium in corporate bonds. Although the relative simplicity of that measure of the 
bond liquidity risk premium is appealing, it ignores other factors that could also affect the CDS-
bond basis and thus can lead to biased estimates of bond market liquidity risk premiums.  
In addition to relative differences in single-name CDS and bond market liquidity risks, 
other factors that may impact the CDS-bond basis include the following: the impact of the value 
of the CTD option owned by protection purchasers in physically settled single-name CDSs, 
different treatments of accrued interest in CDSs and bonds, short sale restrictions in either or 
both markets, and counterparty risk in the CDS market.94 The relative importance of these 
factors, moreover, is not constant over time. For example, Andritzky and Singh (2006) find that 
the CTD option in sovereign CDSs is significant for sovereign debt trading well below par but is 
insignificant for relatively low-risk sovereign debt with prices near their par amounts.  
The Lehman Brothers credit event in September 2008 and the subsequent global financial 
crisis introduced a new era in financial markets in which counterparty risks began to affect 
derivatives prices. Prior to the Lehman Brothers default, derivatives were priced “as if” the credit 
quality of counterparties was AAA.95 For counterparties rated below AAA, collateral 
requirements brought the credit risk of the transaction to a AAA-equivalent rating. Subsequent to 
the Lehman Brothers default, however, most derivatives are now priced to reflect the credit risk 
of the two counterparties.96  
In particular, if the occurrence of a credit event at the reference entity coincides with the 
default of the CDS protection seller, the CDS buyer is at risk not to receive the full contractually 
required payment from the CDS protection selling counterparty. CDS buyers facing 
counterparties with non-trivial perceived credit risk thus will pay less for credit protection than if 
they were facing otherwise-similar counterparties with lower perceived credit risk. The typical 
mitigating factors for this type of counterparty risk is the posting of collateral on non-cleared 
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CDSs and the clearing of certain CDSs by CCPs. The empirical evidence confirms that spreads 
on uncollateralized CDSs reflect counterparty credit risk and gives rise to a non-zero CDS-bond 
basis.97 (Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen, 2011) 
Adler and Song (2010) analyze the theoretical impacts on the CDS-bond basis of 
economic factors. Table 6 summarizes those factors and the direction of the impact of those 
factors on the CDS-bond basis. 
 
Table 6: Factors Influencing the CDS-Bond Basis 
Direction of Basis Effect Description 
Positive (i.e., CDS 
spread exceeds bond 
spread) 
CTD option in CDSs 
The protection buyer in a physically settled CDS can 
choose to deliver any eligible bond and receive par 
value. 
Issuance of new bonds Pushes up demand for insurance, resulting in a higher price of protection 
Bond short selling 
abilities 
If the reference entity’s credit deteriorates, CDS 
spreads react more quickly than bonds as the demand 
for credit protection increases. 
Repo specialness 
Repurchase agreements on certain bonds that are 
deliverable into physically settled CDSs put upward 
pressure on CDS spreads due to limited availability of 
bonds. 
Negative (i.e., bond 
spread exceeds CDS 
spread) 
Counterparty risk Premium compensating CDS protection buyer for the risk that the protection seller defaults 
Bond illiquidity Although the effect can be ambiguous, illiquid bonds trade at higher spreads and therefore reduce the basis. 
Funding risk 
The protection seller’s funding risk is different than 
would be incurred if, instead of entering into a CDS, it 
replicated the CDS by buying the underlying bond 
with funds borrowed at the risk-free rate. 
SOURCE: Adler and Song (2010) 
 
3. Empirical Examinations of the Basis 
Virtually all empirical investigations into deviations of the CDS-bond basis from the 
theoretical parity relationship are based on institutional frictions that interfere with the inter-
market arbitrage trading strategies that normally would eliminate perceived violations in the law 
of one price across single-name CDS and related bond markets. For example, De Wit (2006), Bai 
and Collin-Dufresne (2013), and Mayordomo and Peña (2014) empirically confirm that the 
institutional issues discussed in the previous section (e.g., trading liquidity, funding costs and 
constraints, counterparty risk, and margin requirements) explain a significant amount of the 
variation in the CDS-bond basis prior to, during, and after the credit crisis. 
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2003) compare the credit spread in corporate bonds to 
corresponding single-name CDS credit spreads and find that CDS spreads are lower than 
corporate bond credit spreads for all firms in their sample – i.e., they document a systematically 
                                                            




negative CDS-bond basis in the cross section of their data. They suggest that tax-related and 
liquidity components reflected in corporate bond spreads explain the higher credit spreads on 
corporate bonds. In a follow-up to their 2003 paper, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) 
decompose the CDS-bond basis into default and non-default components and find that the non-
default component varies over time and is correlated with bond market illiquidity.98 Cossin and 
Lu (2004), Levy (2009), Küçük (2010), and Badaoui, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2015) also find that 
illiquidity is a significant explanatory variable for deviations of the CDS-bond basis from parity.  
Houweling and Vorst (2005) and Adler and Song (2010) show that the spread on a par 
fixed-coupon bond over a par default risk-free fixed-coupon bond only equals the CDS premium 
if the payment dates on the CDS and bond coincide and recovery on default is a constant fraction 
of face value. These studies thus confirm the parity relation established by Duffie (1999) and 
show that it only holds exactly for par bonds. 
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Zhu (2006) confirm that the parity relation 
between CDS and bonds is an equilibrium condition but that substantial deviations from parity 
can arise in the short run if, for example, the cost of shorting a bond in the repo market is 
significant. A non-zero CDS-bond basis can also arise from combinations of imperfections in the 
contract specification of CDSs and measurement errors in computing credit spreads. For 
example, with no restructuring event specified in the ISDA master agreements, as much as six to 
eight percent of the CDS spread is a premium paid to protection sellers for bearing restructuring 
risk. (Berndt, Jarrow, and Kang, 2007) 
As discussed in Section II.B.6, protection buyers are entitled to choose from a basket of 
eligible deliverable obligations to be delivered to the protection seller in a physically settled 
single-name CDSs in exchange for receiving the cash value of the par amount of the delivered 
bond. Bonds of a defaulted obligor with different coupon rates, maturities, and depths of 
subordination do not trade at the same price following a default. As such, the CTD option owned 
by single-name CDS protection buyers entitles them to deliver any eligible bond, and rational 
market participants thus will deliver a bond with the lowest price – i.e., the bond with the lowest 
expected recovery rate. Jankowitsch, Pullirsch, and Veža (2008) find that recovery rates can span 
a wide range, varying between eight and 47 percent across ratings classes and across industries. 
As such, the CTD option can be a significant determinant of deviations of the CDS-bond basis 
from parity. (Singh, 2003; Cossin and Lu, 2004; Jankowitsch, Pullirsch, and Veža, 2008) 
Bühler and Trapp (2009) show that the CDS-bond basis is sensitive to credit- and 
liquidity-risk considerations associated with the underlying reference entity. Several studies 
document a CDS “basis smile” in which issuers with single-A credit ratings have lower CDS 
spreads than issuers with AA or BBB rated entities. Relatively low CDS spreads for very high-
grade firms suggest a greater likelihood of a positive basis, whereas for higher-risk firms other 
factors (e.g., the CTD option) are relatively more important determinants of the CDS-bond basis.   
Coudert and Gex (2010c) consider the relation between secondary market bond prices 
following credit events at large reference entities and the recovery rates determined through the 
corresponding auction settlement process. (See Section II.B.5(c).) Their empirical analysis of 
large entities that experienced credit events from 2005 through 2009 includes the Lehman 
Brothers, Washington Mutual, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac credit events. The authors conclude 
                                                            




from their empirical analysis that the major drivers of a non-zero CDS-bond basis are 
counterparty risk (which is magnified when credit events are correlated across protection sellers) 
and the capital outlay required to support CDS-bond inter-market arbitrage transactions. Brigo 
and Chourdakis (2009), Morkoetter, Pleus, and Westerfeld (2012), and Haerri, Morkoetter, and 
Westerfeld (2015) also find that counterparty credit risk impacts the CDS-bond basis. Arora, 
Gandhi, and Longstaff (2012), however, present evidence that the effect of counterparty risk is 
economically small due to the widespread use of collateral in the CDS market. 
As discussed in more detail in Section VI.A, information about a reference entity’s credit 
risk is generally reflected in the CDS market before the bond market. Short-lived deviations from 
parity can thus also arise purely as a result of single-name CDS spreads reflecting new 
information earlier than bond-based credit spreads. (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh, 2005)  
Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) study the negative CDS-bond basis observed for several 
months during the credit crisis. The authors attribute the persistently negative basis to differences 
in margin requirements on corporate bonds and CDSs. For example, with a five percent cost of 
capital and an initial margin requirement of two percent on the CDS and 20 percent on the repo 
of an investment-grade corporate bond (all of which were typical during the crisis period), the 
margin differential between single-name CDSs and bond repos would have been 0.9 percent (i.e., 
5% x (20% - 2%) = 0.9%), which is close to what was observed at the time. 
In the event that financing and margin costs become prohibitively expensive for would-be 
inter-market arbitrageurs, basis trades will not be executed even in the face of obvious relative 
mispricings, which can cause a non-zero CDS-bond basis to persist for extended periods of time 
and by possibly significant amounts. This dynamic was at work particularly during the 2008 
phase of the credit crisis when the CDS-bond basis was substantially negative across broad 
portfolios of both investment-grade and high-yield bonds. During that period of the crisis, the 
costs of financing inter-market arbitrage became prohibitively expensive for typical arbitrageurs. 
According to J.P. Morgan, initial margin on corporate bonds and repos increased from five 
percent in June 2005 to 10 percent in June 2008. In October 2008, margin increased to 20-25 
percent, and financing for many hedge funds (potential basis arbitrageurs) was simply not 
available at any cost. (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2012) Various other academic studies have 
confirmed the role of binding funding constraints as a significant determinant of the persistent 
negative CDS-bond basis during the crisis – see, e.g., Fontana (2011), Augustin (2012) and 
Bhanot and Guo (2012). 
Regulatory and economic capital constraints also contributed to the sustained negative 
CDS-bond basis during the crisis. Specifically, market making in CDS basis trades is balance-
sheet intensive and requires a substantial amount of capital. In market making for CDS basis 
trades involving single-name CDS and cash bond transactions, a dealer acts as an intermediary 
for both transactions.99 The dealer’s trades involving cash bonds affect its total bond inventory 
holdings and capital requirements. (Dealers hold surplus inventories of securities for which they 
make markets. Low dealer inventories therefore have a negative impact on their ability to 
intermediate markets.) The dealer also faces two different counterparties in two different but 
related markets (i.e., the bond and the related single-name CDS). These economic considerations 
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for dealers translate into costs for inter-market arbitrageurs that are higher when bank 
intermediaries face higher funding and capital costs to support such arbitrage activities.  
Dealer banks experienced severe capital shortages during the financial crisis, which was 
exacerbated by dislocations in the repurchase market. (See, e.g., Gorton and Metrick (2012).) As 
dealers faced binding economic and regulatory capital constraints during the crisis, CDS-bond 
arbitrage activities were impeded, which reinforced the persistence of a negative CDS-bond 
basis. (Duffie, 2010; Fontana, 2011; Choi and Shachar, 2014) The CDS-bond basis reverted to 
more normal levels in 2009 subsequent to an improvement in general market conditions and 
dealers’ balance-sheet capacities.  
For sovereign CDSs, Foley-Fisher (2010) documents violations between the CDS and 
bond parity relation in the 2008 – 2009 period and attributes those deviations primarily to 
constraints on credit protection sales (e.g., the E.U. ban on naked shorting using sovereign 
CDSs) and heterogeneous beliefs amongst CDS traders. Janus, Jinjarak, and Uruyos (2013) also 




VII. SINGLE-NAME CDSS, INTERCONNECTEDNESS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
Single-name CDS spreads reflect valuable information about the nature and magnitude of 
interconnectedness between financial institutions that write CDS protection and the potential 
systemic risks to which such interconnectedness may give rise. We review the empirical results 
from the academic literature on the sources and nature of interconnectedness across firms to 
which single-name CDSs give rise. Our discussion in this section is not primarily concerned with 
whether CDSs create or exacerbate systemic risk. Instead, we focus in this section on the 
informational content of single-name CDS spreads as harbingers of potential systemic issues. 
Some of the papers that analyze interconnectedness through single-name CDS channels can be 
interpreted to support conclusions that single-name CDSs result in heightened cross-firm 
interconnectedness, but other papers reviewed in this section can be interpreted as evidence 
against any systemic implication of single-name CDSs. (See, e.g., Duffie (2010), Stulz (2010), 
and Tran (2013).)  
In Section VII.A, we review the volatilities of CDS spreads and the correlation between 
volatilities of credit spreads implied by CDSs, cash bonds, and equities. The second section 
reviews literature discussing sources of interconnectedness. In Section VII.C, we discuss the 
empirical evidence on spillovers in sovereign CDS markets. Specifically, we review the 
empirical record for both the U.S. post-Lehman financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis, followed by a review of the significant articles that empirically examine the interplay 
between sovereign CDSs and foreign exchange markets. Finally, Section VII.D provides an 
overview on the literature on the interrelation between sovereign and banking/corporate credit 
risk. 
A. Single-Name CDS Volatility and Correlation 
Many firms have securities that are actively traded in the single-name CDS, corporate 
bond, and stock markets at the same time. Volatilities of CDS spreads, bond yield spreads, and 
stock prices thus provide a three-dimensional view of the financial condition of reference entities 
underlying outstanding single-name CDSs. Another useful and related measure is the co-
movement of volatilities (i.e., estimated covariance or correlation coefficients) of credit spreads 
implied by CDSs, cash bonds, and equities. The relative magnitudes of these empirical indicators 
of co-movements in asset prices across related markets based in the same common reference 
entities indicate how these different markets are affected by common economic shocks.  
Increased risk and greater uncertainty during crises are reflected in elevated volatility of 
CDS spreads, bond yield spreads, and stock prices when compared to normal markets. For 
example, Belke and Gokus (2011) analyzed the CDS spreads of four large U.S. banks from 2006 
to 2009 and found (not surprisingly) that CDS spread volatilities rose significantly during the 
crisis and that correlations across CDS spreads also became higher during the crisis. (See also 
Coudert and Gex (2010a).) 
Correlations and covariances are not constant over time and often exhibit elevated levels 
during times of market-wide uncertainty such as when Lehman Brothers failed. Covariances tend 
to be higher (lower) in times of high (low) volatility, but variability in covariance has been 
documented to exist beyond what can be explained only by volatility. Some (e.g., Belke and 
Gokus (2011)) argue that increased correlations between single-name CDSs and local equity 




which different banks are often connected. Nevertheless, causality is not implied by correlation, 
and more robust analyses are required to identify statically significant cross-market contagion 
and interconnectedness channels (see. e.g., Section VII.B). 
Almer, Heidon, and Schmaltz (2008) analyze the dynamic behavior of the “CDS slope” 
correlation between short-term (6-month) and long-term (5-year) CDS spreads of banks from 
2001 to 2007. The authors show that this correlation exhibits large variations over time. During 
periods of market distress, spreads tend to co-move, whereas such co-movements subside during 
normal market conditions. An interesting finding by Almer, Heidon, and Schmaltz is that 5-year 
single-name CDS spreads (which, as noted in Section II.B.2, is typically the most actively traded 
maturity) are correlated to the borrower distress proxies contained in the Merton (1974) model 
(e.g., firm value volatility, stock prices, interest rates) but are not sensitive to cross-market 
liquidity risk factors.100 As discussed in Sections IV.B and VI.D, their finding of the insensitivity 
of single-name CDS spreads to CDS and/or bond market liquidity risk is at odds with the rest of 
the literature.  
B. Measuring Interconnectedness Using CDSs 
Coudert and Gex (2010a, 2010d) analyze how the financial crises at General Motors 
(“GM”) and Ford in May 2005 affected single-name CDSs on GM and Ford. Specifically, 
spreads on both firms’ CDSs increased significantly prior to their rating downgrades in May 
2005. More interestingly, CDS spreads for longer-dated tenors also rose during this period for 
U.S. and European corporates. The authors estimated correlation coefficients across markets that 
rose appreciably following the auto manufacturers’ credit downgrades, thereby confirming a 
strong degree of international cross-market integration and market participants’ expectations 
about potential spillover effects.  
Especially since the outbreak of the credit crisis in 2007 and the highly publicized 
failures of firms like Lehman Brothers, the academic literature on the estimation of 
interconnectedness has burgeoned. Interest in this literature has been fueled by enhanced 
regulatory scrutiny of systemic risk and the creation of “systemically important financial 
institutions” as defined by the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) and Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) for international and U.S. institutions, respectively. 
Much of the academic literature on systemic risk today focuses on efforts to quantify the 
riskiness of specific financial institutions in an interconnected world – see, e.g., Acharya, 
Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010), Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012), and 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012) present a useful 
survey of various measures of systemic risk as of 2012. Such measures of systemic risk (ranging 
from simple examinations of market data to complex econometric models of financial networks) 
often utilize CDS spreads as inputs to the analysis of interconnectedness.  
Some examples of academic studies that utilize single-name CDS spreads to analyze 
cross-firm interconnectedness include the following:101 
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• Jacoby, Jiang, and Theocharides (2009) study spillovers of liquidity shocks across single-name CDS, 
corporate bond, and equity markets and find no evidence of a liquidity spillover effect from bonds to 
CDSs and a time lag between the reflection of liquidity shocks on single-name CDS spreads vis-à-vis 
both bond and equity markets; 
• Kim, Loretan, and Remolona (2010) analyze CDS spreads and EDFs on 38 corporate names from the 
Asia-ex-Japan area over the period from January 2005 through January 2009 and find that “knock-
on” effects from the global (mainly western) credit crisis had some impact on higher EDFs for Asian 
firms but that the majority of the adverse impacts felt by the Asian companies was attributable to 
increases in investor risk aversion following the outbreak of the credit crisis; 
• Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic, and Sarno (2012) examine the CDS spreads of the largest 45 
financial institutions in the U.S., U.K., Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, 
and Portugal as measures of their interconnectedness and conclude from their empirical work that a 
strong common factor explained CDS spreads even before the credit crisis, and that the common 
factor driving CDS spreads became more pronounced following the outbreak of the crisis; 
• Giglio (2011) analyzes bond and CDS spreads to differentiate correlated systemic credit risks from 
the firm-specific credit risks of individual reference entities; 
• Nijskens and Wagner (2011) analyze the 38 banks that began to use CDSs from June 1998 through 
June 2006 and determine that the introduction of CDSs was commensurate with increases in the 
banks’ equity betas – i.e., after decomposing the beta increase into volatility and correlation effects, 
the authors conclude that increased interconnectedness is almost entirely a correlation effect, which 
indicates evidence linking CDS usage with systemic interconnectedness;  
• Chen, Cummins, Viswanathan, and Weiss (2013) analyze CDS spreads and stock prices from 2001 
through 2011 in the insurance sector and find strong evidence of interconnectedness between banks 
and insurers; 
• Conrad, Dittmar, and Hameed (2013) estimate joint default probabilities and LGDs for corporate 
reference entities using both CDS spreads and equity option-implied volatilities and find evidence 
that increases in default probabilities at systemically important financial institutions precipitate 
increases in the default probabilities and LGDs of other companies that are reflected in single-name 
CDS spreads; 
• Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) compare market-based measures of systemic risk using CDS 
spreads, interbank rates, and stock prices and conclude that systemic risk measures based on CDSs 
outperform measures based on the other two candidates;  
• Yang and Zhou (2013) analyze interconnectedness and spillover effects across 43 large international 
financial institutions and use CDS spreads to characterize a network comprised of “prime senders, 
exchange centers, and prime receivers of credit risk information”;102 
• Getmansky, Girardi, and Lewis (2014) analyze the ostensible interconnectedness of CDS exposures 
across multiple swap dealers and find that the network of dealers was highly concentrated in general 
and in sovereign CDSs more specifically;  
• Peltonen, Scheicher, and Vuillemey (2014) construct a network from the bilateral notional CDS 
exposures across 642 sovereign and financial reference entities and identify a center of the network 
consisting of 14 dealers, at which a significant concentration of CDS protection sales is apparent; 
                                                            




• Oh and Patton (2015) develop a dynamic model to analyze CDS spreads on U.S. firms from 2006 to 
2012 and find that systemic risks arising from CDS interconnectedness was the highest in 2008 and 
2009 and remained above pre-crisis levels from 2010 through 2012; 
• Zareei (2015) analyzes single-name CDS data and concludes that firms with less interconnectedness 
and systemic importance are more likely to experience credit-related jumps in their CDS spreads and 
are more likely to fail, whereas firms with greater systemic importance exhibit lower failure rates and 
bankruptcy probabilities;  
• Abbassi, Brownlees, Hans, and Podlich (2016) rely on market-based CDS spreads to measure market-
based measures of bank interconnectedness and find a strong relation between CDS-based 
interconnectedness measures and banks’ actual risk exposures in wholesale funding, securities 
investment, and loan markets; 
• Cetina, Paddrik, and Rajan (2016) use CDSs as proxies for the risk in banks’ trading books in the 
annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) stress tests performed annually by 
the Federal Reserve; and  
• Kanno (2016) employs network measures of systemic risk to examine interconnectedness in CDS 
markets, and draws the conclusion that the risks of contagious defaults spreading from single-name 
CDS markets to cash bond, equity, and equity options markets are relatively low. 
C. Sovereign CDSs and Spillover Effects 
Much of the academic literature that has analyzed sovereign CDS spreads has focused on 
the relation between macroeconomic fundamentals, financial market conditions, and sovereign 
credit risk and the transmission channels for financial and macroeconomic shocks across 
countries. For example, Ang and Longstaff (2013) undertake a comparative analysis of 
interconnectedness and systemic sovereign risk within the United States (i.e., across different 
individual U.S. states and the U.S. Treasury) and within Eurozone countries to investigate 
whether systemic sovereign risk is based primarily on financial market disruptions or 
macroeconomic shocks. Their conclusion is that the systemic interconnectedness of sovereign 
credit risk is driven primarily by the financial sector and not by macroeconomic shocks. 
Similarly, De Boyrie and Pavlova (2016) find that spillover effects across emerging market 
sovereigns are driven primarily by shocks in the financial market sector, but also that the 
interconnectedness arises primarily from global financial market shocks.  
Yet, as the discussions below of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the U.S. financial 
crisis following the failure of Lehman suggests, inferences about financial versus 
macroeconomic drivers of interconnectedness often depend significantly on sample-specific 
variables, such as the market (i.e., financial or real economy) from which the primary original 
shock emanated, the size and international interconnectedness of a country, and the relative 
sovereign credit risk of a country. We review the empirical evidence below for both the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the U.S. post-Lehman financial crisis, and we conclude the 
section with a review of the significant articles that empirically examine the interplay between 
sovereign CDS and foreign exchange markets.  
1. Evidence from the Eurozone Crisis 
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis from 2010 through 2012 provides the basis for most 
academic studies that have analyzed the CDS-bond basis, and these studies have produced a 




for the 10 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
and found a significant variation in the co-movement of cross-country CDS spreads during the 
Eurozone crisis period as compared to non-crisis periods. The authors also find that specific 
contagion effects in the sovereign CDS market vary on a country by country basis. Dieckmann 
and Plank (2012), Kalbaska and Gątkowski (2012), Calice, Chen, and Williams (2013), Gündüz 
and Kaya (2013), Blasques, Koopman, Lucas, and Schaumberg (2014), Doshi, Jacobs, and Zurita 
(2014), Glover and Richards-Shubik (2014), Huang, Chen, and Shen (2014), and Galariotis, 
Makrichoriti, and Spyrou (2015) present comparable empirical findings that contagion in 
sovereign CDS markets varies in both direction and magnitude on a country-specific basis.103 
Antón, Mayordomo, and Rodríguez-Moreno (2015), moreover, document that sovereign CDS 
spreads for single-name sovereign CDSs that are most often quoted by a common set of swap 
dealers tend to exhibit higher correlations.  
Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo, and Rigobon (2013) find that the spillover effects across 
sovereign CDSs in the Eurozone were not dependent on the size of the underlying shocks. 
Although the authors documented a change in the size of the propagation of shocks across 
Eurozone countries in the 2003-2006 and 2008-2011 periods, the degree to which shocks from 
one country were transmitted to another actually declined in the post-Lehman period. The 
authors interpret their results as indicating that post-Lehman transmission mechanisms of shocks 
across sovereign CDS markets to private bank funding markets were the result of larger shocks 
and not a series of similar, correlated shocks across multiple countries.  
Groba, Lafuente, and Serrano (2013) examine spillover effects from peripheral Eurozone 
countries to central E.U. members in the period from January 2008 through July 2012. In 
contrast with the conventional view that shocks were transmitted from central European 
countries to the periphery, the authors find that shocks were transmitted in the opposite direction, 
thus indicating a common global shock that propagated through Eurozone sovereign debt 
markets at an uneven pace. A significant conclusion (in line with Pan and Singleton (2008)) from 
this study is that a major component of risk premiums on sovereign CDSs is based on market-
wide, systematic risks and is not merely a market-based revision of expected country-specific 
credit risks. (See Section IV.B.3.) Dockner, Mayer, and Zechner (2013) and Consiglio, Lotfi, and 
Zenios (2016) also show that sovereign CDS spreads are driven mainly by global factors, but that 
country-specific risks still explain some variations in CDS returns (in magnitudes that differ 
depending on the country). 
Significant evidence also suggests that observed co-movements in sovereign credit 
spreads across different countries were not primarily the result of contagion within the financial 
market but rather were the product of transmissions of country-specific macroeconomic shocks. 
(See, e.g., Aizenman, Hutchinson, and Jinjarak (2013), Manasse and Zavalloni (2013), and 
Shoesmith (2014).) Using spreads on sovereign CDSs and long-term sovereign debt (as well as 
ratings for those debt instruments), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) show that the main explanation 
for the rise in sovereign debt yields and CDS spreads during the Eurozone crisis was the 
deterioration of country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals and the transmission of 
macroeconomic shocks across countries, and was not the result of regional spillover effects or 
financial market contagion.  
                                                            




Kim, Salem, and Wu (2015) find a similar result by analyzing the impact of 
macroeconomic news from the U.S., Eurozone countries, and China on sovereign CDS spreads. 
Not surprisingly, they find that macroeconomic news has a significant impact on sovereign credit 
spreads. Better than expected news reduces sovereign CDS spreads, and vice versa. News 
regarding the three major economies that the authors studied also have significant 
macroeconomic spillover effects on sovereign CDS spreads for other countries. 
Yet, the literature is not unambiguous on this issue. For example, Sgherri and Zoli 
(2009), Caceres, Guzzo, and Segoviano (2010), Revoltella, Mucci, and Mihaljek (2010), 
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), and Heinz and Sun (2014) conclude that spreads 
on sovereign CDSs during the Eurozone crisis were more the result of global investor sentiment 
and risk aversion than country-specific macroeconomic problems. Similarly, Aretz and Pope 
(2013) find that sovereign credit risk reflected in CDS spreads is explained primarily by global 
and industry risk factors and not country-specific risks.  
2. Lehman Brothers and the Credit Crisis 
Sovereign CDS spreads have also been used to analyze the diffusion of the U.S. subprime 
and global credit crisis through other global financial markets. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) 
analyzed the spillover effects from the single-name CDSs on distressed institutions during the 
credit crisis vis-à-vis sovereign CDS spreads for emerging-market economies. The authors 
conclude that emerging markets were somewhat insulated from the crisis before the Lehman 
Brothers failure in 2008, but were infected by the deteriorating situation of the U.S. financial 
system and global credit markets thereafter. (Dooley and Hutchison, 2009) This evidence 
contradicts the prevalent view before the crisis that emerging markets were well-insulated from 
adverse financial sector shocks in the rest of the world.  
Dumontaux and Pop (2013) rely on single-name CDS and equity market data to examine 
the spillover effect of the Lehman Brothers failure on to other financial institutions. They 
provide evidence of significant abnormal jumps in CDS spreads following the collapse of 
Lehman in September 2008 and conclude that those jumps reflect upward revisions in market 
participants’ assessments of the future credit risks of surviving firms that had characteristics 
similar to Lehman. 
Wang and Moore (2012) studied the extent to which the sovereign CDS markets of 38 
developed and emerging countries became integrated with the U.S. market during the credit 
crisis. Their evidence revealed that the Lehman shock strengthened cross-market integration 
interaction effects, especially across developed markets. Wang and Moore (2012) attribute the 
shift in the relations between developed and emerging market economics to the low absolute 
levels of U.S. interest rates. 
3. Sovereign CDSs and Currency Market Linkages 
Carr and Wu (2007) find that sovereign CDS spreads for both Brazil and Mexico are 
significantly affected by the level of implied volatility and the slope of the implied volatility 
curve derived from currency options markets. Some studies have investigated the transmission 
mechanisms between sovereign credit risk and currencies in more detail. For example, Hui and 
Chung (2011) examine information flows between sovereign CDSs and foreign exchange 
options for 11 countries in the Eurozone during the European sovereign debt crisis. Employing a 




that from September 2009 through April 2010, at the height of the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis, significant and strong flows of information occurred between sovereign debt and foreign 
exchange markets. In a broader sample from 2006 through 2010, such flows were less 
pronounced and no clear direction of information transmission could be identified. Hui and Fong 
(2011) find similar results.  
Huang and MacDonald (2014) analyze the relation between sovereign CDS spreads and 
returns on foreign exchange “carry trades” – i.e., speculative strategies in which investors borrow 
in a currency with a low interest rate and invest the proceeds of that loan in a higher-yielding 
currency in order to try and exploit deviations from uncovered interest parity. Although popular 
with many investors, the seemingly regular and positive excess returns that such trades generate 
are regarded as an anomaly. (See, e.g., Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984).) Huang 
and MacDonald find that sovereign CDS premiums together with a market liquidity risk 
premium explain over 90 percent of cross-sectional variation in excess returns on carry trades.104 
De Santis (2015) investigates quanto sovereign CDS spreads (i.e., spreads on sovereign 
CDSs that incorporate price differences between Euros and U.S. dollars) and finds that sovereign 
yields of French, Italian, and Spanish sovereign bonds are significantly affected by the perceived 
risk that those countries could exit the Eurozone and have their debt redenominated in a devalued 
legacy currency after controlling for exchange rate, global, regional, and liquidity shocks. Like 
other papers, De Santis (2015) also finds evidence of spillover effects in which shocks to 
domestic economies arising from foreign redenomination risk are larger than the domestic 
shocks in some European countries. Pu and Zhang (2012a) also examined the spreads between 
Euro- and dollar-denominated sovereign CDSs and found a significant increase in those spreads 
during the European sovereign debt crisis. 
D. Interrelated Sovereign and Banking/Corporate Credit Risks 
A number of studies have empirically analyzed the relations between financial distress in 
a country’s banking sector and the sovereign credit risk of the country. Such relations can run 
both directions causally, especially if sovereign bailouts of banks or the banking sector are 
associated with the crisis. In that case, such bailouts of a distressed national banking sector can 
lead to higher costs that can put fiscal pressure on the sovereign, thereby resulting in increased 
sovereign credit risk. Evidence that bank bailout programs by governments lead to increased 
sovereign credit risk and sovereign CDS spreads is presented in Attinasi, Checherita, and Nickel 
(2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), Alter and Schüler (2012), Ejsing and Lemke (2011), Mody and 
Sandri (2011), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013).  
Increased sovereign credit risk also puts pressure on the national banking sector by 
reducing government bond values (which, all else equal, decline when sovereign credit risk is 
higher, as shown in Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014)), reducing the value of future 
government guarantees, and jeopardizing the sovereign rating assigned to the country by the 
major rating agencies.105 Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) describe this as the 
“sovereign-bank loop.” 
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a multi-name CDS index (i.e., the iTraxx SovX Asia Pacific CDS index), we do not separately summarize that paper here. 
105 As a general rule, a private corporation cannot have a higher credit rating than the country rating. For example, the downgrade of a country from 




Based on bank and sovereign CDS spread data from January 2007 through April 2011 for 
all Eurozone countries (as well as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom), Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) report that bank bailouts did in fact shift 
credit risk from national banks to sovereigns, which caused an increase in sovereign credit risk 
and CDS spreads. The authors also find that the resulting increase in sovereign credit risk caused 
an increase in national bank credit risk and bank CDS spreads, even after controlling for 
common risk factors across banks and bank-specific risk attributes. Alter and Schüler (2012), 
Alter and Beyer (2013), Billio et. al. (2013), Gerlach-Kristen (2013), Battistini, Pagano, and 
Simonelli (2014), Li and Zinna (2014), Gątarek and Wojtowicz (2015), and Haerri, Morkoetter, 
and Westerfeld (2015) find similar evidence supporting the sovereign-bank risk loop.  
Erce (2015) finds for 10 Eurozone countries that the sovereign risk feeds back more 
strongly into banking system risk than vice versa. Gross and Kok (2015) study 23 sovereign and 
41 bank reference entities in Europe, Japan, and the United States and conclude that credit risk 
was generally spread from banks to sovereigns in 2008 but that contagion moved in the opposite 
direction from sovereigns to banks during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Ohno (2013) finds 
evidence of the sovereign-bank loop within European countries that received bailout funds but 
does not find significant evidence that those shocks were transmitted to peripheral Eurozone 
countries not experiencing fiscal crises. Billio et. al. (2013) and Gross and Kok (2015) use 
network and interconnectedness measures like those summarized in Section VII.B to propose a 
measure of the systemic sovereign-bank loop. 
Increased sovereign risk also leads to increased borrowing costs for non-financial 
corporations (although, unlike banks, the causation appears to be unidirectional). For example, 
Augustin et. al. (2015) analyze the spillover effects following the first Greek bailout 
announcement on the corporate sector and ascertained that a 10 percent increase in sovereign 
credit risk led to a 1.1 percent increase in reference entity credit risk. Bedendo and Colla (2015) 
similarly find that heightened sovereign risk results in higher corporate spreads and borrowing 
costs with a more pronounced effect for non-financial borrowers that depend directly on 
government support, firms whose sales are primarily in the domestic market, and firms that are 
dependent on bank financing. Haerri, Morkoetter, and Westerfeld (2015) report empirical 
evidence of similar relations.  
Avino and Cotter (2014) analyze the information conveyed by both bank and sovereign 
single-name CDS spreads in the 2004-2013 period for six major European economies from a 
price discovery perspective (as discussed in Section IV.C). By examining both the informational 
efficiency of bank and sovereign CDS spreads and the relative speeds of adjustment in the two 
markets, the authors conclude that both markets play important price discovery roles. For 
developed economies that were relatively healthy during the sample period, the authors conclude 
that bank CDSs were the PPDMs. For distressed economies (e.g., Portugal and Spain), however, 
sovereign CDS markets tended to be the PPDMs both during the credit crisis and Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. 
De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens, and Vander Vennet (2013) analyze the linkage 
between bank and sovereign credit risk at a more granular level in the 2007-2012 period. The 
authors ascertain that banks with relatively less capital, more limited accesses to funding, and a 
more limited focus on traditional banking activities are more vulnerable to risk spillover effects. 
The authors also found that the connection between sovereign and banking shocks depends on 





We have summarized in this review the mechanics of single-name CDSs based on 
corporate and sovereign reference entities, the markets in which they trade, and the 
documentation and market practices governing the trading of these products. We also have 
reviewed and summarized over 260 empirical research studies of single-name CDSs concerning 
the informational content and determinants of CDS spreads, the impacts of single-name CDS 
availability on lenders and reference entity borrowers, the relations between single-name CDS 
markets and related debt and equity markets, and the interconnections and systemic issues 
surrounding single-name CDSs to elucidate the economic benefits and costs of these products.  
We considered four major subject areas into which most single-name CDS research can 
be divided. The summary of our conclusions based on our assessment of the empirical evidence 
in the academic literature is as follows:  
• The informational content and determinants of single-name CDS spreads: 
o Single-name CDS spreads contain valuable information about the probability and severity of 
adverse credit events that the underlying reference entity may experience during the life of the 
CDS contract. 
o Single-name CDS spreads include both expected losses and a risk premium that protection sellers 
demand to compensate for reference entity-specific and systematic risks (both credit-related and 
non-credit-related). 
o Single-name CDS spreads are anticipatory and contain information regarding future 
announcements about the credit risks and financial conditions of the underlying reference entities. 
• Implications of single-name CDS trading for lenders and reference entity borrowers: 
o Single-name CDSs enable financial institutions to achieve their desired risk/return profiles and 
commercial objectives. Little empirical evidence supports the often-voiced belief that banks’ 
usage of single-name CDSs translates into more aggressive and riskier lending decisions. 
o The empirical evidence regarding the impact of bank CDS usage on the ongoing monitoring of 
their borrowers’ credit risks is mixed.  
o Single-name CDSs positively impact the supply of credit to borrowers that are reference entities 
underlying traded CDSs.  
o The impact of single-name CDSs on the cost of credit to borrowers that are reference entities 
underlying traded CDSs depends on the characteristics of the borrowers and whether or not the 
credit spread in their loans is fixed or indexed to borrowers’ CDS spreads.   
o The availability of traded single-name CDSs can influence the capital structure and corporate 
financing decisions of reference entity borrowers. 
o The existence of creditors with hedged exposures to borrowers (so-called “empty creditors”) and 
the amount of hedged credit risk have ambiguous implications for the bankruptcy decisions of 
reference entities underlying single-name CDSs.  
• Relations between single-name CDS markets and related debt and equity markets: 
o Single-name CDSs are the primary markets for price discovery when compared to corporate 





o The introduction of single-name CDS trading has adverse impacts on the liquidity of related debt 
and equity markets, at least initially. 
o The CDS-bond basis is driven by differences in market liquidity, funding costs, counterparty risk, 
and the design of the financial products.  
• Single-name CDSs, interconnectedness, and systemic risk: 
o Although single-name CDSs on corporate and banking reference entities are a source of 
interconnectedness and contain information that may be valuable to policy makers in measuring 
potential systemic risk, no significant empirical evidence indicates that single-name CDSs are 
inherently de-stabilizing or a major threat to systemic stability.  
o Sovereign CDSs are significant transmission mechanisms for economic shocks but not a 
proximate cause of those shocks. 
o A “sovereign-bank” loop exists in which the financial condition of the banking sector and 
sovereign credit risk are interconnected. Single-name CDS spreads for banks and sovereigns 







APPENDIX A: REFERENCES 
Abbassi, P., C. Brownlees, C. Hans, and N. Podlich. 2016. “Credit Market Interconnectedness: What Does the 
Market Really Know?” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 09/2016. 
Abid, F., and N. Naifar. 2006. “The Determinants of Credit Default Swap Rates: An Explanatory Study.” 
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance Vol. 9, No. 1. 
Acharya, V., and T. Johnson. 2007. “Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives.” Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 
84, No. 1. 
Acharya, V., I. Drechsler, and P. Schnabl. 2014. “A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk.” 
Journal of Finance Vol. 69, No. 6 (December). 
Acharya, V., L. H. Pedersen, T. Philippon, and M. Richardson. 2010. “Measuring Systemic Risk.” Working Paper 
(May). 
Adler, M., and J. Song. 2010. “The Behavior of Emerging Market Sovereigns’ Credit Default Swap Premiums and 
Bond Yield Spreads.” International Journal of Finance & Economics Vol. 15. 
Adrian, T., and M. K. Brunnermeier. 2016. “CoVaR.” American Economic Review Vol. 106, No. 7. 
Afonso, A., D. Furceri, and P. Gomes. 2012. “Sovereign Credit Ratings and Financial Markets Linkages: 
Application to European Data.” Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 31, No. 3 (April). 
Aizenman, J., M. Hutchison, and Y. Jinjarak. 2013. “What Is the Risk of European Sovereign Debt Defaults? Fiscal 
Space, CDS Spreads and Market Pricing of Risk.” Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 34 (April). 
Alexopoulou, I., M. Andersson, and O. M. Georgescu. 2009. “An Empirical Study on the Decoupling Movements 
between Corporate Bond and CDS Spreads.” ECB Working Paper No. 1085 (August). 
Almer, T., T. Heidorn, and C. Schmaltz. 2008. “The Dynamics of Short- and Long- Term CDS-Spreads of Banks.” 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Working Paper Series No. 95 (April). 
Alper, C., L. Forni, and M. Gerard. 2013. “Pricing of Sovereign Credit Risk: Evidence from Advanced Economies 
during the Financial Crisis.” International Finance Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer). 
Alter, A., and A. Beyer. 2013. “The Dynamics of Spillover Effects during the European Sovereign Debt Turmoil.” 
EXB Working Paper No. 1558 (June). 
Alter, A., and Y. S. Schüler. 2012. “Credit Spread Interdependencies of European States and Banks during the 
Financial Crisis.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 36, No. 12 (December). 
Altman, E., and B. Karlin. 2009. “The Re-emergence of Distressed Exchanges in Corporate Restructurings.” Journal 
of Credit Risk Vol. 5 (Summer). 
Akerlof, G. K. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics Vol. 84, No. 3 (August). 
Ammer, J., and F. Cai. 2011. “Sovereign CDS and Bond Pricing Dynamics in Emerging Markets: Does the 
Cheapest-To-Deliver Option Matter?” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money Vol. 
21, No. 3 (July). 
Anderson, R. W. 2010. “Credit Default Swaps: What Are the Social Benefits and Costs?” Financial Stability Review 
No. 14 (July). 
Andritzky, J., and M. Singh. 2006. “The Pricing of Credit Default Swaps during Distress.” IMF Working Paper No. 
254 (November). 
Ang, A., and F. A. Longstaff. 2013. “Systemic Sovereign Credit Risk: Lessons from the U.S. And Europe.” Journal 
of Monetary Economics Vol. 60, No. 5 (July). 
Annaert, J., M. De Ceuster, P. Van Roy, and C. Vespro. 2013. “What Determines Euro Area Bank CDS Spreads?” 
Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 32 (February). 
Antón, M., S. Mayordomo, and M. Rodriguez-Moreno. 2015. “Dealing with Dealers: Sovereign CDS 
Comovements.” Working Paper (August). 
Arce, O., S. Mayordomo, and J. I. Peña. 2013. “Credit-Risk Valuation in the Sovereign CDS and Bonds Markets: 
Evidence from the Euro Area Crisis.” Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 35 (June). 
Aretz, K., and P. F. Pope. 2013. “Common Factors in Default Risk Across Countries and Industries.” European 
Financial Management Vol. 19, No. 1. 
Arora, N., P. Gandhi, and F. A. Longstaff. 2012. “Counterparty Credit Risk and the Credit Default Swap Market.” 
Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 103, No. 2. 
Arping, S. 2014. “Credit Protection and Lending Relationships.” Journal of Financial Stability Vol. 10. 
Ashcraft, A. B., and J. A. C. Santos. 2009. “Has the CDS Market Lowered the Cost of Corporate Debt?” Journal of 




Attinasi, M.-G., Checherita, C., and Nickel C. 2009. “What Explains the Surge in Euro Area Sovereign Spreads 
During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09?” ECB Working Paper No. 1131 (December). 
Augustin, P. 2012. “Squeezed Everywhere: Can We Learn Something New from the CDS-Bond Basis?” Working 
Paper (September). 
Augustin, P. 2013. “The Term Structure of CDS Spreads and Sovereign Credit Risk.” Working Paper (October). 
Augustin, P. 2014. “Sovereign Credit Default Swap Premia.” Working Paper (January). 
Augustin, P., H. Boustanifar, J. Breckenfelder, and J. Schnitzler. 2015. “Sovereign to Corporate Risk Spillovers.” 
Working Paper (September). 
Augustin, P., M. G. Subrahmanyam, D. Y. Tang, and S. Q. Wang. 2014. “Credit Default Swaps: A Survey.” 
Foundations and Trends in Finance Vol. 9, No. 1-2. 
Augustin, P., M. G. Subrahmanyam, D. Y. Tang, and S. Q. Wang. 2016. “Credit Default Swaps: Past, Present, and 
Future.” Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 8 (December – forthcoming). 
Aunon-Nerin, D., D. Cossin, T. Hricko, T., and Z. Huang. 2002. “Exploring for the Determinants of Credit Risk in 
Credit Default Income Markets’Information Sufficient to Evaluate Credit Risk?” International Center for 
Financial Asset Management and Engineering Research Paper No. 65 (December). 
Avino, D., and J. Cotter. 2014. “Sovereign and Bank CDS Spreads: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money Vol. 32 (September). 
Avino, D., T. Conlon, and J. Cotter. 2016. “Credit Default Swaps as Indicators of Bank Financial Distress.” UCD 
Geary Institute for Public Policy Discussion Paper Series No. WP2016/01 (January). 
Baba, N., and M. Inada. 2009. “Price Discovery of Subordinated Credit Spreads for Japanese Mega-Banks: 
Evidence from Bond and Credit Default Swap Markets.” Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money Vol. 19, No. 4 (October). 
Badaoui, S., L. Cathcart, and L. El-Jahel. 2013. “Do Sovereign Credit Default Swaps Represent a Clean Measure of 
Sovereign Default Risk? A Factor Model Approach.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37, No. 7 (July). 
Badaoui, S., L. Cathcart, and L. El-Jahel. 2015. “Implied Liquidity Risk Premium in the Term Structure of 
Sovereign Credit Default Swap and Bond Spreads.” European Journal of Finance (January). 
Bai, J. and P. Collin-Dufresne. 2013. “The CDS-Bond Basis.” Working Paper (November). 
Bao, J., and J. Pan. 2013. “Bond Illiquidity and Excess Volatility.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 26, No. 12. 
Barclay, M. J., and C. W. Smith, Jr. 1995. “The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt.” Journal of Finance Vol. 50, 
No. 2 (June). 
Bator, F. M. 1958. “The Anatomy of Market Failure.” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 72, No. 3 (August). 
Batta, G. 2011. “The Direct Relevance of Accounting Information for Credit Default Swap Pricing.” Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting Vol. 38, No. 9-10. 
Battistini, N., M. Pagano, S. and Simonelli. 2014. “Systemic Risk, Sovereign Yields and Bank Exposures in the 
Euro Crisis.” Economic Policy (April). 
Baum, C. F., and C. Wan. 2010. “Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Credit Default Swap Spreads.” Applied Financial 
Economics Vol. 20 No. 10. 
Beber, A., M. W. Brandt, and K. A. Kavajecz. 2009. “Flight-to-Quality or Flight-to-Liquidity? Evidence from the 
Euro-Area Bond Market.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 22, No. 3. 
Bedendo, M., L. Cathcart, L. El-Jahel, and L. Evans. 2013. “The Credit Rating Crisis and the Informational Content 
of Corporate Credit Ratings.” Working Paper (March). 
Bedendo, M., and P. Colla. 2015. “Sovereign and Corporate Credit Risk: Evidence from the Eurozone.” Journal of 
Corporate Finance Vol. 33. 
Beirne, J., and M. Fratzscher. 2013. “The Pricing of Sovereign Risk and Contagion during the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis.” Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 34 (April). 
Belke, A., and C. Gokus. 2011. “Volatility Patterns of CDS, Bond and Stock Markets before and during the 
Financial Crisis: Evidence from Major Financial Institutions.” Ruhr Economic Papers No. 243 (February). 
Berndt, A., and I. Obreja. 2010. “Decomposing European CDS Returns.” Review of Finance Vol. 14, No. 2. 
Berndt, A., and A. Ostrovnaya. 2014. “Do Equity Markets Favor Credit Market News Over Options Market News?” 
Working Paper (August). 
Berndt, A., R. Douglas, D. Duffie, M. Ferguson, M., and D. Schranz. 2005. “Measuring Default Risk Premia from 
Default Swap Rates and EDFs.” BIS Working Papers No. 173 (March). 
Berndt, A., R. A. Jarrow, and C. Kang. 2007. “Restructuring Risk in Credit Default Swaps: An Empirical Analysis.” 
Stochastic Processes and Their Applications Vol. 117, No. 11. 
Berg, T., and D. Streitz. 2016. “Determinants of the Size of the Sovereign Credit Default Swap Market.” Journal of 




Bertoni, F., and S. Lugo. 2014. “The Effect of Sovereign Wealth Funds on the Credit Risk of Their Portfolio 
Companies.” Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 27 (August). 
Beyhaghi, M., N. Massoud, and A. Saunders. 2016. “Why and How Do Banks Lay off Credit Risk? The Choice 
between Retention, Loan Sales, and Credit Default Swaps.” Working Paper (February). 
Bhanot, K., and L. Guo. 2012. “Types of Liquidity and Limits to Arbitrage – The Case of Credit Default Swaps.” 
Journal of Futures Markets Vol. 32, No. 4. 
Billio, M., M. Getmansky, A. W. Lo, and L. Pelizzon. 2012. “Econometric Measures of Connectedness and 
Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors.” Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 104. 
Billio, M., M. Getmansky, D. Gray, A. W. Lo, R. C. Merton, and L. Pelizzon. 2013. “Sovereign, Bank and 
Insurance Credit Spreads: Connectedness and System Networks.” Working Paper (June). 
Binder, J. J. 1998. “The Event Study Methodology since 1969.” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
Vol. 11. 
Bisias, D., M. Flood, A. W. Lo, and S. Valavanis. 2012. “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics.” Office of Financial 
Research Working Paper No. 1 (January). 
Blanco, R., S. Brennan, and I. W. Marsh. 2005. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between 
Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Finance Vol. 60, No. 5 (October). 
Blasques, F., S. J. Koopman, A. Lucas, and J. Schaumberg. 2014. “Spillover Dynamics for Systemic Risk 
Measurement using Spatial Financial Time Series Models.” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 2014-
107/III (August).  
Blau, B. M., and B. S. Roseman. 2014. “The Reaction of European Credit Default Swap Spreads to the U.S. Credit 
Rating Downgrade.” International Review of Economics and Finance Vol. 34. 
Boehmer, E., S. Chava, and H. E. Tookes. 2015. “Related Securities and Equity Market Quality: The Case of CDS.” 
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis Vol. 50, No. 3 (June). 
Bolton, P., and M. Oehmke. 2011. “Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem.” Review of Financial 
Studies Vol. 24, No. 8. 
Bolton, P., and D. S. Scharfstein. 1996. “Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors.” Journal of Political 
Economy Vol. 104, No. 1 (February). 
Bongaerts, D., F. De Jong, and J. Driessen. 2011. “Derivative Pricing with Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence 
from the Credit Default Swap Market.” Journal of Finance Vol. 66, No. 1 (February). 
Boot, A. W. A., and A. V. Thakor. 2000. “Can Relationship banking Survive Competition?” Journal of Finance 
Vol. 55, No. 2 (April).  
Borio, C. 2008. “The Financial Turmoil of 2007-?: A Preliminary Assessment and Some Policy Considerations.” 
Bank of Spain Financial Stability Journal No. 14. 
Borri, N. and A. Verdelhan. 2012. “Sovereign Risk Premia.” Working Paper (February). 
Brandstack, T. 2010. “Do Credit Rating Announcements Matter?” Master’s Thesis Aalto University School of 
Economics (March). 
Brigo, D., and K. Chourdakis. 2009. “Counterparty Risk for Credit Default Swaps: Impact of Spead Volatility and 
Default Correlation.” International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance Vol. 12, No. 07 (November). 
Brigo, D., M. Predescu, M., and A. Capponi. 2010. “Liquidity Modeling for Credit Default Swaps: An Overview.” 
In Credit Risk Frontiers: Suprime Crisis, Pricing and Hedging, CVA, MBS, Ratings, and Liquidity. T. R. 
Bielecki, D. Brigo, and F. Patras, eds. John Wiley & Sons.  
Broto, C., and G. Pérez-Quirós. 2015. “Disentangling Contagion among Sovereign CDS Spreads during the 
European Debt Crisis.” Journal of Empirical Finance Vol. 32 (June). 
Brunnermeier, M. K., and L. H. Pedersen. 2009. “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity.” Review of Financial 
Studies Vol. 22, No. 6.  
Bühler, W., and M. Trapp. 2009. “Explaining the Bond - CDS Basis – the Role of Credit Risk and Liquidity.” 
Centre for Financial Research Working Paper No. 9. 
Bystrӧm, H. 2005. “Using Credit Derivatives to Compute Marketwide Probability Term Structures.” Journal of 
Fixed Income Vol. 15, No. 3 (December). 
Byström, H. 2016. “Stock Prices and Stock Return Volatilities Implies by the Credit Market.” Journal of Fixed 
Income Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring).  
Caceres, C., V. Guzzo, and M. Segoviano. 2010. “Sovereign Spreads: Global Risk Aversion, Contagion or 
Fundamentals?” IMF Working Paper No. 120 (May). 
Calice, G., J. Chen, and J. Williams. 2013. “Liquidity Spillovers in Sovereign Bond and CDS Markets: An Analysis 




Calice, G., R. Mio, F. Štěrba, and B. Vašíček. 2015. “Short-Term Determinants of the Idiosyncratic Sovereign Risk 
Premium: A Regime-Dependent Analysis for European Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Empirical Finance 
Vol. 33 (September). 
Callen, J. L., J. Livnat, and D. Segal. 2009. “The Impact of Earnings on the Pricing of Credit Default Swaps the 
Impact of Earnings on the Pricing of Credit Default Swaps.” Accounting Review Vol. 84, No. 5. 
Cao, C., F. Yu, and Z. Zhong. 2010. “The Information Content of Option-Implied Volatility for Credit Default Swap 
Valuation.” Journal of Financial Markets Vol. 13, No. 3. 
Caporin, M., L. Pelizzon, F. Ravazzolo, and R. Rigobon. 2013. “Measuring Sovereign Contagion in Europe.” NBER 
Working Paper Series No. 18741 (January). 
Carboni, A., and A. Carboni. 2011. “The Cash-CDS Basis for Sovereign Countries: Market Strategy, Price 
Discovery and Determinants.” Working Paper (February). 
Castellanos, J., N. Constantinou, and W. L. Ng. 2015. “The Signalling Properties of the Credit Default Swap Term 
Structure.” Journal of Risk Vol. 17, No. 4.  
Carr, P., and L. Wu. 2007. “Theory and Evidence on the Dynamic Interactions between Sovereign Credit Default 
Swaps and Currency Options.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 31, No. 8 (August). 
Cebenoyan, A. S., and P. E. Strahan. 2004. “Risk Management, Capital Structure, and Lending at Banks.” Journal 
of Banking and Finance Vol. 28. 
Cetina, J., M. Paddrick, and S. Rajan. 2016. “Stressed to the Core: Counterparty Concentrations and Systemic 
Losses in CDS Markets.” Office of Financial Research Working Paper No. 16-01 (March). 
Chakraborty, I., S. Chava, and R. Ganduri. 2015. “Credit Default Swaps and Moral Hazard.” Working Paper. 
Chan-Lau, J. A., and Kim, Y. S. 2004. “Equity Prices, Credit Default Swaps, and Bond Spreads in Emerging 
Markets.” IMF Working Paper No. 27 (February). 
Chen, H., D. Cummins, K. Viswanathan, and M. Weiss. 2013. “Systemic Risk and the Interconnectedness between 
Banks and Insurers: An Econometric Analysis.” Journal of Risk and Insurance Vol. 81, No. 3. 
Chen, R.-R., Cheng, X., and Liu, B. 2008. “Estimation and Evaluation of the Term Structure of Credit Default 
Swaps: An Empirical Study.” Insurance: Mathematics and Economics Vol. 43, No. 3. 
Chen, R.-R., X. Cheng, and L. Wu. 2012. “Dynamic Interactions between Interest-Rate and Credit Risk: Theory and 
Evidence on the Credit Default Swap Term Structure.” Review of Finance Vol. 17, No. 1. 
Chen, R.-R., F. J. Fabozzi, and R. Sverdlove. 2010. “Corporate Credit Default Swap Liquidity and Its Implications 
for Corporate Bond Spreads.” Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall). 
Chen, Y.-H., K. Wang, and A. H. Tu. 2011. “Default Correlation at the Sovereign Level: Evidence from Some Latin 
American Markets.” Applied Economics Vol. 43. 
Chernov, M., A. S. Gorbenko, and I. Makarov. 2013. “CDS Auctions.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 26, No. 3. 
Chiaramonte, L., and B. Casu. 2010. “Are CDS Spreads a Good Proxy of Bank Risk? Evidence from the Financial 
Crisis.” City University of London Cass Business School Centre for Banking Research Working Paper No. 
WP05/10. 
Chiesa, G. 2008. “Optimal Credit Risk Transfer, Monitored Finance, and Banks.” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation Vol. 17.  
Choi, J., and O. Shachar. 2014. “Did Liquidity Providers Become Liquidity Seekers? Evidence from the CDS-Bond 
Basis During the 2008 Financial Crisis.” FRB of New York Staff Report No. 650 (December). 
Choudhry, M. 2006. “Revisiting the Credit Default Swap Basis: Further Analysis of the Cash and Synthetic Credit 
Market Differential.” Journal of Structured Finance Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter). 
Christensen, J. H. E. 2007. “Joint Default and Recovery Risk Estimation: An Application to CDS Data.” Working 
Paper (January). 
Cizel, J. 2013. “Are Credit Rating Announcements Contagious? Evidence on the Transmission of Information across 
Industries in Credit Default Swap Markets.” Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 23, No. 2. 
Coase, R. H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 3 (October). 
Collins, J. P. and P. J. Sackmann. 2003. “Assessing the Legal and Regulatory Environment for Credit Derivatives.” 
Paper Presented at the ABA Annual Meeting, Section of Business Law, Commercial Financial Services Forum: 
A Structured Finance Trio (August). 
Colonnello, S., M. Efing, and F. Zucchi. 2016. “Empty Creditors and Strong Shareholders: The Real Effects of 
Credit Risk Trading.” Working Paper (March). 
Conrad, J., R. F. Dittmar, and A. Hameed. 2013. “Cross-Market and Cross-Firm Effects in Implied Default 
Probabilities and Recovery Values.” Working Paper (May). 
Consiglio, A., S. Lotfi, and S. A. Zenios. 2016. “Portfolio Diversification in the Sovereign Credit Swap Markets.” 




Coro, F., A. Dufour, and S. Varotto. 2012. “The Time Varying Properties of Credit and Liquidity Components of 
CDS Spreads.” Working Paper (February). 
Cossin, D., and H. Lu. 2004. “Are European Corporate Bond and Default Swap Markets Segmented?” Working 
Paper (October). 
Coudert, V., and M. Gex. 2010a. “Contagion inside the Credit Default Swaps Market: The Case of the GM and Ford 
Crisis in 2005.” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money Vol. 20, No. 2 (April). 
Coudert, V., and M. Gex. 2010b. “Credit Default Swap and Bond Markets: Which Leads the Other?” Banque de 
France Financial Stability Review No. 14 (July). 
Coudert, V., and M. Gex. 2010c. “The Credit Default Swap Market and the Settlement of Large Defaults.” 
Economie InternationaleInternationale Vol. 3, No. 123. 
Coudert, V., and M. Gex. 2010d. “Disrupted Links between Credit Default Swaps, Bonds, and Equities during the 
GM and Ford Crisis in 2005.” Applied Financial Economics Vol. 20. 
Coudert, V., and M. Gex. 2013. “The Interactions between the Credit Default Swap and the Bond Markets in 
Financial Turmoil.” Review of International Economics Vol. 21, No. 3. 
Culp, C. L. 2013. “Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking 
System.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Vol. 25, No. 2. 
Culp, C. L., and J. P. Forrester. 2013. “U.S. Structured Finance Markets: Recent Recoveries, Post-Crisis 
Developments, and Ongoing Regulatory Uncertainties.” Journal of Structured Finance Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter). 
Culp, C. L., and J. P. Forrester. 2015. “Have Pre-Crisis Levels of Risk Returned in U.S. Structured Products? 
Evidence from U.S. Subprime Auto ABS, CLOs, and Insurance-Linked Securities Markets.” Journal of 
Structured Finance Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring). 
Culp, C. L., Y. Nozawa, and P. Veronesi. 2015. “Option-Based Credit Spreads.” Fama-Miller Center Working 
Paper, Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 15-49 (December). 
Daniels, K. N., and M. S. Jensen. 2005. “The Effect of Credit Ratings on Credit Default Swap Spreads and Credit 
Spreads.” Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 15, No. 3 (December). 
Danis, A., and A. Gamba. 2016. “The Real Effects of Credit Default Swaps.” Working Paper (September). 
Das, S., and P. Hanouna. 2006. “Credit Default Swap Spreads.” Journal of Investment Management Vol. 4, No. 3 
(April). 
Das, S., P. Hanouna, and A. Sarin. 2009. “Accounting-Based Versus Market-Based Cross-Sectional Models of CDS 
Spreads.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 33, No. 4. 
Das, S., M. Kalimipalli, and S. Nayak. 2014. “Did CDS Trading Improve the Market for Corporate Bonds?” Journal 
of Financial Economics Vol. 111, No. 2. 
Das, U. S., M. G. Papaioannou, and C. Trebesch. 2012. “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Concepts, 
Literature Survey, and Stylized Facts.” IMF Working Paper No. 203 (August). 
De Boyrie, M. E., and I. Pavlova. 2016. “Dynamic Interdepence of Soverign Credit Default Swaps in BRICS and 
MIST Countries.” Applied Economics Vol. 48, No. 7.  
De Bruyckere, V., M. Gerhardt, G. Schepens, and R. Vander Vennet. 2013. “Bank/Sovereign Risk Spillovers in the 
European Debt Crisis.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37, No. 12 (December). 
De Santis, R. 2015. “A Measure of Redenomination Risk.” ECB Working Paper No. 1785 (April). 
De Wit, J. 2006. “Exploring the CDS-Bond Basis.” National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 104 (November). 
Delatte, A.-L., M. Gex, and A. López-Villavicencio. 2012. “Has the CDS Market Influenced the Borrowing Cost of 
European Countries During the Sovereign Crisis?” Journal of International Financial Money and Finance Vol. 
31, No. 3 (April). 
Delis, M. D., and N. Mylonidis. 2011. “The Chicken or the Egg? A Note on the Dynamic Interrelation between 
Government Bond Spreads and Credit Default Swaps.” Finance Research Letters Vol. 8, No. 3. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and H. Huizinga. 2013. “Are Banks Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? International Evidence 
from Equity Prices and CDS Spreads.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37, No. 3 (March). 
Demsetz, H. 1964. “The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights.” Journal of Law & Economics Vol. 7 
(October). 
Demsetz, H. 1967. “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.” American Economic Review Vol. 57, No. 2 (May). 
Demsetz, H. 1969. “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint.” Journal of Law & Economics Vol. 12, No. 1 
(April). 
Dennis, S. A., and D. J. Mullineaux. 2000. “Syndicated Loans.” Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 9. 
Di Cesare, A. 2006. “Do Market-Based Indicators Anticipate Rating Agencies? Evidence for International Banks.” 




Di Cesare, A., and G. Guazzarotti. 2010. “An Analysis of the Determinants of Credit Default Swap Spread Changes 
before and during the Subprime Financial Turmoil.” Banca d’Italia Working Paper No. 749 (March). 
Díaz, A., J. Groba, and P. Serrano, P. 2013. “What Drives Corporate Default Risk Premia? Evidence from the CDS 
Market.” Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 37 (October). 
Diamond, D. 1991. “Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk.” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 106, No. 3 
(August). 
Diamond, D. W., and R. G. Rajan. 2011. “Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics Vol. 126, No. 2 (May). 
Dieckmann, S., and T. Plank. 2012. “Default Risk of Advanced Economies: An Empirical Analysis of Credit 
Default Swaps during the Financial Crisis.” Review of Finance Vol. 16, No. 4. 
Dockner, E. J., M. Mayer, and J. Zechner. 2013. “Sovereign Bond Risk Premiums.” Goethe University Frankfurt 
Center for Financial Studies Working Paper No. 2013/28 (May). 
Dooley, M., and M. Hutchison. 2009. “Transmission of the U.S. Subprime Crisis to Emerging Markets: Evidence on 
the Decoupling–Recoupling Hypothesis.” Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 28, No. 8 
(December). 
Doshi, H. 2011. “The Term Structure of Recovery Rates.” Working Paper (June). 
Doshi, H., J. Ericsson, K. Jacobs, K., and S. Turnbull. 2013. “Pricing Credit Default Swaps with Observable 
Covariates.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 26, No. 8. 
Doshi, H., K. Jacobs, and C. Zurita. 2014. “Economic and Financial Determinants of Credit Risk Premiums in the 
Sovereign CDS Market.” Working Paper (February). 
Dötz, N. 2007. “Time-Varying Contributions by the Corporate Bond and CDS Markets to Credit Risk Price 
Discovery.” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies No. 08/2007. 
Duffee, G. R., and Zhou, C. 2001. “Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful Tools for Managing Risk?” Journal of 
Monetary Economics Vol. 48, No. 1 (August). 
Duffie, D. 1999. “Credit Swap Valuation.” Financial Analysts Journal (January/February). 
Duffie, D. 2010. “Is There a Case for Banning Short Speculation in Sovereign Bond Markets?” Banque de France 
Financial Stability Review No. 14 (July). 
Duffie, D., and D. Lando. 2001. “Term Structures of Credit Spreads with Incomplete Accounting Information.” 
Econometrica Vol. 69, No. 3 (May). 
Duffie, D., and K. J. Singleton. 1999. “Modeling Term Structures of Defaultable Bonds.” Review of Financial 
Studies Vol. 12, No. 4. 
Düllmann, K., and A. Sosinska. 2007. “Credit Default Swap Prices as Risk Indicators of Listed German Banks.” 
Financial Markets and Portfolio Management Vol. 21, No. 3. 
Dumontaux, N., and A. Pop. 2013. “Contagion Effects in the Aftermath of Lehman’s Collapse: Evidence from the 
US Financial Services Industry.” Banque de France Working Paper No. 427 (March). 
Dunbar, K. 2008. “US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market Liquidity Hypothesis and Autonomous 
Credit Risk.” Quantitative Finance Vol. 8, No. 3. 
Dusak, K. 1973. “Futures Trading and Investor Returns: An Investigation of Commodity Market Risk Premiums.” 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 81, No. 6 (November-December).  
Easley, D., M. O’Hara, and P. S. Srinivas. 1998. “Option Volume and Stock Prices: Evidence on Where Informed 
Traders Trade.” Journal of Finance Vol. 53, No. 2 (April). 
Eichengreen, B., A. Mody, M. Nedeljkovic, M., and L. Sarno. 2012. “How the Subprime Crisis Went Global: 
Evidence from Bank Credit Default Swap Spreads.” Journal of International Money and Finance Vol. 31, No. 5 
(September). 
Eisenthal, Y., P. Feldhutter, and V. Vig. 2016. “Leveraged Buyouts and Credit Spreads.” Working Paper (August 
20). 
Ejsing, J., and W. Lemke. 2011. “The Janus-Headed Salvation: Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk Premia during 
2008-2009.” Economics Letters Vol. 110, No. 1. 
Elkamhi, R., K. Jacobs, K., and X. Pan. 2014. “The Cross Section of Recovery Rates and Default Probabilities 
Implied by Credit Default Swap Spreads.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 49, No. 1 
(February). 
Elkamhi, R., K. Jacobs, H. Langlois, H., and C. Ornthanalai. 2012. “Accounting Information Releases and CDS 
Spreads.” Working Paper (March). 
Erce, A. 2015. “Bank and Sovereign Risk Feedback Loops.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and 




Ericsson, J., K. Jacobs, and R. Oviedo. 2009. “The Determinants of Credit Default Swap Premia.” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 44, No. 1 (February). 
Eyssell, T., H.-G. Fung, and G. Zhang. 2013. “Determinants and Price Discovery of China Sovereign Credit Default 
Swaps.” China Economic Review Vol. 24, No. 1. 
Fabozzi, F. J., X. Cheng, and R. R. Chen. 2007. “Exploring the Components of Credit Risk in Credit Default 
Swaps.” Finance Research Letters Vol. 4, No. 1. 
Fama, E. F. 1970. “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.” Journal of Finance Vol. 
25, No. 2 (May). 
Fama, E. F. 1978. “The Effects of a Firm’s Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security 
Holders.” American Economic Review Vol. 68, No. 3 (June). 
Fama, E. F. 1984. “Forward and Spot Exchange Rates.” Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 14, No. 3. 
Fama, E. F. 1991. “Efficient Capital Markets II.” Journal of Finance Vol. 465, No. 5 (December).  
Fama, E. F., L. Fisher, M. C. Jensen, and R. Roll. 1969. “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information.” 
International Economic Review Vol. 10, No. 1 (February). 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1987. “Commodity Futures Prices: Some Evidence on Forecast Power, Premiums, 
and the Theory of Storage.” Journal of Business Vol. 60, No. 1 (January). 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1988. “Business Cycles and the Behavior of Metals Prices.” Journal of Finance Vol. 
43, No. 5 (December).  
Fender, I., B. Hayo, and M. Neuenkirch. 2012. “Daily Pricing of Emerging Market Sovereign CDS before and 
during the Global Financial Crisis.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 36, No. 10 (October). 
Finnerty, J. D. 1992. “An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter). 
Finnerty, J. D., C. D. Miller, and R.-R. Chen. 2013. “The Impact of Credit Rating Announcements on Credit Default 
Swap Spreads.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37, No. 6 (June). 
Flannery, M., J. Houston, and F. Partnoy. 2010. “Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit 
Ratings.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 158, No. 7. 
Foley-Fisher, N. 2010. “Explaining Sovereign Bond-CDS Arbitrage Violations during the Financial Crisis 2008-
09.” Working Paper (October). 
Fontana, A. 2011. “The Negative CDS-Bond Basis and Convergence Trading during the 2007/09 Financial Crisis.” 
National Center of Competence in Research – Financial Valuation and Risk Management Working Paper No. 
694 (September). 
Fontana, A., and M. Scheicher. 2010. “An Analysis of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and Their Relation with 
Government Bonds.” ECB Working Paper No. 1271 (December). 
Forte, S., and L. Lovreta. 2015. “Time-Varying Credit Risk Discovery in the Stock and CDS Markets: Evidence 
from Quiet and Crisis Times.” European Financial Management Vol. 21, No. 3. 
Forte, S., and J. I. Peña. 2009. “Credit Spreads: An Empirical Analysis on the Informational Content of Stocks, 
Bonds, and CDS.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 33, No. 11 (November). 
Frame, W. S., and L. J. White. 2004. “Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little Action?” 
Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 42, No. 1 (March). 
Fung, H.-G., M. Wen, and G. Zhang. 2012. “How Does the Use of Credit Default Swaps Affect Firm Risk and 
Value? Evidence from US Life and Property/Casualty Insurance Companies.” Financial Management Vol. 41, 
No. 4 (Winter). 
Galariotis, E. C., P. Makrichoriti, and S. Spyrou. 2015. “Sovereign CDS Spread Determinants and Spill-Over 
Effects During Financial Crisis: A Panel VAR Approach.” Working Paper (June). 
Galil, K., and G. Soffer. 2011. “Good News, Bad News and Rating Announcements: An Empirical Investigation.” 
Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 35, No. 11 (November). 
Gamba, A., and A. Saretto. 2013. “Firm Policies and the Cross-Section of CDS Spreads.” Working Paper (August). 
Gârleanu, N., and L. H. Pedersen. 2011. “Margin-Based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price.” 
Review of Financial Studies Vol. 24, No. 6. 
Gątarek, L., and M. Wojtowicz. 2015. “The Relation between Sovereign Credit Default Swap Premium and Banking 
Sector Risk in Poland.” Narodowy Bank Polski Working Paper No. 222. 
Gennaioli, N., A. Martin, and S. Rossi. 2014. “Banks, Government Bonds, and Default: What do the Data Say?” 
IMF Working Paper No. 120 (July). 
Gerlach-Kristen, P. 2013. “Euro Area CDS Spreads in the Crisis: The Role of Open Market Operations and 




Getmansky, M., G. Girardi, and C. Lewis. 2014. “Interconnectedness in the CDS Market.” Vanderbilt University 
Owen Graduate School of Management Working Paper (April). 
Giannikos, C., H. Guirguis, and M. Suen. 2013. “The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Dynamics of Price Discovery 
among Stock Prices, CDS Spreads, and Bond Spreads for U.S. Financial Firms.” Journal of Derivatives Vol. 
21, No. 1 (Fall). 
Giglio, S. 2011. “Credit Default Swap Spreads and Systemic Financial Risk.” Working Paper. 
Gilchrist, S. and E. Zakrajšek. 2012. “Credit Spreads and Business Cycle Fluctuations.” American Economic Review 
Vol. 102, No. 4. 
Glosten, L. R., and P. R. Milgrom. 1985. “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with 
Heterogeneously Informed Traders.” Journal of Financial Economic Vol. 14. 
Glover, B., and S. Richards-Shubik. 2014. “Contagion in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Carnegie mellon 
University, Heinz College Research Working Paper No. 9-2014 (September). 
González, L., and L. Naranjo. 2014. “Credit Risk Determinants of Insurance Companies.” Working Paper (March). 
González, O., L. I. R. Gil, S. C. Agra, and P. D. Santomil. 2012. “Banking Risk and Credit Derivatives.” Working 
Paper. 
Gorton, G., and A. Metrick. 2012. “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo.” Journal of Financial Economics 
Vol. 104. 
Gray, R. W. 1961. “The Search for a Risk Premium.” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 69, No.3 (June).  
Greatrex, C. A. 2009a. “Credit Default Swap Market Determinants.” Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 18, No. 3 
(Winter). 
Greatrex, C. A., 2009b. “The Credit Default Swap Market’s Reaction to Earnings Announcements.” Journal of 
Applied Finance Vol. 19, No. 1 & 2. 
Greatrex, C. A., and E. W. Rengifo. 2012. “Government Intervention and the CDS Market: A Look at the Market’s 
Response to Policy Announcements During the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis.” Journal of Applied Finance No. 1. 
Greenlaw, D., J. Hatzius, A. K. Kashyap, and H. S. Shin. 2008. “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage 
Market Meltdown.” U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, Report No. 2. 
Griffin, P. A. 2014. “The Market for Credit Default Swaps: New Insights into Investors’ Use of Accounting 
Information?” Accounting & Finance Vol. 54, No. 3. 
Groba, J., J. A. Lafuente, and P. Serrano. 2013. “The Impact of Distressed Economies on the EU Sovereign 
Market.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 37, No. 7 (July). 
Gross, M., and C. Kok. 2013. “Measuring Contagion Potential among Sovereigns and Banks Using a Mixed-Cross-
Section GVAR.” ECB Working Paper No. 1570 (August). 
Gündüz, Y., J. Nasev, and M. Trapp. 2013. “The Price Impact of CDS Trading.” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion 
Paper No. 20/2013 (November). 
Gündüz, Y., and O. Kaya. 2013. “Sovereign Default Swap Market Efficiency and Country Risk in the Eurozone.” 
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 08/2013. 
Gupta, S., and R. Sundaram. 2015a. “Inventory Effects, the Winner’s Curse, and Bid Shading in Credit Default 
Swap Auctions.” Journal of Derivatives Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter). 
Gupta, S., and R. Sundaram. 2015b. “Mispricing and Arbitrage in CDS Auctions.” Journal of Derivatives Vol. 22, 
No. 4 (Summer). 
Gyntelberg, J., P. Hördahl, K. Ters, and J. Urban. 2013. “Intraday Dynamics of Euro Area Sovereign CDS and 
Bonds.” BIS Working Papers No. 423 (September). 
Haas, M., and J. Reynolds. 2016. “Illiquidity Contagion and Information Spillover from CDS to Equity Markets.” 
Working Paper (April). 
Haerri, M., S. Morkoetter, and S. Westerfeld. 2015. “Sovereign Risk and the Pricing of Corporate Credit Default 
Swaps.” Journal of Credit Risk Vol. 11, No. 1 (March). 
Hakenes, H., and I. Schnabel. 2010. “Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Competition.” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation Vol. 19. 
Han, B., and Y. Zhou. 2011. “Term Structure of Credit Default Swap Spreads and Cross-Section of Stock Returns.” 
McCombs Research Paper Series No. FIN-01-11 (June). 
Hansen, L.P., and R. Hodrick. 1980. “Forward Exchange Rates as Optimal Predictors of Future Spot Rates: An 
Econometric Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 88, No. 5.  
Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1998. “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics Vol. 113, No. 1 (February). 
Hasan, I., L. Liu, and G. Zhang. 2015. “The Determinants of Global Bank Credit-Default-Swap Spreads.” Journal of 




Hassan, M. K., G. Ngene, and J.-S. Yu. 2015. “Credit Default Swaps and Sovereign Debt Markets.” Economic 
Systems Vol. 39. 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review Vol. 35, No. 4 (September). 
Heinz, F. F., and Y. Sun. 2014. “Sovereign CDS Spreads in Europe – The Role of Global Risk Aversion, Economic 
Fundamentals, Liquidity, and Spillovers.” IMF Working Paper No. 17 (January). 
Helwege, J., S. Maurer, A. Sarkar, and Y. Wang. 2009. “Credit Default Swap Auctions.“ Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Staff Report No. 372 (May). 
Hilscher, J., and Y. Nosbusch. 2010. “Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Fundamentals and the 
Pricing of Sovereign Debt.” Review of Finance Vol. 14, No. 2. 
Hilscher, J., J. M. Pollet, and M. I. Wilson. 2015. “Are Credit Default Swaps a Sideshow? Evidence that Information 
Flows from Equity to CDS Markets.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 50, No. 3 (June). 
Hirtle, B. 2009. “Credit Derivatives and Bank Credit Supply.” Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 18, No. 2 
(April). 
Houweling, P., and T. Vorst. 2005. “Pricing Default Swaps: Empirical Evidence.” Journal of International Money 
and Finance Vol. 24, No. 8. 
Hu, H. T. C., and B. Black. 2008a. “Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk 
Implications.” European Financial Management Vol. 14, No. 4. 
Hu, H. T. C., and B. Black. 2008b. “Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions.” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 156, No. 3 (January). 
Huang, A. Y., and C. M. Cheng. 2013. “Information Risk and Credit Contagion.” Finance Research Letters Vol. 10, 
No. 3. 
Huang, H., and R. MacDonald. 2014. “Currency Carry Trades, Position-unwinding Risk, and Sovereign Credit 
Premia.” Working Paper (January). 
Huang, A. Y., C.-H. Shen, and C.-C. Chen. 2012. “The Impact of Major Events from the Recent Financial Crisis on 
Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter). 
Huang, A. Y., C.-H. Shen, and C.-C. Chen. 2014. “Dynamics of Sovereign Credit Contagion.” Journal of 
Derivatives Vol. 22, No. 1 (Fall).  
Hui, C.-H., and T.-K. Chung. 2011. “Crash Risk of the Euro in the Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2009-2010.” Journal of 
Banking & Finance Vol. 35, No. 11 (November). 
Hui, C.-H., and T. Fong. 2011. “Information Flow between Sovereign CDS and Dollar-Yen Currency Option 
Markets in the Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2009-2011.” HKIMR Working Paper No. 40/2011 (December). 
Hull, J., M. Predescu, and A. White. 2004. “The Relationship between Credit Default Swap Spreads, Bond Yields, 
and Credit Rating Announcements.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 28, No. 11 (November). 
Hull, J., and A. White. 2000. “Valuing Credit Default Swaps I: No Counterparty Default Risk.” NYU Working Paper 
No. FIN-00-021. 
Imbierowicz, B., and M. Wahrenburg. 2009. “The Impact of Reasons for Credit Rating Announcements in Equity 
and CDS Markets.” Working Paper (May). 
Ismailescu, I., and H. Kazemi. 2010. “The Reaction of Emerging Market Credit Default Swap Spreads to Sovereign 
Credit Rating Changes.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 34, No. 12 (December). 
Ismailescu, I., and B. Phillips. 2015. “Credit Default Swaps and the Market for Sovereign Debt.” Journal of Banking 
& Finance Vol. 52 (March). 
Ivanov, I., J. Santos, and T. Vo. 2016. “The Transformation of Banking: Tying Loan Interest Rates to Borrowers’ 
CDS Spreads.” Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 38 (June). 
Jacoby, G., G. J. Jiang, and G. Theocharides. 2009. “Cross-Market Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from the CDS, 
Corporate Bond, and Equity Markets.” Working Paper (August). 
Jakovlev, M. 2007. “Determinants of Credit Default Swap Spread: Evidence from European Credit Derivatives 
Market.” Master’s Thsesis at Lappeenranta University of Technology (April). 
Jankowitsch, R., R. Pullirsch, and T. Veža. 2008. “The Delivery Option in Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of 
Banking & Finance Vol. 32, No. 7 (July). 
Janus, T., Y, Jinjarak, and M. Uruyos. 2013. “Sovereign Default Risk, Overconfident Investors and Diverse Beliefs: 
Theory and Evidence from a New Dataset on Outstanding Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Financial Stability 
Vol. 9, No. 3 (September). 
Jarrow, R. A. 2009. “Credit Risk Models.” Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 1 (September). 
Jarrow, R. A. 2011. “The Economics of Credit Default Swaps.” Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 3. 
Johannes, M., and S. Sundaresan. 2007. “The Impact of Collateralization on Swap Rates.” Journal of Finance Vol. 




Jorion, P., and G. Zhang. 2007. “Good and Bad Credit Contagion: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of 
Financial Economics Vol. 84, No. 3 (October). 
Jorion, P., and G. Zhang. 2009. “Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk.” Journal of Finance Vol. 64, No. 5. 
Kalbaska, A., and M. Gątkowski. 2012. “Eurozone Sovereign Contagion: Evidence from the CDS Market (2005–
2010).” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol. 83, No. 3 (August). 
Kallestrup, R., D. Lando, and A. Murgoci. 2016. “Financial Sector Linkages and the Dynamics of Bank and 
Sovereign Credit Spreads.” Journal of Empirical Finance (Forthcoming). 
Kane. E. J. 1988. “Interaction of Financial and Regulatory Innovation.” American Economic Review Vol. 78, No. 2 
(May). 
Kanno, M. 2016. “Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk in the US CDS Market.” Working Paper. 
Kim, D. H., M. Loretan, E. M. Remolona. 2010. “Contagion and Risk Premia in the Amplification of Crisis: 
Evidence from Asian Names in the Global CDS Market.” Journal of Asian Economics Vol. 21. 
Kim, G. H. 2013. “Credit Default Swaps, Strategic Default, and the Cost of Corporate Debt.” Working Paper. 
Kim, S.-J., L. Salem, and E. Wu. 2015. “The Role of Macroeconomic News in Sovereign CDS Markets: Domestic 
and Spillover News Effects from the U.S., the Eurozone and China.” Journal of Financial Stability Vol. 18 
(June). 
King, M. R. 2009. “Time to Buy or Just Buying Time? The Market Reaction to Bank Rescue Packages.” BIS 
Working Papers No. 288 (September). 
Kolokolova, O., M.-T. Lin, and S.-H. Poon. 2015. “Systematic and Firm-Specific Credit and Illiquidity Risks of 
CDS Spreads.” Working Paper (November). 
Küçük, U. 2010. “Non-Default Component of Sovereign Emerging Market Yield Spreads and Its Determinants: 
Evidence from Credit Default Swap Market.” Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring). 
Kuserk, G. J., and P. R. Locke. 1994. “The Chicago Loop Tunnel Flood: Cash Pricing and Activity.” Review of 
Futures Markets.  
Lando, D. 1998. “On Cox Processes and Credit Risky Securities.” Review of Derivatives Research Vol. 2. 
Lando, D., and A. Mortensen. 2005. “Revisiting the Slope of the Credit Curve.” Journal of Investment Management 
Vol. 3, No. 4. 
Leccadito, A., R. S. Tunaru, and G. Urga. 2015. “Trading Strategies with Implied Forward Credit Default Swap 
Spreads.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 58 (September). 
Lee, S. W., and D. J. Mullineaux. 2004. “Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of Commercial Lending 
Syndicates.” Financial Management Vol. 33, No. 3 (Autumn). 
Lehnert, T., and F. Neske. 2006. “On the Relationship between Credit Rating Announcements and Credit Default 
Swap Spreads for European Reference Entities.” Journal of Credit Risk Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer). 
Levy, A. 2009. “The CDS Bond Basis Spread in Emerging Markets: Liquidity and Counterparty Risk Effects.” 
Working Paper (April). 
Li, H., W. Zhang, and G. H. Kim. 2011. “The CDS-Bond Basis Arbitrage and the Cross Section of Corporate Bond 
Returns.” Working Paper (November). 
Li, J. Y., and D. Y. Tang. 2016. “The Leverage Externalities of Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Financial 
Economics Vol. 120, No. 3. 
Li, J., and G. Zinna. 2014. “How Much of Bank Credit Risk Is Sovereign Risk? Evidence from the Eurozone.” Bank 
of Italy Temi Di Discussione No. 990 (October). 
Li, N., and A. Y. Huang. 2011. “Price Discovery between Sovereign Credit Default Swaps and Bond Yield Spreads 
of Emerging Markets.” Journal of Emerging Market Finance Vol. 10, No. 2. 
Lieu, A. 2011. “An Analysis of Credit Default Swap Auctions and Distressed Bond Markets.” Working Paper 
(April). 
Lok, S., and S. Richardson. 2011. “Credit Markets and Financial Information.” Review of Accounting Studies Vol. 
16, No. 3. 
Longstaff, F. A., S. Mithal, and E. Neis. 2003. “The Credit Default Swap Market: Is Credit Protection Priced 
Correctly.” Working Paper (August). 
Longstaff, F. A., S. Mithal, and E. Neis. 2005. “Corporate Yield Spreads Default Risk or Liquidity.” Journal of 
Finance Vol. 60, No. 5 (October). 
Longstaff, F. A., J. Pan, L. H. Pedersen, and K. J. Singleton. 2011. “How Sovereign Is Sovereign Credit Risk?” 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics Vol. 3, No. 2 (April). 





Manasse, P., and L. Zavalloni. 2013. “Sovereign Contagion in Europe: Evidence from the CDS Market.” Quaderni 
DSE Working Paper No. 863 (February). 
Marsh, I., and W. Wagner. 2012. “Why is Price Discovery in Credit Default Swap Markets News-Specific?” 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 12-033/2/DSF33. 
Martin, X., and S. Roychowdhury. 2015. “Do Financial Market Developments Influence Accounting Practices? 
Credit Default Swaps and Borrowers׳ Reporting Conservatism.” Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 59, 
No. 1. 
Massa, M., and L. Zhang. 2012. “CDS and the Liquidity Provision in the Bond Market.” INSEAD Working Paper 
No. 2012/114/FIN (November). 
Mayhew, S. 2000. “The Impact of Derivatives on Cash Markets: What Have We Learned?” Working Paper 
(February). 
Mayordomo, S., and J. I. Peña. 2014. “An Empirical Analysis of Dynamic Depencencies in the European Corporate 
Credit Markets: Bonds Versus Credit Derivaives.” Applied Financial Economics Vol. 24, No. 9. 
Mayordomo, S., J. I. Peña, and J. Romo. 2011. “The Effect of Liquidity on the Price Discovery Process in Credit 
Derivatives Markets in Times of Financial Distress.” European Journal of Finance Vol. 17, No. 9-10. 
Mayordomo, S., M. Rodríguez-Moreno, and J. I. Peña. 2014. “Liquidity Commonalities in the Corporate CDS 
Market around the 2007-2012 Financial Crisis.” International Review of Economics and Finance Vol. 31. 
Meine, C., H. Supper, and G. N. F. Weiβ. 2015. “Do CDS Spreads Move with Commonality in Liquidity?” Review 
of Derivatives Research Vol. 18, No. 3. 
Mengle, D. 2009. “The Empty Creditor Hypothesis.” ISDA Research Notes No. 3. 
Merton, R. C. 1974. “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates.” Journal of Finance 
Vol. 29, No. 2 (May). 
Merton, R. C. 1992. “Financial Innovation and Economic Performance.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Vol. 
4, No. 4 (Winter). 
Merton, R. C. 1995. “A Functional Perspective on Financial Intermediation.” Financial Management Vol. 24, No. 2 
(Summer).  
Micu, M., E. Remolona, and P. Wooldridge. 2006. “The Price Impact of Rating Announcements: Which 
Announcements Matter?” BIS Working Papers No. 207 (June). 
Miller, M. H. 1986. “Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next.” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis Vol. 21, No. 4 (December). 
Miller, M. H. 1988. “The Modigliani-Miller Propositions after Thirty Years.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
Vol. 2, No. 4 (Autumn). 
Miller, M. H. 1992. “Financial Innovation: Achievements and Prospects.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter). 
Minton, B., R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 2009. “How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?” 
Journal of Financial Services Research Vol. 35. 
Mishkin, F. S. 2011. “Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter). 
Mitchell, M., and T. Pulvino. 2012. “Arbitrage Crashes and the Speed of Capital.” Journal of Financial Economics 
Vol. 104. 
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1958. “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment.” 
American Economic Review Vol. 48, No. 3 (June). 
Mody, A., and D. Sandri. 2011. “The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to be Joined at the Hip.” 
IMF Working Paper No. 269 (November). 
Morkoetter, S., J. Pleus, and S. Westerfeld. 2012. “The Impact of Counterparty Risk on Credit Default Swap Pricing 
Dynamics.” Journal of Credit Risk Vol. 1, No. 8 (Spring). 
Morrison, A. D. 2005. “Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions.” Journal of Business Vol. 
78, No. 2 (March). 
Mulherin, J. H., J. M. Netter, and J. A. Overdahl. 1991. “Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial 
Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective.” Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 34, No. 2, Pt. 2 
(October). 
Narayanan, R., and C. Uzmanoglu. 2014. “CDS, Strategic Behavior, and Credit Spreads.” Working Paper 
(November). 
Nashikkar, A., M. G. Subrahmanyam, and S. Mahanti. 2011. “Liquidity and Arbitrage in the Market for Credit 




Ng, V. K., and S. C. Pirrong. 1994. “Fundamental and Volatility: Storage, Spreads, and the Dynamics of Metals 
Prices.” Journal of Business Vol. 67, No. 2 (April).  
Ni, S. X., and J. Pan. 2011. “Trading Puts and CDS on Stocks with Short Sale Ban.” Working Paper (December). 
Nijskens, R., and W. Wagner. 2011. “Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic Risk: How Banks Became Less 
Risky Individually but Posed Greater Risks to the Financial System at the Same Time.” Journal of Banking & 
Finance Vol. 35, No. 6 (June). 
Norden, L. 2014. “Information in CDS Spreads.” Working Paper (March). 
Norden, L., C. S. Buston, and W. Wagner. 2014. “Financial Innovation and Bank Behavior: Evidence from Credit 
Markets.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control Vol. 43. 
Norden, L., and M. Weber. 2004. “Informational Efficiency of Credit Default Swap and Stock Markets: The Impact 
of Credit Rating Announcements.” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 28, No. 11 (November). 
Norden, L., and M. Weber. 2009. “The Co-Movement of Credit Default Swap, Bond and Stock Markets: An 
Empirical Analysis.” European Financial Management Vol. 15, No. 3. 
Norden, L., and M. Weber. 2012. “When Senior Meets Junior: Information in Credit Default Swap Spreads of Large 
Banks.” Working Paper (July). 
O’Kane, D., and S. Sen. 2005. “Credit Spreads Explained.” Journal of Credit Risk Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring). 
O’Kane, D. 2012. “The Link between Eurozone Sovereign Debt and CDS Prices.” EDHEC-Risk Institute (January). 
Oehmke, M., and A. Zawadowski. 2015. “Synthetic or Real? The Equilibrium Effects of Credit Default Swaps on 
Bond Markets.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 28, No. 12 (August). 
Oehmke, M., and A. Zawadowski. 2016. “The Anatomy of the CDS Market.” Review of Financial Studies 
(Forthcoming). 
Oh, D. H., and A. J. Patton. 2015. “Time-Varying Systemic Risk: Evidence from a Dynamic Copula Model of CDS 
Spreads.” Working Paper (May). 
Ohno, S. 2013. “European Sovereign Risk: The Knock-On Effects of Default Risk across the Public and Financial 
Sectors.” Public Policy Review Vol. 9, No. 1. 
Palmgren, M., and H. Tamule. (2009). “The Reaction of Credit Default Swap Prices to Corporate Dividend 
Reductions.” Working Paper. 
Pan, J., and A. M. Poteshman. 2006. “The Information in Option Volume for Future Stock Prices.” Review of 
Financial Studies Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn).  
Pan, J., and K. J. Singleton. 2008. “Default and Recovery Implicit in the Term Structure of Sovereign CDS 
Spreads.” Journal of Finance Vol. 63, No. 5 (October). 
Panetta, F., T. Faeh, G. Grande, C. Ho, M. King, A. Levy, F. M. Signoretti, M. Taboga, and A. Zaghini. 2009. “An 
Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue Programmes.” BIS Working Papers No. 48 (July). 
Parlour, C., and A. Winton. 2013. “Laying off Credit Risk: Loan Sales versus Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of 
Financial Economics Vol. 107, No. 1. 
Pavlova, I., and M. E. De Boyrie. 2015. “Carry Trades and Sovereign CDS Spreads: Evidence from Asia-Pacific 
Markets.” Journal of Futures Markets Vol. 35, No. 11. 
Peltonen, T. A., M. Scheicher, and G. Vuillemey. 2014. “The Network Structure of the CDS Market and Its 
Determinants.” Journal of Financial Stability Vol. 13 (August). 
Pennacchi, G. G. 1988. “Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital.” Journal of Finance Vol. 43, No. 2 (June). 
Peristiani, S., and V. Savino. 2011. “Are Credit Default Swaps Associated with Higher Corporate Defaults?” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 494. 
Pires, P., J. P. Pereira, and L. Martins. 2015. “The Empirical Determinants of Credit Default Swap Spreads: A 
Quantile Regression Approach.” European Financial Management Vol. 21, No. 3. 
Pollack, E. R. 2003. “Assessing the Usage and Effect of Credit Derivatives.” Paper Presented to Harvard Law 
School International Finance Seminar (April). 
Pu, X., and J. Zhang. 2012a. “Can Dual-Currency Sovereign CDS Predict Exchange Rate Returns?” Finance 
Research Letters Vol. 9, No. 3. 
Pu, X., and J. Zhang. 2012b. “Sovereign CDS Spreads, Volatility, and Liquidity: Evidence from 2010 German Short 
Sale Ban.” The Financial Review Vol. 47, No. 1. 
Pu, X., J. Wang, and C. Wu. 2011. “Are Liquidity and Counterparty Risk Priced in the Credit Default Swap 
Market?” Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring). 
Qiu, J., and F. Yu. 2012. “Endogenous Liquidity in Credit Derivatives.” Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 103, 
No. 3. 





Rajan, R. G. 2005b. “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future.” Speech Before the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Wyoming Symposium on Financial Markets, Financial Fragility, and Central Banking (August). 
Raunig, B., and M. Scheicher. 2011. “A Value-at-Risk Analysis of Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Risk Vol. 13, 
No. 4 (Summer). 
Remolona, E. M., M. Scatigna, and E. Wu. 2008. “The Dynamic Pricing of Sovereign Risk in Emerging Markets.” 
Journal of Fixed Income (Spring). 
Revoltella, D., F. Mucci, and D. Mihaljek. 2010. “Properly Pricing Country Risk: A Model for Pricing Long-Term 
Fundamental Risk Applied to Central and Eastern European Countries.” Financial Theory and Practice Vol. 34, 
No. 3. 
Rodríguez-Moreno, M., and J. I. Peña. 2013. “Systemic Risk Measures: The Simpler the Better?.” Journal of 
Banking & Finance Vol. 37, No. 6 (June). 
Roll, R. 1984. “Orange Juice and Weather.” The American Economic Review Vol. 74, No. 5 (December). 
Ross, S. A. 1989. “Institutional Markets, Financial Marketing, and Financial Innovation.” Journal of Finance Vol. 
44, No. 3 (July). 
Rothschild, M., and J. Stiglitz. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics 
of Imperfect Information.” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 90, No. 4 (November). 
Salomao, J. 2014. “Sovereign Debt Renegotiation and Credit Default Swaps.” Working Paper (December). 
Sambalaibat, B. 2014. “CDS and Sovereign Bond Market Liquidity.” Working Paper (April). 
Samuelson, P. A. 1954. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.” Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 36, No. 
4 (November). 
Santamaría, M. T., J. G. Biscarri, and L. L. Benito. 2014. “Financial Crises and the Transfer of Risk between the 
Private and Public Sectors: Evidence from European Financial Markets.” Spanish Review of Financial 
Economics Vol. 12, No. 1 (January – June). 
Sapriza, H., F. Zhao, and X. Zhou. 2009 “Dose Limited Participation Make Sovereign CDS Markets Less 
Informative About Country-Specific Risks?” Working Paper (September). 
Saretto, A., and H. Tookes. 2013. “Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Credit Supply: The Role of Credit 
Default Swaps.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 26, No. 5. 
Schläfer, T., and M. Uhrig-Homburg. 2014. “Is Recovery Risk Priced?” Journal of Banking & Finance Vol. 40 
(March). 
Schneider, P., L. Sӧgner, and T. Veža. 2010. “The Economic Role of Jumps and Recovery Rates in the Market for 
Corporate Default Risk.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 45, No. 6 (December). 
Sgherri, S., and E. Zoli. 2009. “Euro Area Sovereign Risk During the Crisis.” IMF Working Paper No. 222 
(October). 
Shan, S. C., D. Y. Tang, and A. Winton. 2014. “Do Credit Derivatives Lower the Value of Creditor Control 
Rights?” Working Paper (December). 
Shan, S. C., D. Y. Tang, and H. Yan. 2014. “Did CDS Make Banks Riskier? The Effects of Credit Default Swaps on 
Bank Capital and Lending.” Working Paper (June). 
Shao, Y., and T. J. Yeager. 2007. “The Effects of Credit Derivatives on U.S. Bank Risk and Return, Capital and 
Lending Structure.” Working Paper (June). 
Shim, I., and H. Zhu. 2014. “The Impact of CDS Trading on the Bond Market: Evidence from Asia.” Journal of 
Banking & Finance Vol. 40 (March). 
Shivakumar, L., O. Urcan, F. P. Vasvari, and L. Zhang. 2011. “The Debt Market Relevance of Management 
Earnings Forecasts: Evidence from before and during the Credit Crisis.” Review of Accounting Studies Vol. 16, 
No. 3. 
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 2011. “Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter). 
Shoesmith, G. L. 2014. “A Time-Series Postmorten on Eurozone Financial Integration and the Debt Crisis: 
Modeling and Policy Implications.” International Journal of Business Vol. 19, No. 2.  
Silva, P. P., C. Vieira, and I. V. Vieira. 2016. “The EU Ban on Uncovered Sovereign Credit Default Swaps: 
Assessing Impacts in Liquidity, Volatility, and Price Discovery.” Journal of Derivatives Vol. 23, No. 4 
(Summer). 
Singh, M. 2003. “Are Credit Default Swap Spreads High in Emerging Markets? An Alternative Methodology for 
Proxying Recovery Value.” IMF Working Paper No. WP/03/242 (December). 
Singh, M., and C. Spackman. 2009. “The Use (and Abuse) of CDS Spreads during Distress.” IMF Working Paper 




Skinner, F. S., and T. G. Townend. 2002. “An Empirical Analysis of Credit Default Swaps.” International Review of 
Financial Analysis Vol. 11, No. 3. 
Song, W. L. 2013. “Do Credit Default Swaps Affect Lending Practices? Evidence from Syndicate Structures and the 
London Whale Incident.” Working Paper (October). 
Streiz, D. 2016. “The Impact of Credit Default Swap Trading on Loan Syndication.” Review of Finance Vol. 20, No. 
1 (July). 
Stulz, R. M. 1996. “Rethinking Risk Management.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Vol. 9, No. 3 (Fall). 
Stulz, R. 2010. “Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis.” Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 24, No. 1 
(Winter). 
Stulz, R. M. 2015. “Risk-Taking and Risk Management by Banks.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Vol. 27, 
No. 1 (Winter). 
Sturm, P. 2013/14. “How Much Should Creditors Worry About Operational Risk? The Credit Default Swap Spread 
Reaction to Operational Risk Events.” Journal of Operational Risk Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter). 
Subrahmanyam, M., D. Y. Tang, and S. Q. Wang. 2014. “Does the Tail Wag the Dog?: The Effect of Credit Default 
Swaps on Credit Risk.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 27, No. 10. 
Sundaresan, S. 2013. “A Review of Merton’s Model of the Firm’s Capital Structure with Its Wide Applications.” 
Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 5 (November). 
Sufi, A. 2007. “Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans.” Journal 
of Finance Vol. 62, No. 2 (April). 
Tang, D. Y., and H. Yan. 2007. “Liquidity and Credit Default Swap Spreads.” Working Paper (September). 
Tang, D. Y., and H. Yan. 2010. “Market Conditions, Default Risk and Credit Spreads.” Journal of Banking & 
Finance Vol. 34, No. 4 (April). 
Telser, L. G. 1958. “Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat.” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 66, 
No. 3 (June).  
Thompson, R. 1995. “Empirical Methods of Event Studies in Corporate Finance.” In Finance Series of Handbooks 
in Operations Research and Management Science. R. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic, and B. Ziemba, eds. North-
Holland. 
Tran, H. Q. 2013. “The Role of Markets in Sovereign Debt Crisis Detection, Prevention and Resolution.” BIS 
Working Papers No. 72. 
Trujillo-Ponce, A., R. Samaniego-Medina, and C. Cardone-Riportella. 2014. “Examining What Best Explains 
Corporate Credit Risk: Accounting-Based versus Market-Based Models.” Journal of Business Economics and 
Management Vol.15, No. 2. 
Trutwein, P., and D. Schiereck. 2011. “The Fast and the Furious—Stock Returns and CDS of Financial Institutions 
under Stress.” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money Vol. 21, No. 2 (April). 
Trutwein, P., S. Ramchander, and D. Schiereck. 2011. “Jumps in Credit Default Swap Spreads and Stock Returns.“ 
Journal of Fixed Income Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter). 
Tufano, P. 1998. “The Determinants of Stock Price Exposure: Financial Engineering and the Gold Mining Industry.” 
Journal of Finance Vol. 53, No. 3 (June). 
Tufano, P. 2002. “Financial Innovation.” In Handbook of the Economics of Finance. G. Constantinides, M. Harris, 
and R. Stulz, eds. (North-Holland). 
Van der Merwe, A. 2015. Market Liquidity Risk. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Veronesi, P., and Zingales, L. 2010. “Paulson’s Gift.” Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 97, No. 3. 
Wang, P., and T. Moore. 2012. “The Integration of the Credit Default Swap Markets during the US Subprime Crisis: 
Dynamic Correlation Analysis.” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money Vol. 22, 
No. 1 (February). 
Williams Brown, O. 2010. “What Risks and Challenges do Credit Default Swaps Pose to the Stability of Financial 
Markets?” Financial Stability Review No. 14 (July). 
Working, H. 1934. “Price Relations Between May and New-Crop What Futures at Chicago Since 1885.” Wheat 
Studies of the Food Research Institute Vol. 10, No 5 (February). 
Working, H. 1949. “The Investigation of Economic Expectations.” American Economic Review Vol. 39, No. 3 
(May). 
Working, H. 1962. “New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets and Prices.” American Economic Review Vol. 52, 
No. 3 (June). 
Yang, J., and Y. Zhou. 2013. “Credit Risk Spillovers among Financial Institutions around the Global Credit Crisis: 




Yeh, A. J.-Y. 2012. “Credit Default Swap Spreads, Fair-Value Spreads and Interest Rate Dynamics.” Journal of 
Credit Risk Vol. 8, No. 4. 
Zareei, A. 2015. “Network Centrality, Failure Prediction and Systemic Risk.” Journal of Network Theory in Finance 
Vol. 1, No. 4. 
Zettelmeyer, J., C. Trebesch, and M. Gulati. 2013. “The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy.” Economic Policy 
Vol. 28, Issue 75 (July). 
Zhang, B. Y., H. Zhou, and H. Zhu. 2009. “Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads with the Equity Volatility and 
Jump Risks of Individual Firms.” Review of Financial Studies Vol. 22, No. 12. 
Zhu, H. 2006. “An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap 
Market.” Journal of Financial Services Research Vol. 29, No. 3. 
Zinna, G. 2013. “Sovereign Default Risk Premia: Evidence from the Default Swap Market.” Journal of Empirical 




APPENDIX B: AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 
Christopher L. Culp, Ph.D., specializes in structured finance, derivatives, insurance/reinsurance, credit 
risk and credit markets, and risk management. He is a Research Fellow at the Johns Hopkins Institute for 
Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise, an Adjunct Professor at the 
Swiss Finance Institute, and an Adjunct Professor at Universität Bern in the Institut für 
Finanzmanagement, and he was an adjunct member of the faculty at The University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business from 1998 – 2013, where he taught M.B.A.-level courses on derivatives, structured 
finance, and insurance. He is the author of Structured Finance & Insurance (John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 
Risk Transfer: Derivatives in Theory and Practice (John Wiley & Sons, 2004), The ART of Risk 
Management (John Wiley & Sons, 2002), and The Risk Management Process (John Wiley & Sons, 2001), 
and the co-editor of Corporate Aftershock: The Public Policy Lessons from the Collapse of Enron and 
Other Major Corporations with William Niskanen (John Wiley & Sons, 2003) and Corporate Hedging in 
Theory and Practice with Merton H. Miller (Risk Books, 1999). 
 
Dr. Culp provides advisory consulting services and testimonial expertise on issues such as credit and 
capital market conditions, derivatives valuation and use, risk measurement, clearing and settlement, and 
structured credit products. He is the Managing Director of Risk Management Consulting Services, Inc., 
and a Senior Affiliate with Compass Lexecon.  
 
Culp earned his Ph.D. with a concentration in finance from The University of Chicago’s Booth School of 
Business and his B.A. in economics from The Johns Hopkins University. 
___________________ 
Andria van der Merwe, Ph.D., specializes in fixed-income and credit markets and market microstructure, 
including liquidity, high-frequency trading, spoofing, and market manipulation. She is a Research Fellow 
at the Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business 
Enterprise, and was previously an Adjunct Professor at the Illinois Institute of Technology, where she 
taught graduate-level courses on fixed-income asset pricing and modeling. She is the holder of three U.S. 
patents, has been published in several internationally renowned journals, and is the author of Market 
Liquidity Risk: Implications for Asset Pricing, Risk Management and Financial Regulation (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015). 
 
Dr. van der Merwe is a Vice President at Compass Lexecon, where she focuses on securities litigation and 
regulatory investigations and proceedings. Before joining Compass Lexecon, she served as a Director of 
Portfolio Management for four years at the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, where she developed 
and executed trading strategies and was a floor trader in fixed-income securities, including derivatives 
and securitized products. 
 
Van der Merwe earned her Ph.D. in electrical engineering with concentrations in signal processing and 
applied mathematics from The Ohio State University and an M.B.A. with concentrations in finance, 
econometrics, and accounting from The University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business.  
___________________ 
Bettina Stӓrkle, M.Sc., specializes in derivatives and structured finance, securities and financial markets, 
corporate valuation, and corporate governance. She is a Consultant with Risk Management Consulting 
Services, Inc., and an Economist with Compass Lexecon. Her experience covers a variety of industries, 
including fixed-income securities and financial services, insurance, energy, and media. Ms. Stärkle 
previously worked in the Swiss banking industry, and she holds an M.Sc. in business administration with 




APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table 3: Single-Name CDS Auctions, 2005 – May 2016 
Reference Name Tiera Auction Date 
Collins & Aikman Products Co. SNR 06/14/05 
Collins & Aikman Products Co. SUB 06/23/05 
Delta Air Lines Inc. SNR 10/11/05 
Northwest Airlines Inc. SNR 10/11/05 
Delphi Corp. SNR 11/04/05 
Calpine Corp. SNR 01/17/06 
Dana Corp. SNR 03/31/06 
Dura Operating Corp. SUB 11/28/06 
Dura Operating Corp. SNR 11/28/06 
Quebecor World Inc. SNR 02/19/08 
Tembec Industries Inc. SNR 10/02/08 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. SNR 10/06/08 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. SUB 10/06/08 
Federal National Mortgage Association SNR 10/06/08 
Federal National Mortgage Association SUB 10/06/08 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. SNR 10/10/08 
Washington Mutual Inc. SNR 10/23/08 
Landsbanki Islands hf. SUB 11/04/08 
Landsbanki Islands hf. SNR 11/04/08 
Glitnir banki hf. SUB 11/05/08 
Glitnir banki hf. SNR 11/05/08 
Kaupthing banki hf. SUB 11/06/08 
Kaupthing banki hf. SNR 11/06/08 
Tribune Company SNR 01/06/09 
Republic of Ecuadorb SNR 01/14/09 
Equistar Chemicals, LP SNR 02/03/09 
Lyondell Chemical Company SNR 02/03/09 
Millennium America Inc. SNR 02/03/09 
Nortel Networks Corp. SNR 02/10/09 
Nortel Networks Limited SNR 02/10/09 
Smurfit-Stone Container Enterprises Inc. SNR 02/19/09 
Station Casinos Inc. SNR 03/31/09 
Chemtura Corp. SNR 04/14/09 
Great Lakes Chemical Corp. SNR 04/14/09 
The Rouse Company LP SNR 04/15/09 
LyondellBasell Industries AF SCA SNR 04/16/09 
Abitibit-Consolidated Inc. SNR 04/17/09 
Charter Communications Holdings LLC SNR 04/21/09 
Capmark Financial Group Inc. SNR 04/22/09 
Idearc Inc. SNR 04/23/09 
Bowater Inc. SNR 05/12/09 
Syncora Guarantee Inc. SNR 05/27/09 
JSC BTA Bank SNR 06/10/09 
R.H. Donnelley Corp. SNR 06/11/09 
General Motors Corp. SNR 06/12/09 
JSC Alliance Bank SNR 06/18/09 
Visteon Corp. SNR 06/23/09 
Six Flags Inc. SNR 07/09/09 
Lear Corp. SNR 07/21/09 




Reference Name Tiera Auction Date 
Bradford & Bingley PLC SUB 07/30/09 
Thomson SNR-B3 10/22/09 
Thomson SNR-B2 10/22/09 
Thomson SNR-B1 10/22/09 
CIT Group Inc. SNR 11/20/09 
Thomson SNR 12/10/09 
Hellas Telecomm (Luxembourg) II SUB 12/15/09 
JSC Naftogaz of Ukraine SNR 12/16/09 
Financial Guaranty Insurance Company SNR 01/07/10 
Cemex SAB de CV SNR 02/18/10 
Aiful Corp. SNR 03/25/10 
Japan Airlines Corp. SNR 04/22/10 
Ambac Assurance Corp. SNR 06/04/10 
Truvo Subsidiary Corp. SNR 07/15/10 
Takefuji Corp. SNR 10/28/10 
Anglo Irish Bank SUB-B3 12/09/10 
Anglo Irish Bank SUB-B2 12/09/10 
Anglo Irish Bank SNR-B3 12/09/10 
Anglo Irish Bank SNR-B2 12/09/10 
Anglo Irish Bank SNR/SUB-B1 12/09/10 
Ambac Financial Group SNR 12/10/10 
Anglo Irish Bank (Restructuring) SNR/SUB 02/02/11 
Allied Irish Bks PLC SNR 06/30/11 
Allied Irish Bks PLC SUB 06/30/11 
Bank of Irelandc SNR/SUB-B1 07/28/11 
Bank of Irelandc SNR-B2 07/28/11 
Bank of Irelandc SNR-B3 07/28/11 
Bank of Irelandc SNR-B6 07/28/11 
Bank of Irelandc SUB-B2 07/28/11 
Bank of Irelandc SUB-B3 07/28/11 
Bank of Irelandc SUB-B6 07/28/11 
Irish Life and Permanent SNR-B1 07/29/11 
Irish Life and Permanent SNR-B2 07/29/11 
Irish Life and Permanent SNR-B3 07/29/11 
Irish Life and Permanent SUB-B1 07/29/11 
Irish Life and Permanent SUB-B2 07/29/11 
Irish Life and Permanent SUB-B3 07/29/11 
Irish Life and Permanent (Restructuring) SNR-B1 10/05/11 
Irish Life and Permanent (Restructuring) SNR-B2 10/05/11 
Victor Company of Japan SNR 11/09/11 
Dynegy Holdings LLC SNR 11/29/11 
SEAT Paginegialle SPA SUB 12/09/11 
The PMI Group Inc. SNR 12/13/11 
AMR Corp. SNR 12/15/11 
Northern Rock (Asset Management) PLC SNR-B1 02/02/12 
Northern Rock (Asset Management) PLC  SNR/SUB-B2 02/02/12 
Eastman Kodak Company SNR 02/22/12 
Hellenic Republicb SNR 03/19/12 
Elpida Memory Inc. SNR 03/22/12 
ERC Ireland Finance Limited SNR 03/29/12 
Sino-Forest Corp. SNR 05/09/12 





Reference Name Tiera Auction Date 
Residential Capital LLC SNR 06/06/12 
Overseas Shipholding Group Inc. SNR 12/06/12 
Edison Mission Energy SNR 01/16/13 
SNS Bank NV SNR/SUB-B1 04/04/13 
SNS Bank NV SNR/SUB-B6 04/04/13 
Bankia SA SNR/SUB-B1 06/05/13 
Bankia SA SNR/SUB-B2 06/05/13 
Bankia SA SNR/SUB-B3 06/05/13 
Bankia SA SNR/SUB 06/05/13 
Urbi, Desarollos Urbanos, SAB de CV SNR 06/06/13 
CODERE Fin Luxembourg SA  SNR 10/09/13 
OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes SA SNR 12/04/13 
Energy Future Holdings Corp. SNR 05/21/14 
Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co.  
      LLC/EFIH Finance Inc. SNR 05/21/14 
Texas Competitive Electric Holdings  
      Co. LLC SNR 05/21/14 
Argentine Republicb SNR 09/03/14 
Caesars Entertainment Operating Co. SNR 02/19/15 
RadioShack Corp. SNR 03/05/15 
Sabine Oil Gas Corp. SNR 06/23/15 
Alpha Appalachia Hldgs Inc. SNR 09/17/15 
Republic of Ukraineb SNR 10/06/15 
Abengoa SA SNR 01/14/16 
Pacific Exploration & Production Corp. SNR 04/06/16 
Peabody Energy Corp. SNR 05/04/16 
Norske Skogindustrier ASA SNR-B2 06/22/16 
Norske Skogindustrier ASA SNR-B3 06/22/16 
Norske Skogindustrier ASA SNR-B4 06/22/16 
Portugal Telecom International Finance BV SNR 07/21/16 
Commonwealth of Puerto Ricod SNR 08/17/16 
Grupo Isolux Corsan Finance BV SNR 08/24/16 
SOURCE: Creditex/Markit    NOTES: a: “SNR” and “SUB” refer to senior and subordinated obligations of the reference entity, 
respectively. In cases where the notation includes “Bx” (e.g., B1 or B6), this refers to a basket of obligations deliverable under 
the CDS. The basket numbers themselves do not have any economic significance – e.g., B1 is not necessarily less risky than B2. 
b: Italicized reference entities are sovereigns.  c: The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland.  d: The Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States. 
 
 
Table 7: CDS Data Used in Empirical Studies Reviewed
Article Sample Period Type (#) of CDS Reference Entitiesa Reference Entity Notes Region(s) of Reference Entitiesb CDS Tenor(s) (years) CDS Data Source(s)
Abbassi, Brownlees, Hans, and 
Podlich (2016) 1/2006-12/2013 Financial Institutions (13)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Banks Germany 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 Markit
Abid and Naifar (2006) 5/2000-5/2001 Corporates (73) Global N/A UBS
Acharya and Johnson (2007) 1/2001-10/2004 Corporates (79) North America 5 CreditTrade
Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 
(2014) 1/2007-4/2011 Financial Institutions (36), Sovereigns (15)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Banks
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
N/A Bloomberg, Datastream, Markit
Adler and Song (2010) 1998-1/2006 Sovereigns (16)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, Turkey, Venezuela, South 
Africa
1, 3, 5, 10 JP Morgan
Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes 
(2012) 1/2003-10/2010 Sovereigns (24)
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom
5 Datastream
Aizenman, Hutchinson, and 
Jinjarak (2013) 2005-2010 Sovereigns (50) Global 3, 5, 10 CMA Datavision
Alexopoulou, Andersson, and 
Georgescu (2009) 1/2004-10/2008 Corporates (29) Europe 5 Datastream
Almer, Heidorn, and Schmaltz 
(2008) 1/2001-12/2007 Financial Institutions (58) Global 0.5, 5 Markit
Alper, Forni, and Gerard (2013) 1/2008-10/2010 Sovereigns (18)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom., U.S.
5  Markit
Alter and Beyer (2013) 10/2009-7/2012 Sovereigns (11), Financial Institutions (9), Index (4)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Banks, Sovereign 
Sample includes Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom
5 CMA, Datastream, Bloomberg
Alter and Schüler (2012) 6/2007-5/2010 Sovereigns (7), Financial Institutions (14) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks
France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 5 Datastream
Ammer and Cai (2011) 2/2001-3/2005 Sovereigns (9)
Brazil, China, Colombia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela
5 Markit
Andritzky and Singh (2006) 7/2002-1/2003 Sovereigns (1) Brazil Latin America 1, 3, 5
Bloomberg, CreditTrade, 
Datastream, quotes directly 
provided by traders
Ang and Longstaff (2013) 5/2008-1/2011 Sovereigns (12), States (10)
States include California, Florida, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Texas
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, U.S.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Bloomberg
Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, 
and Vespro (2013) 12/2003-9/2010 Financial Institutions (32)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Banks Europe 5 Datastream
Antón, Mayordomo, and 
Rodriquez-Moreno (2015) 1/2008-10/2011 Sovereigns (11)
 For Robustness Checks: additional 
non-EMU Sovereign (39)
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
5 CMA
Arce, Mayordomo, and Peña 
(2013) 1/2004-2/2012 Sovereigns (11)
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
5 CMA
Aretz and Pope (2013) 2006 - 2008 Corporates (N/A) Global N/A Old Mutual Asset Management
Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff 
(2012) 3/2008-1/2009 Corporates (125) CDX index constituents North America 5 Bloomberg
Ashcraft and Santos (2009) Q1/2001-Q2/2005 Corporates (111/152) 111 firms in bond analysis; 152 firms in loan analysis N/A 5 Markit
Attinasi, Checherita, and Nickel 
(2009) 7/2007-3/2009 Sovereigns (11), Index (1)
Index Sample consists of the iTraxx 
Financials Senior
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
N/A Bloomberg
Augustin (2012) 1/2004-9/2010 Corporates (177) U.S. 5 CMA Datavision
Augustin (2013) 1/2001-2/2012 Sovereigns (44) Global 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 Markit
Augustin (2014) 5/2003-8/2010 Sovereigns (38) Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 Markit
Augustin, Boustanifar, 
Breckenfelder, and Schnitzler 
(2015)
2/2010-6/2010 Corporates (226) Global 5 CMA Datastream
Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko, 
and Huang (2002) 1/2008-2/2000 Corporates (323), Sovereigns (69) Global London Interdealer Broker
Avino, Conlon and Cotter (2016) 2004-2012 Financial Institutions (60)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Includes Banks, Diversified Banks, 
and Financial Services
Europe 5 Markit
Avino and Cotter (2014) 1/2004-3/2013 Financial Institutions (28), Sovereigns (6) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Europe 5
CMA, Datastream, Thomson 
Reuters
Baba and Inada (2009) 4/2004-12/2005 Financial Institutions (4) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Japan 5 Bloomberg
Badaoui, Cathcart, and El-Jahel 
(2013) 11/2005-9/2010 Sovereigns (9)
Chile, Korea, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, 
Brazil, Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey 5 Thomson Reuters
Badaoui, Cathcart, and El-Jahel 
(2015) 11/2005-9/2010 Sovereigns (3) Brazil, Turkey, Philippines 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Thomson Reuters
Bai and  Collin-Dufresne (2013) 1/2006-12/2011 Corporates (487) U.S. 5 Markit
Bao, Pan (2013) 1/2004-9/2010 Corporates (N/A) Sample Size Varies Each Year; Average of 303 Companies N/A 5 CMA
Batta (2011) 6/1997 - 5/2004 Corporates (242) N/A 5 CreditTrade
Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli 
(2014) 4/2010-3/2013 Countries (15) Global 5 Bloomberg
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Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz 
(2009) 4/2003-12/2004 Countries (10)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Entities in European Union Member 
States
Europe 3, 5, 7, 10 Lombard Risk
Bedendo, Cathcart, El-Jahel, and 
Evans (2013) 2/2004-1/2010 Corporates (249) U.S. 5 CMA Datavision
Bedendo and Colla (2015) 1/2008-12/2011 Corporates (118), Sovereigns (8)
Sovereign Sample Includes Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
Europe 5 Markit
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) 9/2008-9/2011 Sovereigns (31) Euro area (10), Other Advanced (7), Latin America EME (5), other EME (9) N/A Bloomberg
Belke and Gokus (2011) 1/2006-12/2009 Financial Institutions (4) U.S. 5 CMA, Datastream, Thomson Reuters
Berg and Streitz (2016) 7/2010-7/2012 Sovereigns (57) Worldwide N/A DTCC
Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, 
Ferguson, and Schranz (2005) 9/2000-8/2003 Corporates (69) U.S. 5 CIBC
Berndt, Jarrow, and Kang (2007) 7/1999-6/2005 Corporates (1521) 60 CDSs in the study are index products U.S. (929), Non-U.S. (532) 5 ValuSpread, Lombard Risk 
Berndt and Obreja (2010) 1/2003-12/2008 Corporates (150) Corporate Sample Restricted to Euro-denominated CDSs Europe 5 Bloomberg
Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2014) 1/2002-11/2006 Corporates (144)
Corporate Sample Includes 
Companies from 9 Different 
Industries
U.S. 5 Markit
Bertoni and Lugo (2014) 1/2003-10/2010 Corporates (1429) N/A 5 CMA, Datastream
Beyhaghi, Massoud, and 
Saunders (2016) 1/2003-12/2007 Corporates (202) U.S. 5 Markit
Bhanot and Guo (2012) 6/2008-9/2009 Corporates (35) U.S. N/A Bloomberg
Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, 
Merton, and Pelizzon (2013) 1/2001-3/2012 Sovereigns (17)
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherland, Portugal, Denmark, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway, 
Switzerland, U.S., Japan
5 Bloomberg
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh 
(2005) 1/2001-6/2002 Corporates (33)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Investment-Grade Companies Europe and U.S. 5 CreditTrade and JP Morgan
Blasques, Koopman, Lucas, and 
Schaumburg (2014) 2/2009-5/2014 Sovereigns (9)
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain N/A Bloomberg
Blau and Roseman (2014) 7/2011-9/2011 Sovereigns (31) Asia, Europe, U.S. 5 Bloomberg
Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen 
(2011) 1/2004-12/2008 Corporates (595) U.S. 5 CMA, Datastream
Brandstack (2010) 1/2000 - 6/2009 Corporates (160) Corporate Sample Restricted to Investment-Grade Companies U.S. 5 Bloomberg
Broto and Pérez-Quirós (2015) 1/2007-12/2012 Sovereigns (10)
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom, U.S.
10 CMA, Datastream, Thomson Reuters
Bühler and Trapp (2009) 6/2001-6/2007 Corporates (155) Corporate Sample Restricted to Euro-denominated CDSs N/A 5 Bloomberg
Byström (2016) 1/2004-1/2013 Corporates (22) Corporate Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs U.S. 1, 5, 10 Datastream
Caceres, Guzzo, and Segoviano 
(2010) 6/2005-1/2010 Sovereigns (10) Europe N/A Datastream
Calice, Chen, and Williams 
(2013) 8/2005-10/2010 Sovereigns (10)
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain
5, 10 CMA, Datastream, Thomson Reuters
Calice, Mio, Štěrba, and Vašíček 
(2015) 9/2007-2/2012 Sovereigns (5)
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Czech 
Republic, Poland 5, 10 Bloomberg
Callen, Livnat and Segal (2009) 2002-2005 Corporates (508) Corporate Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs N/A 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Lombard Risk
Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2010) 1/2001-12/2006 Corporates (301) Corporate Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs N/A
5 Markit
Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo, 
and Rigobon (2013) 11/2008-9/2011 Sovereigns (8)
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom 5 Datastream
Carboni and Carboni (2011) 9/2008-9/2010 Sovereigns (18) Europe (14), Asia-Pacific (3), U.S. (1) 5 CMA, Merrill Lynch 
Carr and Wu (2007) 1/2002-3/2005 Sovereigns (2) Mexico and Brazil 1, 3, 5 Bloomberg
Castellanos, Constantinou, and 
Ng (2015) 1/2007-2/2011 Corporates (20) U.S. 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 HSBC
Cetina, Paddrik, and Rajan 
(2016) 2013-2015 Corporates (3173-4297)
4,297 (as of 11/09/12), 3,651 (as of 
10/11/13), and 3,173 (as of 10/3/14) N/A N/A DTCC, Markit
Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri 
(2015) 1994-2012 Corporates (507) U.S. N/A
Markit, CMA Datavision, and 
Bloomberg
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) 3/2001-5/2003 Sovereigns (8) Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia, Turkey, Venezuela 5 CreditTrade, Deutsche Bank
Chen, Cheng, and Liu (2008) 4/2003-5/2004 Corporates (44) Global 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 JP Morgan
Chen, Cheng, and Wu (2012) 5/2003-10/2007 Corporates (310), Financial Institutions (90)
Number of reference entities 
reported are averages N/A 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 Investment Bank
Chen, Cummins, Viswanathan, 
and Weiss (2013) 2/2002-5/2008 Financial Institutions (33)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Includes Banks and Insurance 
Companies 
Global 5 Markit
Chen, Fabozzi, and Sverdlove 
(2010) 2/2000-4/2003 Corporates (584) U.S. 5 Creditex
Chernov, Gorbenko, and 
Makarov (2013) 1/2006-12/2011 Auctions (26) Global N/A Creditfixings
Chiaramonte and Casu (2010) 1/2005-3/2009 Financial Institutions (57) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks U.S. (7), Europe (43), Asia (7) 5 Datastream
Choi and Shachar (2014) 7/2007-6/2009 Financial Institutions (35) U.S. All DTCC, Markit
Christensen (2007) 3/2001-6/2005 Corporates (1) Corporate Sample Limited to Ford Motor Co. U.S. 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Markit
Cizel (2013) 1/2003-3/2011 Corporates (169) U.S. 5 CMA, Thomson Reuters
Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi 
(2016) 1/2001-12/2014 Corporates (5770)
Corporate Sample Includes 
Companies with and without CDS 
Trading
U.S. N/A DTCC, Markit
Conrad, Dittmar, and Hameed 
(2013) 7/2006-10/2010 Corporates (119) Global 5 CMA, Bloomberg
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Consiglio, Lotfi, and Zenios 
(2016) 10/2008-3/2016 Sovereigns (N/A) Europe 5 N/A
Coro, Dufour, and Varotto (2012 1/2006-7/2009 Corporates (135) Europe 5 GFI Group
Cossin and Lu (2004) 1/2002-7/2003 Corporates (39) Europe 5 Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley
Coudert and Gex (2010a) 1/2004 - 2/2007 Corporates (226) U.S. and Europe 5 Bloomberg, Datastream
Coudert and Gex (2010b) 2005 - 2009 Corporate (26), Sovereign (1) CDS Auction Data Global N/A Bloomberg, Creditex, ISDA, Markit
Coudert and Gex (2010d) 6/2004-12/2005 Corporates (120)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Entities in the CDX.NA.IG, iTraxx 
Europe Main, CDX.NA.HY, iTraxx 
Europe Crossover
U.S. 5 Bloomberg, Datastream
Coudert and Gex (2013) 1/2007-3/2010 Financial Institutions (17), Sovereigns (18) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Lithuania, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey
5 Bloomberg, Datastream
Daniels and Jensen (2005) 2000-2002 Corporates (72) U.S. 5 JP Morgan
Danis and Gamba (2016) 1994-2013 Sovereigns (N/A) U.S. N/A N/A
Das, Hanouna, and Sarin (2009) Q3/2001 - Q1/2005 Corporates (230)
Sample Restricted to USD-
denominated CDSs and excludes 
Financial Institutions
N/A 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 Bloomberg
Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak 
(2014) 8/2001-12/2008 Corporates (350) U.S. 5 Bloomberg
De Boyrie and Pavlova (2016) 1/2010-7/2014 Sovereigns (14)
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea,
Turkey, United States, Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Spain
5 Thomson Reuters
De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, 
Schepens, and Vander Vennet 
(2013)
2007-2012 Financial Institutions (40), Sovereigns (15) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks
Sovereigns are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom
5 Bloomberg, CMA
De Santis (2015) 9/2011-11/2013 Sovereigns (4) Italy, Spain, France, Germany 3, 5 Thomson Reuters
De Wit (2006) 1/2004-12/2005 Corporates (92), Sovereigns (11) Global 3, 5, 10 Bloomberg
Delatte, Gex, and López-
Villavicencio (2012) 1/2008-7/2010 Sovereigns (10)
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain
5 Datastream
Delis and Mylonidis (2011) 7/2004-5/2010 Sovereigns (4) Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 10 Bloomberg
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2013) 2001-2008
Financial Institutions (62 in CDS Sample 
and 1045 in Market-to-Book Sample)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Banks Worldwide 5 Markit
Di Cesare (2006) 8/2001-7/2005 Financial Institutions (42) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks U.S. (11), Europe (27), Japan (4) 5 Bloomberg
Di Cesare and Guazzarotti 
(2010) 1/2002-3/2009 Corporates (167) U.S. 5 Bloomberg
Díaz, Groba and Serrano (2010) 6/2006-3/2010 Corporates (85) Europe 1,3,5 Markit
Dieckmann and Plank (2011) 1/2007-4/2010 Sovereigns (18)
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
10 Markit
Dockner, Mayer, and Zechner 
(2013) 1/2006-2/2012 Sovereigns (10)
Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain
1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Bloomberg and Datastream
Dooley and Hutchinson (2009) 1/2007-2/2009 Sovereigns (14)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, China, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, 
Russia, South Africa, Turkey
5 N/A
Doshi (2011) 1/2001 - 3/2008 Corporates (46) Corporate Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs N/A 3, 5, 7 CRSP & Compustat
Doshi, Ericsson, Jacobs, and 
Turnbull (2013) 1/2011-12/2010 Corporates (95)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Entities in the DJ.CDX.NA.IG North America 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Markit
Doshi, Jacobs, and Zurita (2014) 1/2001-6/2012 Sovereigns (28)
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, 
Thailand, Czech Republic, Israel, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, 
United Kingdom
1, 5, 10 Markit
Dötz (2007) 1/2004-10/2006 Corporates (36) Corporate Sample Restricted to Entities in the iTraxx Europe Europe 5
Bloomberg, Thomson 
Financial Datastream
Düllmann and Sosinska (2007) 2/2002-6/2005 Financial Institutions (3) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Germany 3, 5, 10 Bloomberg
Dumontaux and Pop (2013) 1/2008-12/2008 Financial Institutions (85) U.S. 1, 5, 10 Thomson Reuters
Dunbar (2008) 1/2004 - 8/2006 Corporates (41) Corporate Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs U.S. 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Bloomberg, JP Morgan
Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic, 
and Sarno (2012) 7/2002-11/2008 Corporates (45)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Banks and Insurers and USD-
denominated CDSs
Global 5 Bloomberg
Eisenthal, Feldhutter, and Vig 
(2016) 2001-2015 Corporates (43) U.S. 3, 5, 10, 30 Markit
Ejsing and Lemke (2011) 1/2008 - 6/2009 Corporates (10)
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal
5 Datastream
Elkamhi, Jacobs, and Pan (2014) 10/2004-6/2007 Corporates (152) Corporate Sample Restricted to Entities in the CDX Index North America 1, 3, 5 Markit
Elkhami, Jacobs, Langlois,  and 
Ornthanalai (2012) 1/2002-3/2008 Corporates (87)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Entities in the CDX Index North America 5 Markit
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Erce (2015) 9/2005-1/2014 Financial Institutions (48), Sovereigns (10) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands,
Austria
5 Bloomberg, Datastream
Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo 
(2009) 1/1999-12/2002 Corporates (N/A) Global 5 CreditTrade
Eyssell, Fung, and Zhang (2013) 1/2001 - 12/2010 Sovereigns (1) Sovereign Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs China 5 Markit
Fabozzi, Cheng, and Chen (2007) 2/2000-4/2003 Corporates (562) Europe, U.S. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Creditex
Fender, Hayo, and Neuenkirch 
(2012) 4/2002-12/2011 Sovereigns (12)
Bulgaria, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, China, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
South Africa
5 Markit
Flannery, Houston, and Partnoy 
(2010) 1/2006-3/2009 Corporates (302) North America 5 Markit
Foley-Fisher (2010) 12/2007-3/2010 Sovereigns (10)
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, 
France, Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, 
Austria
5, 10 Bloomberg, CMA
Fontana (2011) 1/2006-8/2009 Corporates (37) U.S. 5 Thomson Financial Datastream
Fontana and Scheicher (2010) 1/2006-6/2010 Sovereigns (10) Sovereign Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain
10 Bloomberg
Forte and Lovreta (2015) 1/2002-12/2008 Corporates (92) Corporate Sample Excludes Financial Institutions Europe 5 GFI
Forte and Peña (2009) 9/2001-6/2003 Corporates (17) Corporate Sample Excludes Financial Institutions Europe (15), U.S. (2) 5 Banco Santander
Galariotis, Makrichoriti, and 
Spyrou (2015) 11/2008 - 1/2014 Sovereigns (10)
Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain
5 Bloomberg, Datastream International, DTCC
Galil and Soffer (2011) 1/2002-6/2006 Corporates (N/A) N/A 5 Markit
Gamba and Saretto (2013) 1/2002-12/2010 Corporates (276) U.S. 5 Bloomberg
Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) 9/2005-12/2009 Corporates (N/A) U.S. N/A "A major broker-dealer"
Gątarek and Wojtowicz (2015) 1/2004-6/2014 Sovereigns (16)
Poland, Netherlands, France, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Germany
5 CMA, Datastream, Thomson Reuters
Gerlach-Kristen (2013) 8/2005-8/2012 Financial Institutions (12), Sovereigns (6) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks
Sovereigns include Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain 5 Datastream
Getmansky, Girardi, and Lewis 
(2014) 1/2012-12/2012 Corporates & Sovereigns (20)
Sample Restricted to Contracts with 
U.S. Counterparties or Affiliated 
with U.S. Entities or U.S. Reference 
Entities
Global N/A DTCC
Giannikos, Guirguis, and Suen 
(2013) 1/2005-12/2008 Financial Institutions (39) U.S. 5 CMA
Giglio (2011) 1/2004 - 6/2010 Financial Institutions (15) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Europe, U.S. 5 Bloomberg, CMA
Glover and Richards-Shubik 
(2014) Q3/2005-Q3/2011 Sovereigns (13) Europe 5 CMA
González and Naranjo (2014) 7/2002 - 6/2012 Corporates (20) U.S.(12), Europe(8) 5 Bloomberg, Compustat and official regulatory filings
González, Gil, Agra, and 
Santomil (2012) 2006-2010 Corporates (134) Europe All Financial Statements
Greatrex (2009a) 1/2001-3/2006 Corporates (333) U.S. 5 Markit
Greatrex (2009b) 1/2001-4/2006 Corporates (476) U.S. 5 Markit
Greatrex and Rengifo (2012) 7/2006-12/2009 Corporates (348) U.S. 5 N/A
Groba, Lafuente, and Serrano 
(2013) 1/2008 - 7/2012 Sovereigns (14)
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, 
Sweden, United Kingdom
1, 3, 5 Datastream
Gross and Kok (2013) 1/2008-4/2013 Financial Institutions (41), Sovereigns (23) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, United Kingdom, U.S.
5 N/A
Gündüz and Kaya (2013) 1/2004-10/2011 Sovereign (10)
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain
10 Markit
Gündüz, Nasev, and Trapp 
(2013) 1/2009 - 6/2011 Corporates (70) Germany 5 DTCC
Gupta and Sundaram (2015b) 11/2006 - 12/2013 Auctions (73) U.S. N/A Creditex, Markit, DTCC
Gyntelberg, Hördahl, Ters, and 
Urban (2013) 10/2008-5/2011 Sovereigns (7)
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain 5, 10 CMA
Haas and Reynolds (2016) 1/2008-12/2013 Corporates (492) U.S. 5 GFI, Thomson Reuters
Haerri, Morkoetter, and 
Westerfeld (2015) 1/2009-2011 Companies (107) Europe 5 Bloomberg
Han and Zhou (2011) 8/2002-12/2009 Corporates (695) North America 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 Markit
Hasan, Liu, and Zhang (2015) 2001-2011 Financial Institutions (161) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Global 5 Markit
Hassan, Ngene, and Yu (2015) N/A-11/2013 Sovereigns (7) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey 5
Bloomberg, Datastream, 
Thomson Reuters
Heinz and Sun (2014) 1/2007-12/2012 Sovereigns (24)
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Netherlands
5 Bloomberg, Datastream
Helwege, Maurer, Sarkar, and 
Wang (2009) 1/2005-3/2009 Auctions (43) U.S. N/A ISDA, Creditex, Markit
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Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson 
(2015) 1/2001-12/2007 Corporates (783) U.S. 5 Datastream, DTCC, Markit
Hirtle (2009) Q2/1997-Q4/2006 Financial Institutions (57) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Call Reports
Houweling and Vorst (2005) 5/1999-1/2001 Corporates/Sovereigns (225)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
USD and Euro-denominated CDS; 
Quotes on Euro denominated CDS 
are only observed from 3/2000-
1/2001
Global 0.08, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10
creditex, CreditTrade, and 
quotes from commercial and 
investment banks
Huang and Cheng (2013) 1/2004 - 12/2010 Corporates (200) U.S. 5 Thomson Datastream
Huang and MacDonald (2014) 9/2005 - 1/2013 Sovereigns (26) Europe 5 Bloomberg, Datastream, Markit, CMA Datavision
Huang, Shen, and Chen (2012) 1/2007-12/2008 Financial Institutions (73)/Corporates (395) U.S. 5 Thomson Reuters, Datastream
Huang, Shen, and Chen (2014) 9/2005-5/2010 Sovereigns (47) Global 5 Thomson Reuters, Datastream
Hui and Chung (2011) 1/2006 - 4/2010 Sovereigns (11)
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
5 Bloomberg
Hui and Fong (2011) 12/2007 - 8/2011 Sovereigns (N/A) U.S. & Japan 0.08, 0.25, 5 Bloomberg
Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) 1/1998-5/2002 Corporates (1502), Sovereigns (60), Quasi-Sovereign (37)
North America (798), Europe (451), 
Asia (330), Other (20) 5 GFI
Imbierowicz and Wahrenburg 
(2009) 1/2001-12/2007 Corporates (472)
North America (185), Europe (153), 
Asia (133), Latin America (1) 5 Bloomberg, Datastream
Ismailescu and Phillips (2015) 1/2001-9/2010 Sovereigns (41) Global 5 Datastream, Markit, Thomson Reuters
Ivanov, Santos, and Vo (2016) 2005-2012 Corporates (62) N/A 5 Markit
Jacoby, Jiang, and Theocharides 
(2009) 1/2001-12/2008 Corporates (N/A) 
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
USD-denominated CDSs U.S. 5 Bloomberg, Markit
Jakovlev (2007) 1/2003 - 12/2006 Corporates (50) Corporate Sample Excludes Financial Institutions Europe 5 Datastream
Jankowitsch, Pullirsch, and Veža 
(2008) 1/2003-1/2005 Corporates (12) Europe All Thomson Reuters
Janus, Jinjarak, and Uruyos 
(2013) 2010-2011 Sovereigns (50) Global 5 CMA
Jorion and Zhang (2007) 1/2001-12/2004 Corporates (820) North America 5 Markit
Jorion and Zhang (2009) 1/2001-12/2005 Corporates (178) Corporate Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs North America 5 Markit
Kalbaska and Gątkowski (2012) 8/2005-9/2010 Sovereigns (9)
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
U.S.
5 Datastream
Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci 
(2016) Q1/2004-Q4/2010 Corporates (33), Sovereigns (17)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
USD- or Euro-denominated CDSs
Sovereigns are Austria, Australia, 
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the 
United States
5 CMA, Fitch
Kim (2013) 2/2001-3/2008 Corporates (136) U.S. 5 Markit
Kim, Salem, and Wu (2015) 11/2007-3/2012 Sovereigns (19)
Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Russia, Spain, South Africa, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, U.S.
5 Thomson Reuters
King (2009) 1/2008-1/2009 Financial Institutions (28) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Europe, U.S. 5 Markit
Kolokolova, Lin, and Poon 
(2015) 1/2001-5/2012 Corporates (356)
Corporate Sample Excludes 
Financial Institutions U.S. 1 Markit
Küçük (2010) 1/2004-5/2008 Sovereigns (21) Emerging Markets 5 CMA
Lando and Mortensen (2005) 7/1999-12/2003 Sovereigns (65), Other (1,425) Global 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Lombard Risk Systems Limited
Leccadito, Tunaru, and Urga 
(2015)
1/2001-11/2006 and 
6/2008-3/2013 Corporates (198-207 and 626-647)
Sample Sizes Depend on 
Methodology and Sample Period N/A
0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 
15, 20, 30 Markit
Lehnert and Neske (2006) 8/2000-8/2003 Corporates (100)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
entities in the TRAC-X Europe 
index
Europe 5 JP Morgan
Levy (2009) 1/2000-5/2008 Sovereigns (16)
Sovereign Sample Restricted to 
entities in the Lehman Brothers 
MSCI Emerging Market Index
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Philippine, Poland, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Venezuela
5 Bloomberg
Li and Huang (2011) 1/2004-7/2008 Sovereigns (20) Sovereign Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs
China, Korea, Czech Republic, Israel, 
Malaysia, Poland, Hungary, Russia, 
Mexico, Colombia, Egypt, Morocco, 
Peru, Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Turkey, Venezuela, Argentina, Pakistan
5 Thomson Reuters
Li and Tang (2016) 6/1997-4/2009 Corporates (N/A) Sample Sizes Depend on Methodology and Sample Period North America N/A CreditTrade, GFI
Li and Zinna (2014) 1/2008-12/2013 Financial Institutions (21) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Germany, France, Italy, Spain 5 CMA
Li, Zhang, and Kim (2011) 1/2001-12/2008 Corporates (145-288)
Sample Restricted to USD-
denominated CDSs and Sample Size 
Varies by Period
N/A 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 30 Markit
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis 
(2003) 3/2001-10/2002 Corporates (68) U.S. 5 Citigroup
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis 
(2005) 3/2001-10/2002 Corporates (68) U.S. 5 Citigroup
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and 
Singleton (2011) 10/2000-1/2010 Sovereigns (26) Global 5 Bloomberg
Manasse and Zavalloni (2013) 1/2006-3/2012 Sovereigns (15)
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium,
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Netherland, 
Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
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Marsh and Wagner (2012) 1/2004-10/2008 Corporates (193) U.S. 5 Anonymous Credit-Oriented Hedge Fund
Martin and Roychowdhury 
(2015) 1/2002-12/2009 Corporates (529)
Corporate Sample Excludes 
Financial Institutions U.S. N/A CMA
Massa and Zhang (2012) 1/2001-12/2009 Corporates (N/A) 158122 bond-month observations U.S. 5 Markit
Mayordomo and Peña (2014) 11/2005-4/2011 Corporates (38) Corporate Sample Excludes Financial Institutions Europe 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 GFI
Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno, 
and Peña (2014) 1/2005-3/2012 Corporates (401)
Corporate Sample Excludes 
Financial Institutions Global 5 CMA
Meine, Supper, and Weiβ (2015) 1/2004-9/2010 Corporates (228) U.S. 5 CMA
Micu, Remolona, and Wooldridge
(2006) 1/2001-3/2005 Corporates (439) U.S. (246), Europe (114), Japan (79) 5 Markit
Minton, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2009) 1/1999-12/2005 Financial Institutions (395)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Banks All FR Y-9C filings
Morkoetter, Pleus, and 
Westerfeld (2012) 9/2004-12/2009 Reference (198) Europe, North America 5 Bloomberg
Narayanan and Uzmanoglu 
(2014) 10/2008-12/2012 Corporates (169) U.S. All CMA, DTCC, Markit
Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and 
Mahanti (2011) 7/2002-6/2006 Corporates (1,167) U.S. All CMA, GFI
Ni and Pan (2011) 8/2008-11/2016 Corporates (395) N/A N/A CMA
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) 6/1998-6/2006 Financial Institutions (38) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks
Europe (9), North-America (25), Asia 
(2), Australia (2) N/A US FDIC Call Reports
Norden (2014) 1/2000-12/2005 Corporates (95) Europe, U.S. 5 CreditTrade and anonymous European bank
Norden and Weber (2004) 7/1998-12/2002 Corporates (90) Europe (58), U.S. (24), Asia (8) 5 Anonymous European Bank
Norden and Weber (2009) 7/1998-12/2002 Corporates (58) Europe (35), U.S. (20), Asia (3) 5 CreditTrade and anonymous European bank
Norden and Weber (2012) 1/2001-12/2008 Financial Institutions (20) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Europe 5 Bloomberg, CreditTrade
Norden, Buston, and Wagner 
(2014) 1/1997-12/2009 Financial Institutions (1046)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Banks (918 Banks had 
CDS Positions)
All Call Reports
Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) 10/2008-12/2012 Corporates (123) U.S. 1-30 DTCC, Markit
Oh and Patton (2015) 1/2006-4/2012 Corporates (100)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Entities in the CDX.NA.IG Series 
17
5 Markit
Ohno (2013) 7/2007-10/2011 Financial Institutions (31), Sovereigns (8)
Sovereigns are Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal,
Greece
N/A Markit
O'Kane (2012) 1/2008-9/2011 Sovereigns (7) Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Germany 5 Bloomberg
Palmgren and Tamule (2009) 1989-2007 Corporates (7) U.S. 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Research Insight
Pan and Singleton (2008) 3/2001-8/2006 Sovereigns (3) Mexico, Turkey, Korea 1 ,2, 3, 5, 10 CreditTrade
Pavlova and De Boyrie (2015) 9/2008-8/2013 Sovereigns (10)
Sovereign Sample Restricted to 
Entities in the Markit iTraxx SovX 
Asia Pacific Index
Australia, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, China, Indonesia, Korea, 
Philippines, Vietnam
5 Datastream
Peltonen, Scheicher, and 
Vuillemey (2014) 12/30/2011
Financial Institutions (602), Sovereigns 
(40)
Sovereign Sample Includes 18 G20 
Sovereigns and 22 European Sovereigns 5 DTCC
Peristiani and Savino (2011) 2001-2008 Corporates (N/A) U.S. N/A Bloomberg, DTCC, Markit
Pires, Pereira, and Martins (2015) 8/2002-2/2007 Corporates (260) Europe, U.S. 5 Bloomberg
Pu and Zhang (2012a) 1/2008-12/2010 Sovereigns (10)
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Spain
5 Bloomberg
Pu and Zhang (2012b) 10/2000-4/2011 Sovereigns (54) Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East, South America 5 Bloomberg
Pu, Wang, and Wu (2011) 1/2001-12/2007 Corporates (523) Corporate Sample Restricted to USD-denominated CDSs U.S. 5 Markit
Qiu and Yu (2012) 2001-2008 Corporates (732) North America 5 Markit
Raunig and Scheicher (2011) 3/2003-10/2006 Corporations (86)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Entities in the iTraxx Europe and 
iTraxx Crossover
Europe N/A N/A
Remolona, Scatigna, and Wu 
(2008) 1/2002-5/2006 Sovereigns (24)
Latin America, Central and Eastern 
Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa 5 Markit
Revoltella, Mucci, and Mihaljek 
(2010) 2000-2009 Sovereigns (14)
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Turkey, 
Serbia, Kazakhstan, Russia
5 Bloomberg
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña 
(2013) 1/2004-11/2009 Corporates (33), Index (2)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Banks, Index Sample Includes CDX 
IG 5y and iTraxx Europe 5y
Western Europe (20), U.S. (13) 5 Datastream, Markit, Thomson Reuters
Salomao (2014) 1/2008-3/2011 Sovereigns (1) Greece 5 Datastream
Sambalaibat (2014) 1/2004-1/2012 Sovereigns (65) N/A 5 CMA, DTCC
Santamaría, Biscarri, and Benito 
(2014) 1/2008-6/2012 Sovereigns (13)
Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Ireland, 
United Kingdom., Greece, Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland, 
Denmark
5 CMA
Sapriza, Zhao, and Zhou (2009) 10/2000-12/2007 Sovereigns (13)
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Philippines
5 Bloomberg
Saretto and Tookes (2013) 2002-2010 Corporates (122) U.S. N/A Bloomberg
Schlӓfer and Uhrig-Homburg 
(2014) 1/2001-12/2007 Corporates (17)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
USD-denominated CDSs and 
Excludes Financial Institutions
U.S. 5 Markit
Schneider, Sӧgner, and Veža 
(2010) 1/2/2001-5/30/2008 Corporates (278) U.S. 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 Markit
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Sgherri and Zoli (2009) 1/2003-3/2009 Sovereigns (11)
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
10 Datastream
Shan, Tang, and Winton (2014) 6/1997 - 4/2009 Corporates (921) U.S. N/A CreditTrade, GFI, Markit
Shan, Tang, and Yan (2014) 6/1997 - 4/2009 Financial Institutions (43) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks U.S. N/A FR Y-9C filings, OCC reports
Shao and Yeager (2007) 1/1997-12/2005 Financial Institutions (2,246)
Financial Institutions Sample 
Restricted to Bank Holding 
Companies; Maximum Sample Size 
is Shown
U.S. All FR Y-9C filings
Shim and Zhu (2014) 1/2003-6/2009 Corporates (116) Hong Kong, SAR, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore 5 Markit
Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and 
Zhang (2011) 2001-2008 Corporates (710) U.S. 5 Markit
Shoesmith (2014) 4/2007-3/2012 Sovereigns (8) France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Portugal N/A Bloomberg
Silva, Vieira, and Vieira (2016) 1/2008-12/2015 Sovereigns (84) Global 3, 5, 7, 10 Bloomberg, DTCC, Thomson Reuters
Skinner and Townend (2002) 9/1997-2/1999 Sovereigns (29) Global N/A CDS trade tickets
Song (2013) 2006-2008 Financial Institutions (40) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks U.S. All FR Y-9C filings
Streitz (2016) 2000-2010 Corporates (327) U.S. All Bloomberg, CMA
Sturm (2013/14) 1/2004-9/2010 Financial Institutions (33) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks Europe 5 CMA
Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 
(2014) 6/1997-4/2009 Corporates (901) North America All CreditTrade, GFI, Markit
Tang and Yan (2007) 6/1997-3/2006 Corporates (120) Sample Size is Averaged U.S. 5 CreditTrade
Tang and Yan (2010) 6/1997-11/2006 Corporates (176) U.S. 5 CreditTrade, GFI
Trujillo-Ponce, Samaniego-
Medina, and Cardone-Riportella 
(2014)
2002-2009 Corporates (51)
Corporate Sample Restricted to 
Entities in the FTSEuroFirst 100 
Index
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, United Kingdom All Markit
Trutwein and Schierek (2011) 1/2007-12/2008 Financial Institutions (13) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks U.S. 5 Markit
Trutwein, Ramchander, and 
Schiereck (2011) 4/2005-3/2008 Corporates (295) North America 5 Markit
Veronesi and Zingales (2010) 1/2007-10/2008 Financial Institutions (9) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks U.S. 5 Datastream
Wang and Moore (2012) 1/2007-12/2009 Sovereigns (38) Global 5, 7 Datastream
Yang and Zhou (2013) 1/2007-9/2008 Financial Institutions (43)
U.S., United Kingdom, Germany, 
Switzerland, France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Portugal
5 Bloomberg, CMA
Yeh (2012) 2001-2008 Corporates (N/A) North America 5 Markit
Zareei (2015) 1/2010-12/2012 Corporates (50) U.S. N/A N/A
Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) 1/2001-12/2003 Corporates (307) U.S. 5 Markit
Zhu (2006) 1/1999-12/2002 Financial Institutions (8), Corporates (16) Financial Institutions Sample Restricted to Banks U.S. (19), Europe (3), Asia (2) 5 CreditTrade
Zinna (2013) 4/2003-11/2007 Sovereigns (8) Brazil, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Turkey 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 JP Morgan
Notes:
(a) The numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of reference entities within a particular sample. For studies which analyze the impact of CDS usage on certain corporations, the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of 
corporations in the respective samples. E.g., for studies which analyze the impact of CDS usage on bank lending behavior, the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of banks in the samples.
(b) The numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of reference entities per region in studies that analyze more than one region.
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